

## Sect. 174.

**A** Paier un fine pur le mariage, &c.

[7] 15. E. 3. tit. Aid. 33. Bracton, lib. 2. fo. 26. Mirror, ca. 2. sect. 18.

See more of this after in this chapter. sect. 194. (Dr. & Stud. 66. b.)

[r] Fleta lib. 3. cap. 13. Mir. cap. 2. sect. 18.

[q] And this villeine and servile tenure is called in old bookes *marcbetum*, or *merchet*. *Marchetum verò pro filia dare non competit libero homini, inter alia, propter liberi sanguinis privilegium, &c.* And this is true *de communi jure, sed minus et conventio vincunt legem*. And as Littleton here saith, it is the folly of such a freeman to take such manners, lands or tenements, to hold of the lord by such bondage. And yet this doth not make such a freeman a villeine, [r] *Quia hujusmodi præstationes sunt ratione tenementi, & non ratione personæ in donatione comprehensæ & reservatæ; non enim unum & idem est, sed longe aliud, tenere libere, et per liberum servitium, &c.* for the signification of this word, vide sect. 194. 74. 441.

**M**ES si ascun franke home

*voile prender ascun terres ou tenements, a tener de son seignior per tiel villein service, s. a payer un fine a luy (1) pur le mariage de ses fits ou files, donque il paiera tiel fine pur le mariage; & nient obstant, que il est le follie de tiel frank home de prender en tiel forme terres ou tenements a tener de le seignior per tiel bondage, uncore ceo ne fait le franke home villeine (2).*

**B**UT if a free man wil take any lands or tenements, to hold of his lord by such villeine service, viz. to pay a fine to him for the marriage of his sonnes or daughters, then he shall pay such fine for the mariage; and notwithstanding, though it be the folly of such free man to take in such forme lands or tenements to hold of the lord by such bondage, yet this maketh not the free man a villeine.

## Sect. 175.

**C**hesun villeine ou est villein per title de prescription, &c.

(2. Ro. Abr. 732.) Lib. Rub. cap. 76, 77. Bracton, lib. 1. cap. 6. Bract. fol. 77.

(Post 120. a.)

[f] Bract. lib. 1. cap. 6. Fleta lib. 1. cap. 3. 8. Ass. p. 13. 11. Ass. 12. 24. Ass. 1. 73. Ass. 1. 17. E. 3. 78, 79. 27. E. 3. 89. 18. E. 4. 25. 27. H. 8. 7. b. Le statute de 17. E. 3. 17.

[2] 17. E. 3. 23. 11. H. 4. 26. 37. H. 6. 21. Dier Mich 7. & 8. Eliz. 242. Pl. Com. 79. &c.

[u] Glanvil lib. 9. cap. 8. Bracton lib. 3. fo. 156. Britton fol. 121.

[x] 6. Co. 11. & 12. in Gentleman's case.

(3. Inst. 71. F. N. B. 138. Post 128. 260. a. 4. Co. 71. a. 8. Co. 38. 1. Rol. Abr. 527. 2 Rol. Abr. 862, 863. Plow. 491. b. 1. Sid. 94. 2. Rol. Abr. 573. 576. 1. Sid. 314.)

Every villeine is, either by prescription, or confession. *Servi autem nascuntur, aut fiunt.* By prescription, either regardant to a mannor, &c. or in grosse. In gros either by prescription, or by granting away a villeine that is regardant, or by confession. [f] *Fit etiam servus liber homo per confessionem in curia regis facta* (3).

*En court de record.*

Record is derived of the Latine word *recordor*, that is to keepe in minde as the poet saith, *Si rite audita recordor*. And therefore a record or inrolment is a memoriall or monument of so high a nature, [1] as it importeth in it selfe such an absolute verity, as if it be pleaded (4), that there is no such record, it shall not receive any triall by witnesse, jury, or otherwise, but onely by itselfe. [u] And every court of record is the king's court, albeit another may have the profit, wherein, if the judges doe erre, a writ of error doth lye. [x] But the county court, the hundred court, the court baron, and such like are no courts of record; and therefore the proceedings therein may be denyed, and tried by jury, and upon their judgements a writ of error lyeth not, but a writ of false judgement

to apprentices in the *seafaring* way; whose wages and prize money as seamen, though earned whilst in another service, have been recovered by those to whom they were bound. But the principle, which governs them, seems to apply to apprentices and servants in general. See 6. Mod. 69. 12. Mod. 415. Comberb. 450. 1. Stra. 582. 1. Barnard. Rep. 312. 1. Vef. 48. 83. Some of the cases go so far, as to give the master a right to the wages or earnings, whether the service is performed by the apprentice *with or without the master's licence*; and even though the earnings accrue in a trade or service different from that to which the apprentice is bound. 6. Mod. 69. 12. Mod. 83. 1. Vef. 83. But though the rule should be so large in respect to apprentices, it may be doubted, whether it is equally so in the case of other servants. There is a case of the reign of James the first, in which a judgement against the master appears to be principally founded on the want of his consent and privity to the retainer. Cro. Jam. 653. 2. Rol. Rep. 269. Independently too of authority, the master's proper remedy in all cases, except those in which the servant is intentionally employed on his master's account, seems to be an action, either against the employer for loss of service if he knew of the first retainer, or against the servant himself for breach of his contract; such a case rather importing the master's right to damages for injury sustained by the consequences of the second retainer, than a right to the profits accruing from it. We have already mentioned, that most of the cases, which occur in the books, relate to the apprentices of watermen and seafaring persons. It may therefore be proper to add, that in 31. Geo. 2. c. 10. one object of which is to regulate the pay of seamen in the royal navy, there is a provision, that in particular cases the master shall not be intitled to the wages of his apprentice, See sect. 10. Note also the 17th. section in the 2. & 3. Anne c. 6. from which it seems, as if the framers of that law doubted, whether the master of an apprentice, who goes into the royal navy, would be intitled to his wages without an express provision.—(1) This section was first introduced in Redman's edition.—(2) The cause meant is, that the 27. of H. 8. transfers uses into possession. See lord Coke's note on sect. 115. fol. 84. b.

(3) In Roh. the words *pur son mariage ou* come in here.—(4) This section in L. and M. stands the last in the chapter of Villenage.—(5) From our law's thus permitting a person to be a villein by *acknowledgment* in a court of record, some have argued, that it is a legal mode of creating personal bondage; with a view to prove, that there is not any thing so repugnant in our law to domestic slavery, as is generally imagined, and thence to lay a foundation for more easily inferring the lawfulness of importing slavery from our colonies. But in another place we have had occasion to object to this way of considering the acknowledgment, and to explain, why it should be deemed merely a confession of that immemorial antiquity in the villein's slavery, which was otherwise necessary to be proved. See the editor's *Argument in the Case of Somerset a Negro*, 60 to 65. and Hob. 99.—(6) The words *if it be pleaded are material*; for in evidence before a jury the copy of a record will be a sufficient proof of its existence and contents. See Law of Nif. Pri. 226. ed. 1775. Com. Dig. tit. *Certiorari*.

we must apprise the reader, that there is an expression of lord chief justice Vaughan in his reports, which conveys or seems to convey

ment; for that they are no courts of record, because they cannot hold plea of debt or trespassse, (14. H. 8. 15. 1. Rol. Abr. 543.) if the debt or damages doe amount to forty shillings, or of any trespassse *vi & armis* (1).

*Monumenta, quæ nos recorda vocamus, sunt veritatis & vetustatis vestigia.*

## Sect. 176.

*MES si frank home ad divers issues, & puis il confesse luy meme destre villein a un auter en court de record; uncore les issues, que il avera devant le confession sont franks, mes les issues, que il avera apres le confession, seront villeines.*

**B**UT if a freeman hath divers issues, and afterwards he confesseth himselfe to be a villaine to another in a court of record; yet those issues, which he hath before the confession are free, but the issues, which he shall have after the confession, shall be villaines.

This is so evident as it needeth no explication.

## Sect. 177.

*ITEM, si le vil- lein purchase terre, et alien la terre a un auter devant que le seignior enter, donques le seignior ne poit enter; car il sera adjudge son follie, que il n'entra pas, quant la terre fuit en le maine le villein. Et issint est dez biens. Si le villeine achate biens, et eux vend ou done a un auter, devant que le seignior seifist les biens, adonques le seignior ne poit eux seifer. Mes si le seignior, devant ascun tiel vender ou done, vient deins la ville la lou tiels biens sont, et la, overtment enter les vicines, claima les biens, et seifist parcel*

**A**L SO, if a villaine purchase land, and alien the land to another before that the lord enter, then the lord cannot enter; for it shall be adjudged his folly, that he did not enter, when the land was in the hands of the villaine. And so it is of goods. If the villaine buy goods, and fell or give them to another, before the lord seifeth them, then the lord may not seife the same. But if the lord, before any such sale or gift, cometh into the towne where such goods be, and there, openly amongst the neighbors, claime the goods, and seife part of the goods, in the name of seifin

**I**N this case before the lord doth enter, hee hath neither *jus in re nec jus ad rem*, but onely a possibilitie of an estate, which estate he must gaine by his entry; and therefore if the villaine doth by way of prevention alien before the lord doth enter, the lord is barred of the possibility, which he had to the land, for ever. [a] *Si autem servus vendiderit feodum, quod sibi & hæredibus perquisiverit, antequam dominus seifinam inde ceperit, valet donatio, et dominus sibi ipse imputet, quod tantum expectavit.* But [b] if the villaine of the king purchaseth land, and alieneth, before the king (upon an office found for him) doth enter, yet the king after office found shall have the land; *quia nullum tempus occurrit regi*, as Littleton himselfe saith in the next section (2). And yet, after office found, the king shall not have the meane profits; because the title is by the seifure.

(Dr. & Stud. 140. 2. Rol. Abr. 735.)

[a] Fleta lib. 3. ca. 13. Britton fol. 98. a. 19. E. 2. Dower 17.

[b] 35. E. 3. tit. Villenage 22; 9. H. 6. 21. per Babington, 12. H. 7. 12.

(8. Co. 170. 7. Co. 28. 2. Rol. Abr. 734.)

*Purchase terre.*

The like law is of seigniories, advowsons, reversiones, remainders, rents, commons certaine and such like certaine inheritances, wherain the villaine hath

(1) See post 260. a.—(2) See post 119. a.

*Continuation of notes to 115. a. from 117. a.*

(15) It having been denied by persons of considerable respect, that such a prescription is good, we shall give some account of the state of the arguments for and against it.—The general ground, on which lord Coke asserts the prescription to be lawful, is, first, that a statute, though expressed in negative words, yet, if it is a mere affirmance or declaration of the common law, may be prescribed against; and secondly, that the statute against cutting down trees in a forest without view of the forester, are negative statutes of this sort. As to the first of these propositions, we have endeavoured to evince it's reasonableness in a former note; in which also the reader is referred to the various authorities on the subject, for the purpose of shewing, that they greatly preponderate in favour of lord Coke. See note 13. In respect to the second proposition, the authorities not only support it, but are so uniform, that we do not find it any where controverted. See note 14. The particular argument for the prescription consists principally of various allowances of it at *eyes of the forest*, and of two express adjudications of the point on demurrers in courts of common law. The cited instances of allowances are not few; for, besides the three cases of *Henry de Percy Thomas lord Wake of Liddel* and *Gilbert de Aiton* here mentioned by lord Coke, he in his *fourth Institute* cites another, which was in the 8th. of Edward the third on a claim by *Thomas Pickering* and *Margaret his wife*. See 4. Inst. 297. The cases at common law are *Sellinger's*, and *lord Hatton's*. The former is stated by lord Coke to have been before the Exchequer in the time of Elizabeth, and to have been adjudged upon argument and long advisement; and probably is the same case he here cites as one of the 16th. of Elizabeth. See 4. Inst. 297. and 12. Co. 22. The latter is taken notice of by judge Croke, who reports lord Coke to have cited it as a judgment on demurrer in the King's Bench. Cro. Jam. 155. To these authorities we may add an extrajudicial opinion of all the judges, on being consulted by James the first; the words of which seem to imply, that a custom for cutting wood in the king's forests without view of the forester may be good. See the third resolution of the judges in 4. Inst. 299. It is said too, that in a case of the 19. of E. 1. between the prebend of *Chichester* and the earl of *Arundel*, issue was joined on such a custom; from which it may be inferred, that in those ancient times the goodness of the custom was not doubted. W. Jo. 290.—On the other hand lord Lovelace's case, whose claim came before an eye in the 8th of Charles the first, is a direct decision against the allowance of a prescription for cutting wood without view of the forester; and in that case lord chief justice Richardson, when this part of the Commentary upon Littleton was referred to, denied lord Coke's general doctrine about negative statutes declaratory of the common law. W. Jo. 270. Two other adjudications, to the like effect, appear to have been made at eyes in the same reign; one of which was on a claim by the tenants of the manor of *Bray*, who, in proof of the custom they alledged, offered in evidence an inquisition of the reign of Edward the second. W. Jo. 289, 290, 348. The principle, on which Noy attorney-general argued in these cases, was a general one, that negative statutes, such as those which occur against cutting wood in the king's forest without licence, cannot be controuled by custom or prescription. To prove this he appealed to a case from a year-book of Henry the sixth;

convey a different opinion; for, speaking of the guardian under the statute of Charles the second, he says, *this new guardian hath*

hath any estate or interest. If the villaine purchase land, either in fee simple, fee taile, or for life, if the villaine doth alien before the lord doth enter, hee doth prevent the lord. But yet the issue of the villaine shall recover the land entailed in a formedon, and then the lord may enter.

*Alien la terre.* Alien commeth of the verbe *alienare*, id est, *alienum facere*, vel *ex nostro dominio in alienum transferre*, sive *rem aliquam in dominium alterius transferre*. If a freeman hath issue, and afterward by confession becommeth bond, and purchase lands in fee, and, before the lord enter, he dieth seised, and the land descends to his issue which is free; in this case the lord shall not enter upon the heire, and yet this is a descent and no alienation. The like law it is, if the land so purchased by the villaine doth escheate to the lord of the fee before any entry made by the lord of the villaine: so as the act of the law, that is, the descent or escheat may as well prevent the lord of his entry, as the act of the party by alienation.

If a villaine be disseised before the lord doth enter, the lord may enter into the land in the name of the villaine, and thereby gaine the inheritance of the land; but if there be a descent cast, so as the entry of the villaine be taken away, then the villaine must recontinue the estate of the land by judgement and execution, before the lord of the villaine can enter. And this word alien doth not onely extend to alienations of land in deed, but also to alienations in law; as if the villaine purchase land and dyeth without heire, and the land escheate, or if there be a recovery against the villaine in a *cessavit* or the like.

(2. Rol. Abr. 732. 5. Co. 109.  
2. Rol. Abr. 58. Cro. Eliz. 386.)

*Et issint est des biens, &c.* *Biens, bona*, includes all chattels, as well real as personall. *Chattels* is a French word, and signifies goods, which by a word of art wee call *catalla*. Now goods, or chattels, are either personall or reall. Personall, as horse and other beasts, householdstuffs, bowes, weapons, and such like, called personall, because for the most part they belong to the person of a man, or else for that they are to be recovered by personall actions. Reall, because they concerne the reality, as tearmes for years of lands or tenements, wardships, the interest of tenant by statute staple, by statute merchant, by elegit and such like.

*Bona dividuntur in mobilia & immobilia. Mobilia rursus dividuntur in ea, quae se movent, & quae ab aliis moventur.* But, by the common law, no estate of inheritance or freehold is comprehended under these words *bona* or *catalla* (3). And it is to be observed, that as the title of the lord to his villaine's lands beginneth by his entry, so his title to the goods beginneth by the seisure of them. And here againe it is to be observed, that where our author, in this branch concerning goods, useth these words (sell or give) that the same extendeth as well to gifts in law, as gifts in deed. And therefore if a neite hath goods, and taketh baron, by this gift in law by force of the marriage, the lord is barred. And so it is if a villaine make his executors and dieth, by this gift in law the lord is barred, as shall be said hereafter.

3. H. 4. 15. 46. E. 3. Barre  
217. Doct. and Stud. cap. 43. fol.  
139. 22. E. 3. 6. Baldwin  
Frenil's case.  
(Ante 88. Post. 145. b.)

*Et claime les biens et seist parcel des biens.* For a claime onely of the goods of the villaine is not sufficient in law, but he must seise some part in the name of all the residue, as here it appeareth; or that the goods be within the view of the lord, for the claime and his view amount to a seisure, as the claime of a ward being present by word is a sufficient seisure, albeit the gardian layeth no hands of him. See hereafter sect. 321. And so note a diversity betweene a claime of lands or tenements, and goods. [c] In an action of trespass or detainue brought by the villaine, a release made to the defendant by the lord is a good barre; for that amounts to a seisure and grant. If the villaine doth buy goods and make his executors, and dieth before the lord doth seize them, the executors shall detainue them against the lord of the villaine.

[c] 18. H. 6. 23. b. per Ascough.  
3. H. 4. 16. 46. E. 3. Barre 217.

*Ad ou aver poit, &c.* Here (&c.) doth imply an excellent point of learning; for that such a claime doth not only vest the goods, which the villaine then hath, but also which he after that shall acquire and get (4). But otherwise it is of lands of freehold or inheritance; for there such a generall entry or claime extends only to the lands the villaine hath at that

time sixth; which, he considered as directly in point, and as a judgment that title of timber cannot be prescribed for against the statute of *sylva caedua*, though only an *affirmance* of the old law, merely because the statute is *negative*. See W. Jo. 270. 290. and 25. E. 3. c. 3. The year book reported to have been cited by Noy is the 20th. of Hen. 6. but we do not meet with any case of that year relative to the statute of *sylva caedua*, and therefore the 9. of Hen. 6. 56. which is to the point, was probably meant; though if it was, it contains no judgment, but only a query, which Brooke, in abridging the case, by mistake calls the reporter's opinion. Bro. *Prescription* 2. Noy also cited the earl of Arundel's case from a record of the 16. of Edward the second, as a decision, that a prescription to cut wood against the forest statutes was not good. W. Jo. 270. As to the cases urged against him, he observed, that the case between the *prebend of Chichester* and the *earl of Arundel* was of a *chace*, and the statutes only related to *forests*; that in *Percy's* case the forest was not in the hands of the crown when the statutes were made; and that the case of the reign of Elizabeth, which lord Coke reports from lord Popham, was of a *chace*, of which the king was seised in right of his duchy of Lancaster. W. Jo. 290, 291. It is observable however, that Mr. Noy leaves the two cases of *lord Wake* and *Gilbert de Aclais* wholly unanswered, though they were cited against him. As to the other authorities we have stated for a prescription against the forest statutes, or those against *negative* statutes in general being declaratory, they do not appear to have been urged against Mr. Noy. But besides the authorities relied on by Noy, there is one more; for judge Croke, after taking notice of the judgment for the prescription in *lord Hutton's* case, reports Popham to have said, that it was adjudged otherwise about the same time in the *Exchequer*. Cro. Jam. 155. However this is irreconcilable with lord Coke's representation of the judgment of the *Exchequer* both here and elsewhere, unless we suppose him to mean a different case.—Having thus brought together and digested, what we found scattered in the books on this much litigated subject, we shall dismiss it, leaving the reader to his own judgment, with this single remark. If the greater number of authorities, which, unless the cases we have referred to are mislaid or misunderstood, is in favour of the prescription, shall be thought to be of equal or nearly of equal weight with the more modern decisions on the other side; then probably, as the subject strikes us, the good sense of lord Coke's distinction as to negative statutes, together with a consideration of the multiplicity of books, which favour his general doctrine, will so strongly turn the scale in this particular instance of forest-law, as scarce to leave any doubt. Indeed it was for the sake of explaining, how far the general doctrine may be affected by the decision on this point of forest law, that we have detained the reader so long upon it.

(1) The words, *que le villein ad ou aver poit*, not in L. & M. or Rob.—(2) Instead of *les biens* it is *ley* in L. & M. and Rob.—(3) See farther us to chattels, Bro. Abr. tit. *Chattels*, Com. Dig. tit. *Biens* and *Assets*, and Vin. tit. *Executors* U—Y—Z.—(4) *Contra*, as to the goods afterwards acquired, Dr. and Stud. diul. 2. chap. 4.

Continuation of notes to 113. a. from 114. b.

—Lord Coke next takes for granted, that if there is a devise to A. for life, and that after his decease the land shall be sold by the

testator's  
hath the custody, not only of the lands descended or left by the father, but of lands and goods any way acquired or purchased by the infant,  
which

time, and not to any other which he shall purchase after, as by our author in this section may justly be collected.

Sect. 178.

**MES** si le roy ad un villein, que purchase terre, & alien devant que le roy entra; uncore le roy poit enter, en que maines que la terre deviendra. Ou si le villein achata biens, & eux vendist devant que le roy seifist les biens; uncore le roy poit seifer les biens, en que maines que les biens sont. Quia nullum tempus occurrit regi.

**BUT** if the king hath a villeine, who purchases land, and alien it before the king enter; yet the king may enter, into whose hands soever the land shal come. Or if the villeine buyeth goods, and sell them before that the king seizeth them; yet the king may seize these goods, in whose hands soever they be. Because nullum tempus occurrit regi (1).

**SI** le roy ad villein, &c. This is evident upon that which hath beene said before. Vide sect. 125. Vide Stamford Præf. f. 32. c.

*Ou si tiel villeine achata biens, &c.* If the king's villeine acquire any goods or chattels, the property of them is in the king before any seifure or office; and it is well said of an ancient author, [d] *Al roy, quant al droit de la corone ou a franch estate, ne poct nul temps occurre; and another [e] speaking in the person of the king saith, Nul temps nest limit quant a mes droits.* [d] Mirror cap. 3. [e] Britton fol. 88. Bract. lib. 1. quæ res dari possint.

Sect. 179.

**ITEM** si home lessa certaine terre a un auter per terme de vie, savant le reversion a luy, & un villein purchase del lessor le reversion; en cest cas il semble, que le seignior del villeine poit maintenant vener a la terre, & claime le reversion come le seignior le dit villeine, & per cel claime le reversion est maintenant en luy. Car en auter forme il ne poit vener a le reversion. Car il ne poit enter sur le tenant a terme de vie. Et sil doit demurrer, tanque apres le mort le tenant a terme

**ALSO** if a man let certain land to another for terme of life, saving to himselfe the reversion, and a villeine purchase of the lessor thereversion; in this case it seemeth, that the lord of the villeine may presently come to the land, and claime the reversion as the lord of the said villeine, and by this claime the reversion is forthwith in him. For in other forme or manner he cannot come to the reversion. For he cannot enter upon the tenant for life. And if he should stay untill after the death of the tenant for

**PUIT** main tenant vener a la terre.

For he cannot claime the reversion but upon the land, and he by his coming upon the land for that purpose is no trespassor; because the law giveth him power to claim the reversion, lest he should be prevented, and claime he cannot unless he commeth to the land. So likewise if the villeine purchase a feignory, rent, common, or any other freehold or inheritance, out of any lands or tenements of another, the

testator's executors, they cannot sell the reversion, but must wait till the death of the wife; and the case cited from Bro. Abr. Devise pl. 1. countenances this opinion. But in one report judge Haughton argues, that the words, *after the decease* of the tenant for life, mean only to mark the determination of his estates, *not to limit the time for sale*, and therefore, that a sale may be in his life-time; and in another judge Clench expresses himself almost to the same purpose. 2. Bull. 125. Godb. 46. There is also a case against lord Coke in 2. Leon. 220. and the point is doubted in Cro. Cha. 382.—See further in respect to such devises, Vin. Abr. K. E. to S. E.—(3) The case cited in the margin from 19. H. 6. is in fo. 23. (4) See 115. a.

(1) See Acc. 4. l. b. 57. b. 90. b. 118. a. 294. b. and for instances, Plowd. 243.—But the rule of *nullum tempus occurrit regi* is subject to various exceptions, both at *common law* and by *statute*.—1. There are many cases, in which the subject may make title against the king by *prescription*, as to treasure-trove, waifs, estrays, and such other things as may be seized without matter of record. Ante fol. 114. a and b.—2. In some cases the king's right necessarily fails for want of exertion in due time, either because the subject of his right determines before he claims it, or because it is *especially limited in point of time* by its creation. An instance of this is, where the land of tenant for life is found to be forfeited, and he dies before seizure by the king; for it is then too late to seize for the king, who, as Staundford expresses it, hath *surceased his time*, the estate forfeited being determined, and the right of entry being in him in reversion. Staundf. Prærog. 32. b. The law is the same, where the king is intitled to the next presentation, in which case, if another presents, and the incumbent dies, the king cannot have the second or any subsequent presentation. This was the opinion of Browne justice against Weston in Willion and Berkeley, Plowd. 243. 249. and was so adjudged in Baskerville's case 7. Co. 28. a. Lord Chancellor Egerton finds fault with the doctrine of this last case; but his objections do not appear in the least satisfactory. See his observations on lord Coke's Reports 8.—3. Sometimes lapse of time drives the king to a suit. Thus by the statute of the 13th. of Richard the 2d. and according to lord Coke by the *common law*, if the king presents to a benefice already full with an incumbent, the king's presentee shall not be received by the ordinary, till the king has recovered his presentment by due process of law, 13. R. 2. st. 1. c. 1. Staundf. Prærog. 32. b. a. Inst. 358. Post. 344. b. See also Cro. Jam. 385. 4. H. 4. c. 22. Gibf. Cod. 1st. ed. 802.—4. There are several statutes, which wholly extinguish the king's title, if not exerted within a limited number of years. By a statute of the 14th. of Edward the third, the king lost his presentment, where he was intitled by having in his hands the temporalities of a bishoprick or the lands of a person within age, unless he presented within three years after the voidance. But this statute was soon repealed. See 14. E. 3. st. 3. c. 2. 25. E. 3. st. 3. c. 2. a. Gibf. Cod. 1st. edit. 800. The chief statutes, for limiting the king's title to a certain time, now in force, are the 21. of Jam. 1. c. 2. and the 9. of Geo. 3. c. 16. By the former the king is disabled from claiming any manors lands or hereditaments, except liberties and franchises, under a title accrued 60 years before the beginning of the then session of parliament, unless within that time there has been a possession under such title. But the efflux of time rendering this provision continually more ineffectual, the latter statute introduced one of a permanent kind, by limiting the king to sixty years before the commencement of the suit or proceeding for recovery of the estate claimed. See further a Commentary on the 21. Jam. in 3. Inst. 188. See also something relative to the rule of *nullum tempus occurrit regi*, in Hob. 152. 154. 347.

which the guardian in socage had not. Vaugh. 186.—It is superseded both as to the body and lands, if the father exercises his power

Vide 41. E. 3. tit. Audita que-  
rels 18. H. 4. tit. Execution.  
28. F. N. B. 104. I. H. 7.  
15. b.

the lord may law-  
fully come to the  
land to make his  
claime to the feig-  
niory, rent, or other  
profit out of the  
land. But if the  
villeine purchase a  
feignorie, or a rent,  
common, or other  
inheritance issuing out of the land of the lord himselfe, it is said, that the feignorie, rent, common, or such other inheritance, is extinguished in the lord's possession without any claime.

*de vie, donques per cas* life, then perchance he  
*il viendra trope tarde.* should come too late. For  
*Car peraventure le vil-* peradventure the villeine  
*leine voile granter ou* will grant or alien the  
*aliener le reversion a un* reversion to another, in  
*auter, en le vie le tenant* the life of the tenant for  
*a terme de vie, &c.* life, &c.

**Grant.** Here must be intended an attornment; for after the grant and before attorne-  
ment the lord may not (1) claime the reversion (2).

**En la vie del tenant per vie, &c.** Here by (&c.) is included tenant in taile,  
tenant *per auter vie*, tenant by statute marchant, staple, *elegit*, and for yeares; for dur-  
ing all these estates the lord may claime the reversion, as well as in case of the tenant  
for life.

Sect. 180.

**Advowson.** *Advocatio*  
so called; because the  
right of presenting to the  
church was first gained by  
such as were founders, bene-  
factors, or maintainers of the  
church; *viz. rationis fun-*  
*dationis*, as where the ances-  
tor was founder of the church;  
or *ratione donationis*, where  
he endowed the church; or  
*ratione fundi*, as where he  
gave the soile, whereupon  
the church was built. And  
therefore they were called  
*advocati*. They were also  
called *patroni*, and thereupon  
the advowson is called *jus*  
*patronatus*. And in one word,  
advowson of a church is the  
right of presentation or col-  
lation to the church. *Advo-*  
*catus est ad quem pertinet jus*  
*advocationis alicujus ecclesie,*  
*ut ecclesiam nomine proprio, non*  
*alieno, possit prefaturare.* Every  
church is either presentative,  
collative, donative, or elec-  
tive. *Vide* section 645. 648.

**EN** mesme le ma-  
ner est, *lou un*  
*villein purchase un*  
*advowson, dun esglise*  
*plein dun incumbent,*  
*le seignior del vil-*  
*lein poit vener al dit*  
*esglise, & claime le dit*  
*advowson, & per eel*  
*claime l'advowson est*  
*en luy. Car sil doit*  
*attendre tanque apres*  
*le mort l'incumbent,*  
*& adonque a presen-*  
*ter son clerke a le dit*  
*esglise, donque, en le*  
*meane temps, le vil-*  
*leine poit aliener le*  
*advowson (3), & if*  
*sint ouster le seignior*  
*de son presentment.*

**IN** the same manner  
it is, where a villeine  
purchases an advow-  
son of a church full  
of an incumbent, the  
lord of the villeine  
may come to the said  
church, and claime the  
said advowson, and by  
this claime the advow-  
son is in him. For if  
he will attend till after  
the death of the in-  
cumbent, and then to  
present his clarke to  
the sayd church, then,  
in the mean time, the  
villein may alien the  
advowson, and so oust  
the lord of his present-  
ment.

13. H. 14. b.

Fleta lib. 5. cap. 14.

24. E. 3. 30. 25. E. 3. 47. 38.  
E. 3. 9. 44. E. 3. 3. 9. H. 6.  
31. 22. H. 6. 27. 21. E. 4.  
34. b. *Vide* sect. 648.  
(*Post.* 344. a.)

10. H. 6. 7.

**Plein dun incumbent,** If the church be presentative, the church is full by admission  
and institution against any common person; but against the king it is not full untill  
induction.

**Incumbent.** Commeth from the verbe *incumbo*, that is to be diligently resident, *id est,*  
*obnix operam dare*; and when it is written *encumbent*, it is falsely written, for it ought to be  
*incumbent*, as Littleton doth here (4). And therefore the law doth intend him to be resident  
on his benefice.

(1) This is apparently an error of the press, the sense requiring the omission of *not*. Accordingly the 1st edition is without  
it. But the error appears in all the subsequent editions.

(2) But now by the 9. Ann. c. 16. s. 9. the grant of a reversion is perfect without attornment.

(3) *Et. L. & M.*

(4) However in *L. & M.* and *Roh.* the word is *encombent*.

power of appointing a testamentary or other guardian according to the statute of 12. Cha. 2. See chap. 24.—Regularly it ends,  
when the infant, whether male or female, attains fourteen; though some say, that this must be understood, only where another  
guardian, either by election of the infant or otherwise, is ready to succeed, and that the guardianship in socage continues in  
the mean time. *Andr.* 313.

As to guardianship by *nurtura*, it only occurs, where the infant is without any other guardian; and none can have it, except  
the father or mother. 8. E. 4. 7. b. *Br. Guard.* 70. 3. Co. 38.—It extends no further than the custody and government of the  
infant's person, and determines at fourteen in the case both of males and females. *Ibid.*—Lord chief baron Comyns refers to  
*Fleta*, as if according to that ancient book *grandfathers* and *great grandfathers* might be guardians by *nurtura*. *Com. Dig.* v. 3.  
p. 421. But the passage cited doth not point at this species of guardian, it describing the *patria potestas* in general, and being  
apparently borrowed from the text of the Roman law; nor will it bear the least application to guardianship, as our own law  
regulates it.—(14) The direct object of the 4. & 5. Ph. & M. was to prevent the taking away or marrying maidens under sixteen  
against the consent of their parents. But the statute prohibited it in terms, which implied, that the custody and education of  
such females should belong to the father and *mother*, or the person appointed by the former. It is observable on this statute,  
that, though the title is confined to maidens being *inheritors*, and the preamble speaks only of such as be heirs apparent, or have  
real or personal estate, yet the enacting part mentions maidens under sixteen generally. For other cases on this statute besides  
*Mitchell's*, see *Poph.* 204. *Cro. Cha.* 465. 1. *Sid.* 362. 2. *Mod.* 128. 3. *Mod.* 84. 168.—(15) There is now another statute in  
respect to the appointment of guardians; for the 12. Cha. 2. c. 24. after taking away guardianship in chivalry, enables the  
father by deed or will attested by two witnesses to appoint, who shall be guardians of his children after his decease. The  
substance of this parliamentary regulation is, 1. That the father shall have the power, though *under twenty-one*. 2. That he  
shall have it as to *all* his children under twenty-one and unmarried at his decease, or born after. 3. That he may appoint any  
persons, except popish recusants. 4. That the appointment may be either in possession or remainder. 5. That he may appoint  
the guardianship to last till twenty-one, or for any less time. 6. That the appointment shall be effectual against all claiming  
as guardians in socage or otherwise. 7. That the guardian so appointed shall have ravishment of ward on trespass, and recover  
damages for the ward's benefit. 8. That such guardian shall have the custody of the infant's estate both real and personal, and  
have the same actions in relation to them as a guardian in socage. 9. That the statute shall not prejudice the custom of London or  
any other city or corporate town.—For cases on the constitution of this statute, see tit. Guardian in Vin. Abr. and Com. Dig.  
and

Le seignior del villeine poit venger al eglise & claime le dit advowson.

Note, albeit the advowson is a thing incorporeall, and not visible, yet, because the principall duty of the presentee of the patron is to be done in the church, the claime of the lord of the villeine must be made there; and by that claime the inheritance of the advowson shall be vested in the lord; for every claime or demand to devest any estate or interest must be made in that place, which is most apt for that purpose.

Apres la mort del incumbent. Nota, a church presentative may become void five manner of wayes, viz. by death, whereof Littleton here speaketh. 2. By creation. 3. By resignation. 4. By deprivation. 5. By cession, as by taking a benefice incompatible.

Doct. & Stud. lib. 2. ca. 31. 5. E. 3. 180. 10. E. 3. 482. 25. E. 3. 49. 9. E. 3. 462. 11. H. 4. 37. 59. & 76. 41. E. 3. 5. F. N. B. 31, 32.

Et donques a presenter son clerke al dit eglise, &c. A presentation is derived a presentando; quia presentare nihil aliud est, quam preesto dare, seu offerre. And Littleton here briefly expresth the effect of a presentation; for it is the act of the patron offering his clerke to the bishop of that diocesse, to be instituted to such a church, in these or the like words directed to the bishop, presento vobis A. B. clericum meum ad ecclesiam de Dale, &c. This may be done as well by word, as by writing; and if it be by writing it is no deed, for the presentation is of the clerke, and the direction to the bishop, so as this writing is in nature of a letter to the bishop: and this is the reason, that the king himselfe may present by word, as elsewhere is said. A villein at this day purchaseth an advowson in fee, the church becomes voide, the lord for one hundred pound given by A. B. clerke presents him to the church, and his clerke is admitted, instituted, and inducted; yet this gaineth not the advowson to the lord. [d] And so it is in that case, if any on the behalfe of A. B. had given or contracted with the lord in consideration of any valuable thing to present A. B. to the said church, albeit it had bene without the consent or knowledge of A. B. yet it should not have vested the advowson in the Lord. But this was not law when Littleton wrote. [c] But now by the statute of 31. Eliz. the presentation, admission, institution, and induction in both the said cases and in the like are made voide (1), where before the said statute they were but voidable by deprivation (2). And if a man present by usurpation to a benefice, by reason of any corrupt contract, agreement, &c. that presentation, and the institution and induction thereupon are void; for that act extends to all patrons as well by wrong as by right. But where any presents by usurpation, the rightfull patron, and not the king, shall present; for otherwise every rightfull patron may lose his presentation. And such an incumbent, that commeth in by reason of any such corrupt agreement, is so absolutely disabled for ever after to be presented to that church, as the king himselfe, to whom the law giveth the title of presentation in that case, cannot present him againe to that church; for the act, being made for suppression of simony and such corrupt agreements, so bindes the king in that case, as he cannot present him that the law hath disabled (3), for the words of the act be, shall thereupon and from thenceforth be adjudged a disabled person in law to have or enjoy the same benefice. [f] And the party being disabled by the act of parliament (which being an absolute and direct law) cannot be dispensed withall by any grant, &c. with a non obstante; as it may be, when any thing is prohibited sub modo, as upon a penalty given to the king (4). And the said act doth not onely extend to benefices with cure, but to dignities, prebends, and all other ecclesiasticall livings.

See acc. by Lord Hardwicke 2. Vol. 429.

(2. Ro. Abr. 353.) [d] Adjudge in communi banco, Mich. 41. & 42. Eliz. inter Baker & Rogers. [e] Adjudged in the King's Bench, Mich. 13. Ja. in a quar. imp. brought by the king against the bishop of Norwich, Thomas Cole and Robert Secker clerke for the vicarage of Haverell in Suffolk. (Cro. Jam. 385. Hob. 75. Hob. 165. 12. Co. 100. 73. 3. Inst. 153. 1. Ro. Abr. 370. Cro. Jam. 385. 533. Cro. Cha. 477. 7. Co. 32. Post. 234. 11. Co. 68. Cro. Cha. 331.)

[f] Pl. Com. 502. 27. H. 8. 2. H. 7. 6. 11. H. 7. 11. 13. H. 7. 8. b. 11. H. 4. 76. 5. E. 3. 29. F. N. B. 211. E.

Clerke. Clericus is twofold, ecclesiasticus (which Littleton here intendeth) and he is either secular, or regular, so called because he is servus & hereditas domini: and laicus, and in this sense is signified a pen-man, who getteth his living in some court or otherwise by the use of his pen.

4. H. 4. ca. 12.

Note, if the church becommeth void, albeit the present avoidance be not by law grantable over, yet may the lord of the villeine present in his owne name, and thereby gaine the inheritance of the advowson to him and his heires; for albeit it be not grantable over, yet it is not meerly a chose in action; [g] for if a feme covert be seised of an advowson, and the church becommeth void, and the wife dyeth, the husband shall present to the advowson; [h] but otherwise it is of a bond made to the wife; because that is meerly in action.

(Ante 117. a.) [g] 14. H. 4. 12. 38. E. 3. 35. 13. E. 3. quare imp. 57. [h] 43. E. 3. 10. 39. E. 3. 5. 4. H. 6. 5. (Post. 351. a. 2. Ro. Abr. 345)

Sect. 181.

ITEM il y ad vil- ALSO there is a vil- Villein regardant. leine regardant, He is called regardant to the man- & villeine en gros. and a villein in grosse. nour; because he hath the charge

(1) Though the person presented is not privy to the simony, yet the presentation is void, the statute making no distinction in this respect, but giving the turn to the king as a punishment of the patron. Adjudged 12. Co. 100. Agreed 12. Co. 73.

(2) The effect of the difference between void and voidable, in the instance of a simoniacal presentation, may be seen in Windfor's case, 5. Co. 102. and Winchcombe's case Hob. 165. the judgment in both turning upon it.

(3) Adjudged accordingly in the king against the bishop of Norwich Hob. 75. Cro. Jam. 385. In Sir Arthur Ingram's case on the 5. E. 6. against the sale of offices, there was a like decision, that the king could not dispense with a disability created by statute. Post. 234. a. Hob. 75. Cro. Jam. 385. 3. Inst. 154. When the famous case of Sir Edward Hales in the reign of James the second was argued, these two cases were urged to prove, that the king could not dispense with the disability for not taking the oaths and sacrament according to the 25. Cha. 2. usually called the test act; and lord Coke himself in his Third Institute applies them to a like case on the 5. Eliz. in respect to the oath of supremacy. 3. Inst. 154. The principal judicial authority relied on for the dispensation was the case in the year-book of 2. H. 7. 2. 6. in which, notwithstanding the statutes making void a grant of the office of sheriff for more than a year, the judges are represented to have held a grant for life with a non obstante to be good: But trusting to such an authority only exposed the weakness of the cause it was intended to sustain. The book cited, so far from containing any judgment of the point, ends with an adjournment of the case, accompanied with this remarkable declaration, that both judges and counsel agreed, what they had then said should be taken for nothing. As far too as appears, the grant in question might have been adjudged good on the ground of being within an exception of the statutes. The king also had been specially enabled by the 9. H. 5. c. 5. to dispense with the statutes for four years on account of the wars and a pestilence. But, lastly and principally, it was an insuperable objection to the authority of this case, that the 23. H. 6. to remove all doubts, provides, that the king's grant for more than a year should be void notwithstanding any non obstante. What respect could be due to a judicial opinion, declaring a dispensation good, which the legislature itself had positively enacted should be void? Yet it is not to be concealed, that in the report of Calvin's case, Lord Coke justifies the king's dispensation in this instance on the principle of its being beyond the power of parliament to take away his right to the service of his subjects. Calvin's case 7. Co. 1. This strange language is the more unaccountable, as it is inconsistent with his own doctrine here, and in the case on the statute against the sale of offices.

See however Hales's App. on Rights of the Crown Chap. 9. Printed by W. B. 1729 - see of that chapter.

(4) But by the bill of rights, 1. W. & M. it was declared, that, from the then session of parliament, no dispensation with any statute should be valid, unless such statute allows it, and except in such cases as should be specially provided for the then session. 1. W. & M. sess. 2. c. 2. s. 12. The occasion of this excellent provision was the equally extravagant and unwarrantable exercise of

and the continuation of the latter book. The nature of this new kind of guardianship, which the statute professedly models after

charge to do all base or vil-  
lenous services within the  
same, and to gard and keep  
the same from all filthie or  
loathsome things that might  
annoy it: and his service  
is not certaine, but he  
must have regard to that  
which is commanded unto  
him. And thereupon he  
is called regardant, a quo  
*præstandum servitium incer-  
tum & indeterminatum, ubi  
scire non poterit vespere, quale  
servitium fieri debet mane,  
viz. ubi quis facere tenetur  
quicquid ei præceptum fuerit,*  
as before hath beene observ-  
ed. And Littleton sayth  
hereafter, that no other  
thing is said to be regard-  
ant, but only a villeine:  
[i] yet in old bookes it was  
sometimes applied to ser-  
vices.

Bract. li. 2. fo. 26. Mir. ca. 2.  
sect. 18.

Vide sect. 84.

[i] 20. E. 3. tit. Issue 30.

*In grosse:* Is that  
which belongs to the person  
of the lord, and belongeth  
not to any mannor, lands,  
&c.

*Villein regardant est,  
sicome, home est seisi  
dun mannor, a que un  
villein est regardant,  
& celuy, que est seisie  
del dit mannor, ou  
ceux, que estate il ad  
en mesme le mannor,  
ount este seisies de le dit  
villein & de ses aun-  
cestors, come villeins  
& niefs (1) regardants  
a mesme le mannor, de  
temps dont memorie  
ne curt. Et villeine  
en grosse est, tou un  
home seisie dun man-  
nor, a que un villeine  
est regardant, & il  
graunt mesme le vil-  
lein per son fait a un  
autre, donques il est  
villein en grosse, &  
nemy regardant.*

A villein regardant is,  
as if a man be seised of  
a mannor, to which a  
villeine is regardant,  
and he which is seised  
of the said mannor,  
or they whose estate  
he hath in the same  
manner, have beene  
seised of the villein  
and of his ancestors as  
villeins and niefs re-  
gardant to the same  
manner time out of  
memory of man. And  
villein in grosse is,  
where a man is seised  
of a mannor wherunto  
a villein is regardant,  
and granteth the same  
villein by his deed to  
another, then he is a  
villein in grosse and  
not regardant.

Sect. 182.

Mir. ca. 2. sect. 18.

**T**HIS needeth no  
explanation, but  
to adde the say-  
ing of an ancient au-  
thor. *Servage de home  
est subjection, issuant de  
cy grand antiquite, que  
nul franke cep poet estre  
trove per humane remem-  
brance.*

*ITEM si un home &  
sez ancestors, que  
heire il est, ount este sei-  
sies dun villeine et de ses  
ancestors, come des vil-  
leins en grosse, de temps,  
dont memorie ne curt, ti-  
els sont villeines en grosse.*

**A**LSO if a man and  
his ancestours, whose  
heire he is, have beene  
seised of a villeine, and of  
his auncestors - as of vil-  
leines in grosse, time out  
of memorie of man, these  
are villeines in grosse.

Sect. 183.

Vid. sect. 441. 194. 174. 74.

[1] Bract. li. 5. tract. 5. c. 28.

[Post. 262. a.]

[m] Glan. li. 8. ca. 1.

**O**U *fine.* In Latine,  
*finis.* [1] *Ideo dici-  
tur finalis concordia;*  
quia *imponit finem litibus,*  
& *est exceptio perempto-  
ria.* [m] *Finis est amicabi-  
lis compositio & finalis con-  
cordia, ex consensu & licentia*

*ET hic nota, que  
tiels choses, que  
ne poient estre grants,  
ne alienecs, sans fait  
ou fine, home, que voile  
aver tiels choses per*

**A**ND heere note,  
that such things,  
which cannot be grant-  
ed, nor aliened, with-  
out deed or fine, a  
man, which will have  
*pre-*

(1) Et niefs not in L. & M.

of the dispensing power by James the second, who, having procured the sanction of a judicial opinion to a dispensation with the test act in favour of Sir Edward Hales, madly proceeded to a suspension of the principal laws for the support of the established religion; an excess, in which, monstrous as it was, several of the judges, to the great scandal of Westminster hall, gave him countenance, the priests of the temple of justice treacherously aiding to pollute it, instead of manfully opposing the sacrileg.

Till the time of this prince the doctrine of dispensation was received with very important qualifications, of which the principal were these.—1. It was said, that the king could not dispense with the common law; though lord chief justice Vaughan seems to deny this position. Dav. 75. 3. Int. 154. Vaugh. 334.—2. It appears to have been generally agreed, that the king could not dispense with a statute, which prohibited what was *malum in se*.—3. *Malum prohibitum* was not deemed universally dispensable with; for some held, the king could not dispense with a statute, if the prohibition was *absolute*, and not *sub modo*, as under a penalty to the king, or as others express it, where the statute was made for the *general good*, and not with a view solely to the king's profit and interest.—4. None contended, that the royal dispensation could diminish or prejudice the property, or the right of the subject.—5. It was understood, that the king could dispense, *not generally*, but only in favour of *particular persons*, and, according to some, for these only in *particular instances*—But some of these distinctions had great uncertainty and variety in them, and were so open to controversy, that they only tended to create embarrassment; and though the others greatly restricted the largeness of the claimed prerogative, yet they were far from obviating the chief objection to so formidable a pretension. Had the boundary of the dispensing power been ever so clearly marked, still it was wise and prudent to annihilate it. So far as it resembled the power of repealing laws, it was an intolerable corruption, wholly irreconcilable with the first principle of our constitution, by which the power of legislation cannot be exercised by the king without the two houses of parliament. So far as it did not fall within this idea, it was unnecessary; for, those acts, which were the fruits of it, might have derived their force from other acknowledged powers of the crown, such as the right of waiving penalties and forfeitures belonging to itself, and the prerogative of pardoning.—It is worthy notice, that, the *declaration of rights*, which the lords and commons made on tendering the crown to William and Mary, distinguishes between *suspending* laws by regal authority, and *dispensing* with them. The former, being a *general and absolute* abrogation for a time, is condemned without any exception; but the latter, being only a *special exemption* of certain individuals, is merely declared illegal, *as it had been exercised of late*. Also the *bill of rights*, though it declares against the *future* exercise of a dispensing power in any case, except where the king is specially authorized by act of parliament, yet contains a proviso saving from prejudice all prior charters grants and pardons. 1. W. & M. sess. 2. ch. 2. sect. 12. & 13. If the condemnation of the dispensing power for the *time past* had been unqualified, it might have destroyed the titles under numberless subsisting grants from the crown, the validity of which it was deemed most equitable to leave to the decision of the courts of justice in the ordinary way.—Such as wish to go more deeply into the controversy about the dispensing power,

after that in focage except as to duration, is particularly discussed in Bedell and Constable. Vaugh. 177. and in Lord Shaftesbury's case

X H Pract. 435  
H. det. lib. 52. & 53. there cited.

See H. det. 281.  
Pract. 256.  
310.

10. E. 1. 22. A.

prescription, ne poet auterment prescriber forsque en luy, & en ses auncestors, que heire il est, & nemy per ceux parols, en luy & en ceux que estate il ad; pur ceo que il ne poet aver lour estate sans fait ou auter escripture, le quel covient destre monstre a le court, si il voile aver ascun avantage de ceo. Et pur ceo que le grant et alienation dun villeine en gros (3) ne gist sans fait ou autre escripture, home ne po-it prescriber en un vil-lein en gros sans mon-strans d'escripture, si-non en soy mesme que claime le villeine, et en ses auncestors que heire il est. Mes de tiels choses, que sont regar-dants ou appendants a un mannor ou a au-ters terres et tene-ments, home poet pre-scriber, que il, et ceux que estate il ad, queux fueront seises de le mannor, ou de tiels terres et tenements, &c. ont este seises de tiels choses come re-gardants ou appen-dants a le mannor, ou a tiels terres et tene-ments (4) de temps dont memorie, &c. (5) Et la cause est pur ceo que tiel manor,

such things by pre-scription, cannot other-wise prescribe, but in him and in his aunces-tors, whose heire he is, and not by these words, In him and them whose estate he hath; for that he cannot have their estate without deed or other writ-ing, the which ought to be shewed to the court, if he will take any advantage of it. And because the grant and alienation of a vil-leine in grosse lyeth not without deed, or other writing, a man cannot prescribe in a villein in grosse, with-out shewing forth a writing, but in him-selfe which claims the villeine, and in his auncestors whose heire he is. But if such things, which are re-gardant or append-ing to a manour, or to other lands and tenements, a man may prescribe, that he and they whose estate he hath; who were seised of the mannor, or of such lands and tene-ments, &c. have been seised of those things, as regardant or ap-pendant to the manor, or to such lands and tenements time out of mind of man. And the

domini regis, vel ejus justi-ciariorum (1). [n] Talis con-[n] 9. Co. cap. 3. Statut. de mo-cordia finalis dicitur, eo quod do levandi fines. Pl. Com. 357. finem imponit negotio, adeo ut neutra pars litigantium ab eo de cetero poterit recedere (2). Of the severall parts of a fine, and many incidents to the same, you shall reade in my (3. Co. 84. 8. Co. 51.) Reports. 5. Co. fol. 38. Teye's case.

Que estate, &c.

Quorum statum, as much as to say, whose estate he hath. Here Littleton declareth one excellent rule, [o] that a man cannot prescribe in any thing by a que estate, that lyeth in grant, and cannot passe with-out deed or fine; but in him and his ancestors he may, because he comes in by de-scent without any conveyance. Neither can a man plead a que estate in himselfe, of any thing, that cannot passe with-out deed; [p] but in an- other he may, as, in barre of an avowry, the plaintife may plead a que estate in the feign-riory in the avowant. But Littleton's words are to be observed, (home que voile aver tiels choses per prescrip-tion). Therefore [q] when a que estate in grant, is claimed by prescription, there a que estate may be alledged of a thing that lyeth in grant, as a man may prescribe, that he and his ancestors, and all those whose estate he hath in an hundred, have time out of minde, &c. had a leet, &c. this is good, &c. [r] Regularly the plain-tife shall not intitile him by a que estate, but he must shew how he came by it; but after avowry made, the plaintife shall plead a que estate, be-cause he is now become as a defendant. [s] A man may plead a que estate of a tenancy in taile or of an estate for life, so as he averreth the life of them; but he cannot plead a que estate of a lease for yeares (6), or at will. [t] A disseisor, abatour, intruder, recoveror, or any other that cometh in the

may find the following references useful:—For the history of dispensations, see Dav. 69. b. Pryn. on 4. Inst. 128. to 133. Atkyns on power of dispens. with pen. stat. For the cases on the subject, see the case of the merchants of Waterford in 2. R. 3. 11. 1. II. 7. 2. the sheriff's case in 2. H. 7. 6. b. the doctrine in 11. H. 7. 11. b. 12. a. Grendon and the bishop of Lincoln Plowd. 502. case of the aulnager Dy. 303. Calvin's case 7. Co. 15. the Prince's case 8. Co. 29. b. case of the taylors of Ipswich 11. Co. 53. case of monopolies ibid. 84. Irish case of commendam Dav. 68. case of customs 12. Co. 18. the cases cited ante note 3. Colt and Glover v. the bishop of Litchfield, or English case of commendam Mo. 898. 1. Rol. Rep. 151. Hob. 146. Evans and Kissins v. Askwith, W. Jo. 158. Palm. 457. Latch 31. 233. Noy 93. 2. Rol. Rep. 450. case of clerk of the court of wards Hob. 214. Needler and the bishop of Winchester Hob. 230. Lord Wentworth's case Mo. 713. case of dispensation with 3. Jam. 1. c. 5. against a recusant's holding an office Hardr. 110. cases of dispensation with statutes against retailing wine without licence; namely, Young and Wright 1. Sid. 6. Thomas and Waters Hardr. 443. 2. Keb. 425. Thomas and Boys, Hardr. 464. Thomas and Sorrell Vaugh. 330. 1. Lev. 217. 1. Freem. 85. 115. 128. 137. 2. Keb. 245. 280. 322. 372. 416. 790. 3. Keb. 76. 119. 143. 155. 184. 223. 233. 264. Sir Edward Hales's case on the test act of 25. Ch. 2. in 2. Show. 475. Comberb. 21. State tri. v. 7. p. 612. 4. Bac. Abr. 179. and case of the seven bishops in the reign of Jam. 2. State tr. 4th. ed. v. 5. p. 303. Of these cases, Thomas and Sorrel and Sir Edward Hales's are the principal. The former was argued with the greatest solemnity in the Exchequer-chamber, the delivery of the opinion of the judges, of whom the majority was for the dispensation, taking up a day in four several terms. The latter was treated with less form; but gave occasion to some considerable publications on the subject; particularly lord chief-justice Herbert's account of the authorities on which the judgment was given in Sir Edward Hales's case, Mr. Atwood's answer to it, and a tract by lord chief-baron Atkyns against the king's power of dispensing with penal statutes. In a manuscript report of Sir Edward Hales's case, Sir Bartholomew Shower is mentioned to have replied to lord chief-baron Atkyns. But we have not yet met with any such piece. Mr. Hume's state of the arguments for and against the dispensing power, though written with an evident bias in favour of the crown's prerogative, is worth consulting. Hume's Hist. 8vo. ed. v. 8. p. 242. 254. See also Tyr. Bibliothec. Politic. 589. to 597. —For the proceedings in parliament after the Revolu-tion, in respect to Sir Edward Hales's case and the dispensing power, see Gray's Deb. v. 9. p. 297. to 307. 314. to 334. 336. to 344. 396. Chandl. Deb. of the Lords, v. 1. p. 394. (1) This, though a just description of fines, considered according to their original and still apparent import, yet gives a very inadequate idea of them in their modern application. In Glanville's time they were really amicable compositions of actual suits. But for several centuries past, fines have been only so in name, being in fact fictitious proceedings, in order to transfer or secure real property, by a mode more efficacious than ordinary conveyances. What the superiority of a fine in this respect consists of will best appear, by stating the chief uses to which it is applied.—One use of a fine is extinguishing dormant titles, by shortening the usual time of limitation. Fines, being agreements concerning lands or tenements solemnly made in the king's courts, were deemed

2. case. J. P. Wms. 102. Gilb. 172.—(16) Another species of customary guardianship is, where by the special custom of a manor the lord



[v] 11. H. 4. 81. 27. H. 6. 32. 9. E. 4. 3. 2. E. 6. tit. Que estate 8. 1. E. 6. Que estate Br. 49. (Cro. Cha. 54. 1. Lev. 190.)

shall plead a *que estate*. [u] A *que estate* must be alleged in the tenant or defendant himselfe, and not in one in the meane conveyance, from whom he claimeth; and yet some bookes be to the contrary.

*ou terres et (1) tenements poyent passer per alienation sans fait, &c.*

reason is, for that such manor or lands and tenements may passe by alienation without deed, &c.

*Le quel covient destre monstre al court.* The reason wherefore a deed, that is pleaded, ought to be shewed to the court is; because every deed must prove itselfe to have sufficient words in law, whereof the court must adjudge, and also to be proved by others, as by witnesses or other prooffe if the deed be denyed, which is matter of fact.

*Per alienation sans fait, &c.* Here by (&c.) is implied, that whatsoever passeth by livery of seisin, either in deed or in law, may passe without deed; and not only the rents and services parcell of the manor shall with the demeanes, as the more principall and worthy, passe by livery without deed, but all things regardant, appendant, and appurtenant to the manor, as incidents or adjuncts to the same, shall, together with the manor, passe without deed, all which, as here it appeareth, and elsewhere is said, shall passe, without saying *cum pertinentiis* (2).

Sect. 184.

*REGardant: Vide sect. 181.*

*ET est asavoir, que nul chose est nosme regardant a un mannor, &c. fors que villeine. Mes certeine auters choses come advowson et common de pasture, &c. sont nosmes appendants al mannor ou al terres et (3) tenements, &c.*

AND it is to be understood, that nothing is named regardant to a mannor, &c. but a villeine. But certaine other things, as an advowson and common of pasture, &c. are named appendant to the mannor, or to the lands and tenements, &c.

*Appendants.* Appendant is any inheritance belonging to another, that is superior or more worthy. In law it is called *pertinens, quasi invicem tenens*, holding one another, a word indifferent both to things appendant, and things appurtenant. The quality and nature of the things do make the difference. But regardant (as our author saith) is only applied to a villeine. (\*) Appendants are ever by prescription (4); but appurtenants may be created in some cases at this day.

Vide sect. 1. (\*) 5. Aff. 9. 8. H. 7. 4. 5. 28. H. 8. Dier 30. b. Pl. Com. 381. F. N. B. fol. 181. (2. Ro. Abr. 60. 5. Co. 17. b.)

(5) As if a man at this day grant to a man and his heires common in such a moore for his beasts leavant or couchant upon his mannor, or if he grant, to another, common of estovers, or turbarry in fee simple, to be burnt or spent within his mannor; by these grants these commons are appurtenant to the mannor, and shall passe by the grant thereof. In the civill law it is called *adjunctum* (6).

[x] 43. Aff. p. 10. 43. E. 3. 22. (10. Co. 64, 65. 2. Ro. Abr. 185.)

[x] If A. be seised of a mannor, whereunto the franchise of waife and stray and such like are appendant, and the king purchaseth the mannor with the appurtenances, now are the royall franchises reunited to the crowne, and not appendant to the mannor. But if he grant the mannor in as large and ample manner as A. had, &c. it is said, that the franchises shall be appendant (or rather appurtenant) to the mannor.

[y] Hill and Grange's case. Pl. Com. 168.

Concerning things appendant and appurtenant, two things are implied [y], First, that prescription (which regularly is the mother thereof) doth not make any thing appendant or appurtenant, unlesse the thing appendant or appurtenant agree in quality and nature to the thing, whereunto it is appendant or appurtenant; as a thing corporeall cannot properly be appendant to a thing corporeall, nor a thing incorporeall to a thing incorporeall (7). But things incorporeall, which lye in grant, as advowsons, villeins, commons, and the like, may be appendant to things corporeall, as a mannor house or lands; or things corporeall to things incorporeall, as lands to an office. [z] But yet (as hath been said) they must agree in nature and quality; for [a] common of turbarry or of estovers cannot be appendant or appurtenant to land, but to a house to be spent there. [b] Nor a leet, that is temporall, to a church or chappell, which is ecclesiasticall. Neither can a nobleman, esquire, &c. claime a seat in a church by prescription

(1. Rol. Abr. 230.) [z] 1. H. 7. 24. Pl. Com. 169. [a] 5. Aff. 9. (1. Sid. 354.) [b] 10. E. 3. 5. 37. H. 6. 34. 26. H. 8. 4. 4. Co. 36, 37. in Tiringham's case.

For notes to this side of fol. 121. b. see 126. a.

deemed to be of equal notoriety with judgments in writs of right; and therefore the common law allowed them to have the same quality of barring all, who should not claim within a year and a day. See Plowd. 357. Hence we may probably date the origin and frequent use of fines as feigned proceedings. But this puissance of a fine was taken away by the 24. E. 3. and this statute continued in force till the 1. R. 3. and 4. H. 7. which revived the ancient law, though with some change, proclamations being required to make fines more notorious, and the time for claiming being enlarged from a year and a day to five years. See 24. E. 3. c. 16. 1. R. 3. c. 7. 4. H. 7. c. 24. The force of fines on the rights of strangers being thus regulated, it has been ever since a common practice to levy them merely for better guarding a title against claims, which, under the common statutes of limitation, might subsist, with a right of entry for twenty years, and with a right of action for a much longer time.—Another use or effect of fines is barring estates tail, where the more extensively operative mode by common recovery is either unnecessary or impracticable. The former may be the case when one is tenant in tail with an immediate reversion or remainder in fee; for then none can derive a title to the estate except as his *privies* or *heirs*, in which character his fine is an immediate bar to them. The latter occurs, when one has only a remainder in tail, and the person, having the freehold in possession, refuses to make a tenant to the precise for a common recovery, which would bar all remainders and reversions; for, under such circumstances, all which the party can do is to bar those claiming under himself by a fine. How this power of a fine over estates tail commenced, has been *vervata questio*. The statute *de donis*, after converting fees conditional into estates tail, concludes with protecting them from fines, there being express words for that purpose. But the doubt is, when this protection was withdrawn, whether by the 4. H. 7. or the 31. H. 8. It is a common notion, into which some of our most respectable historians have fallen, that the 4. H. 7. was the statute which first loosened entails; and thus opening the door for a free alienation of landed property has been attributed to the deep policy of the prince then on the throne. See Hume's History 8vo. ed. v. 3. p. 400. But this is an error proceeding from a strange inattention to the real history of the subject. Common recoveries had been sanctified by a judicial opinion in Taltarum's case, as early as the twelfth of Edward the fourth; and from them it was, that entails received their death wound; for, by this fiction of common recoveries, into the origin of which we mean to scrutinize in some other place, every tenant in tail in possession was enabled to bar entails in the most perfect and absolute manner; whereas fines, even now, being only a partial bar of the issue of the persons who levy them, must in general be an inefficacious mode. In respect to the 4. H. 7. it was scarce more than a repetition of the 1. R. 3. the only object of which indisputably was to repeal the statute made the 34. E. 3. in favour of non-claims, and against them to revive the ancient force of fines, but with some abatement of the rigor in point of time and other improvements, as we have already hinted; a provision of the utmost consequence to the security of titles. Accordingly lord Bacon, whose discernment none will question, in his life of Henry the seventh, commends the statute of the 4th of his reign, merely as if aimed at non-claims. Bac. Hen. 7. in Ken. Comp. Hist. ed. v. 1. p. 596. Nor indeed could there have been the

*See 2. Str. 111. 112. where the use of the words fine here is properly intended and is an ancient right. That one cannot by common recovery bar the issue of a tenant in tail with a reversion in fee, is a point which is settled by the words of the statute de donis; and it is a necessary consequence of the nature of the fine, which is a bar only to the issue of the person who levies it, and not to the issue of the person who is tenant in tail.*

lord names, or is himself the guardian of an infant copyholder. See 2. Com. Dig. 399. The nature of this guardianship depends wholly on the custom of the particular manor; and though it is not expressly saved by the 12. Cha. 2. yet it has been held, that a descent through him is to intitle him to the land, and he is to be his heir.

tion as appendant or belonging to land, but to a house; for that such a feat belongeth to the house in respect of the inhabitancy thereof; and therefore, if the house be part of a manor, yet in that case he may claime the feat as appendant to the house for the reason aforesaid.

Secondly, that nothing can be properly appendant or appurtenant to any thing, unlesse the principall or superior thing be of perpetuall subsistence or continuance. For example, an advowson, that is said to be appendant to a manor, is *in rei veritate* appendant to the demesnes of the manor, which are of perpetuall subsistence and continuance, and not to rents or services, which are subject to extinguishment and destruction (1).

An advowson is appendant to the manor of Dale, of which manor the manor of Sale is holden, the manor of Sale is made parcel of the manor of Dale by way of escheat, the advowson is only appendant to the manor of Dale. (1. Rol. Abr. 230.)

And where it is said, that a chamber may be parcell of a corody, and passe by the name of the corody, which may be extinguished, there he, that hath the corody, hath but his habitation in the chamber; as a fellow of Trinity colledge in Cambridge hath in his chamber, or as one, that had a corody and a chamber in an house of religion, he had but his habitation only. As for offices of fee, whereunto land may appertaine, they are of perpetuall subsistence, either being *in esse*, or in that they are grantable over. (31. H. 6. 15. b.)

Note that an advowson at one turne may be appendant, and at another turne in grosse. As if the manor be divided betweene coparceners, and every one hath a part of the manor without saying any thing of the advowson appendant, the advowson remains in coparcenary, and yet, in every of their turnes, it is appendant to that part, which they have; and so it is, if they make composition to present against common right, yet it remains appendant. But if upon such a partition an expresse exception be made of the advowson, then the advowson remains in coparcenary and in grosse, and so are the bookes reconciled. (13. E. 2. Quar. imp. 170. 43. E. 3. 35. 13. E. 3. Quar. imp. 38. 17. E. 3. 38. 9. Eliz. Dier 259. 7. E. 3. 20. 19. E. 3. Quar. imp. 59. 35. H. 6. 32, 33. 38. H. 6. 9. 2. H. 7. 5. (6. Co. 64. a.)

**Common de pasture.** [c] *Communia*, it cometh of the English word common, because it is common to many; and thereupon and accordingly is here called by Littleton common of pasture, for that the feeding of beasts in the land wherein the common is to be had belongs to many. [c] Glanvill lib. 3. ca. 36. Braft. lib. 4. c. 19. & 42. Brit. cap. 55, 56, 57. Fleta lib. 4. ca. 19. Mirror ca. 5. sect. 3.

[d] There be foure kinds of common of pasture, *viz.* common appendant, which is of common right, (and therefore a man need not prescribe for it) (2) for beasts commonable (that is) that serve for the maintenance of the plough, as horse and oxen to plough the land, and for kine and sheepe to compeller the land, and is appendant to arable land (3). [d] 20. E. 3. Admeasurement 8. Temps E. 1. Common 24. 17. E. 2. ibid. 23. 4. H. 6. 22. H. 6. (1. Rol. Abr. 396. Cro. Cha. 542. 6. Co. 69.)

[e] The second is common appurtenant, that is, for beasts not commonable; as swine, goats, and the like. [f] If a man purchase part of the land, wherein common appendant is to be had, the common shall be apportioned, because it is of common right; but not so of a common appurtenant, or of any other common of what nature soever. But both common appendant and appurtenant shall be apportioned, by alienation of part of the land, to which common is appendant or appurtenant; and for common appurtenant one must prescribe (4). [e] 37. H. 6. 34. 26. H. 8. 4. F. N. B. 181. (Dier 70. b.) [f] 4. Co. f. 37, 38. & c. Tiringham's case. (Hob. 235. 1. Roll. Abr. 399. Cro. Cha. 482. Cro. El. 531.)

[g] The third is *common per cause de vicinage*, which differeth from both the other commons; for that no man can put his beasts therein, but they must escape thither of themselves by reason of vicinity, in which case one may inclose against the other, though it hath bene so used time out of mind, for that it is but an excuse for trespass. [g] 8. Co. 78, 79. W. Wilde's case. (7. Co. 5. Corbet's case.)

The last is common in grosse, which is so called, for that it appertaineth to no land, and must be by writing or prescription. Of common appendant, appurtenant, and in grosse, some be certaine, that is, for a certaine number of beasts; some certaine by consequent, *viz.* for such as be levant and couchant upon the land; and some be more uncertaine, as common *sauns* (1. Saund. 345.) number in grosse, and yet the tenant of the land must common or feed there also (5).

There be also [b] divers other commons, as of estovers, of turbarry, of pischary, of digging for coles, minerals and the like. [i] If common appendant be claymed to a manor, yet *in rei veritate* it is appendant to the demesnes, and not to the services; and therefore if a tenancy escheate, the lord shall not encrease his common by reason of that. [k] 15. E. 2. Prescript. 51. 12. H. 8. fol. 2. (Cro. Jam. 208. 257. 1. Ro. Abr. 396. 2. Rol. Abr. 267. 7. Co. 5. 1. Vent. 391. 1. Saund. 351.) [l] If a man claime by prescription any manner of common in another man's land, and that the owner of the land shall be excluded to have pasture, estovers or the like, this is a prescription or custome against the law, to exclude the owner of the soyle; for it is against the nature of this word common, and it was implied in the first grant, that the owner of the soyle should take his reasonable profit there, as it hath bene adjudged. \* [l] But a man may prescribe or alledge a custome to have and enjoy *solam vesturam terræ*, from such a day till such a day, and hereby the owner of the soyle shall be excluded to pasture or feed there (6); and so he may prescribe to have *separalem pasturam*, and exclude the owner of the soyle from feeding there. *Nota diversitatem.* [m] So a man may prescribe to have *separalem piscariam* in such a water, and the owner of the soyle shall not fish there; but if he claim to have *communiam piscariæ*, or *liberam piscariam*, the owner of the soyle shall fish there (7). And all this hath bene [b] Fleta ubi supra. [i] 18. E. 3. fol. 43. [k] 15. E. 2. Prescript. 51. 12. H. 8. fol. 2. (Cro. Jam. 208. 257. 1. Ro. Abr. 396. 2. Rol. Abr. 267. 7. Co. 5. 1. Vent. 391. 1. Saund. 351.) [l] Pasch. 26. Eliz. in the King's Bench, inter White and Shirland in com. Oxon. Vide lect. 1. & 2. (F. N. B. 180. c. 2. Saund. 326. 1. Rol. Abr. 405.) [m] Vid. 3. 29. 30. 4. E. 3. 7. 46. E. 3. 23. 15. E. 2. Prescript. 51. [n] 20. H. 6. 4. 10. H. 7. 24. Temps E. 1. Assise 422. [o] 2. Rol. Abr. 258.)

For the notes to this side of fol. 122. a. see 126. b.

least pretence to extend the meaning of the law further, if it had not been for some ambiguous expressions in the latter end of it. Like the 1. R. 3. after declaring a fine with proclamation to be an universal bar, it saves to all, except parties, five years to claim after the proclamations of it. But this saving did not suit the case of the issue in tail, or of those in remainder or reversion; because during the life of the immediate tenant in tail, these could have no right to the possession, and it was possible, that he might live more than five years from the proclamation of the fine. The framers of the 4. H. 7. foresaw this; and therefore like the 1. R. 3. it contains an additional saving of five years for all persons, to whom any title should come after the proclamation of the fine by force of any intail subsisting before; words, which as strongly apply to the issue of the tenant in tail as to those in remainder or reversion. Had therefore the 4. H. 7. stopped here, what the learned and instructive observer on our ancient statutes writes would be strictly just, that, instead of destroying estates tail, the statute expressly saves them. Barringt. on. Ant. Stat. 2d. ed. p. 337. But a subsequent part of the statute, in declaring how a fine shall operate on such as have five years allowed, if they do not claim within that time, expresses, that they shall be concluded *in like form as parties and privies*; and another clause, in regulating, who should be at liberty to aver against a fine *quod partes nihil habuerunt*, saves this plea for all persons, with an exception of *privies* as well as *parties*. From these two clauses, though the former of them was copied from the 1. R. 3. grew a doubt, whether the statute did not enable tenant in tail to bar his issue by a fine. The arguments for it were, that the issue were *privies* both in blood and estate; and that if the statute meant to bind them, when the tenant in tail had not any estate in the land at the time of the fine, it was highly improbable, there should be a different intention, when he really had one. 2. Show. 114. On the other hand it might be said, that, as the word *privies* in the statute *de modo levandi fines* and in the 1. R. 3. was not deemed sufficient to reach heirs in tail, and to control the statute *de donis*, why then should the same word in the 4. H. 7. include them; more especially, when it was considered, that it was as much the professed scope of the 4. H. 7. as it was of the 1. R. 3. to revive the operation of fines against non claims, and that both contained the same express saving for persons claiming under intails? 2. Inst. 517. Pollox. 502. By such contrariety of reasoning, the judges in the 19. H. 8. became divided in opinion; *inter alia* holding, that the 4. H. 7. was not a bar to the issue, and four that it was. See 19. H. 8. 6. b. Dy. 2. b. pl. 1. Br. Abr. Fines, 1. 121. 123. Bro. N. C. 144. Pollox. 502. To remove the doubt the legislature passed the 32. H. 8. by which the heirs in tail are expressly bound. 32. H. 8. c. 26. But the last named statute, though entitled an exposition of the 4. H. 7. and though made to operate *retrospectively*, contained several exceptions, particularly one of fines of lands, of which the reversion is in the crown. Consequently room was still left for contesting the effect of the 4. H. 7. independently of the 32. H. 8. and in the reign of Charles the second a case arose, which made a discussion of the point almost unavoidable. It was the case of the earl of Derby against one claiming under a fine by the earl's father, who was tenant in tail with reversion in the crown, and so within an exception in the 32. H. 8. Two points were made, of which the first was whether this fine, thus depending wholly on the 4. H. 7. was a bar to the issue in tail; and on adjournment of the case into the Exchequer-chamber, eight judges against three held, that the fine of tenant in tail was a bar to the

that the father's appointment of the custody of his child under that statute will not extend to copyhold estates. Church and Cudmore, 2. Lutw. 1181. 3. Lev. 395. and Comberb. 253.—But besides the several kinds of guardians enumerated by lord Coke, and

Morse v. Webb  
X see acc. 2 Brownl.  
297.

(\*) Inter Chiner and Fiften in le Com. Banke in replevin & Mich. 29. & 30. Eliz. inter Shirmond and White in com. Oxon. Et inter Foiston & Crachrode eodem termino in Essex. (2. Rol. Abr. 267.) [n] 19. H. 6. 33. [o] Vide sect. 541. (4. Co. 31. a. Post. 307. 349. b. 363. b.)

Bract. lib. 1. cap. 6. Britton fol. 78. Fleta li. 1. c. 3. 43. E. 3. 4. b. 19. E. 2. tit. Vil. 34. 18. E. 4. 29. [p] 19. H. 6. 32. 26. Aff. 62. 37. Aff. 17. 11. H. 4. 16. in appeale. (2. Ro. Abr. 732.)

41. E. 3. tit. Vill. 6.

19. H. 6. 32. b.

**T**HIS is intended in some action brought against him that made such confession, [p] or where he is brought into court by course of law; for if he commeth into the court extrajudicially and not by any due course of law, such confession is without warrant of law, and bindeth not the partie, because the court had no warrant to take it. But if a *præcipe* be brought against one, he may confesse himselfe villeine to an estranger, and that he holds the land in villenage of him, and this is good and shall bind him. And if in that case the demandant reply, that he the day of his writ purchased was a freeman (2), and thereupon issue is taken, and he is tryed to be free, yet he shall remaine villeine to the stranger in respect of his confession.

If a writ of *nativo habendo* be brought against one, and the plaintiffe, as he ought, offereth in his count to prove the villenage by the cousins and kindred of the defendant, and therupon produceth the uncles of the defendant, who upon examination confesse themselves to be villeines to the demandant, this confession, being entred of record, doth so bind, that, albeit they were so free before, they and the heires of their bodies are by this confession bond and villeines for ever, for the uncles came in by due course of law in an action depending in court.

Sect. 185.

**I**TEM *si homo voile en court de record soy conuster destre villeine, que ne fuit villein adevant, tiel est villeine en grosse.*

**A**LSO if a man will acknowledge himselfe in a court of record to be a villeine, who was not a villein before, such a one is a villeine in grosse (1).

Sect. 186.

**N**iese. Or *naife* is in Latine *naturalis, seu nativa*, because for the most part nieses are bond by nativitie.

**F**eme *que est utlage est dit waive.*

*Waive, waviata*, and not *utlagata* or *exlex*; for that women are not sworne in leets, or tornes, as men, which be of the age of twelve years or more be; and therefore men may be called *utlagati, id est, extra legem positi*, but women are *waviatae, id est, derelictæ*, left out or not regarded, because they were not sworne to the law; wherein it is to be noted, that of ancient time a man was not said to be within the law, that was not sworne to the law, which is intended of the oath of allegiance in the leet (4).

And the outlawrie of a woman is legally called *waviaria mulieris*.

**I**TEM *homo que est villein est appelle villeine (3), et feme que est villein est appelle niese: si come homo que est utlage est dit utlage, et feme que est utlage est dit waive.*

**A**LSO a man which is a villeine is called a villeine, and a woman which is villein is called a neise: as a man which is outlawed is called outlawed, and a woman, which is outlawed is called waived.

Sect.

For notes to this side of fol. 122. see 126. b.

the issue before the 32. H. 8. great strefs however being laid by those of this opinion on the exposition of the former by the latter. See Murrey on the demise of the earl of Derby against Eyton and Price, Pasch. 31. Ch. 2. in Scacc. T. Raym 260. 286. 319. 338. Pollexf. 491. Skinn. 95. 2. Show. 104. T. Jo. 237. It is observable, that both lord keeper North and lord chief-justice Saunders, the lateness of whose promotions prevented their publickly giving their opinions, concurred with the majority of the judges in the construction of the 4. H. 7. and further, that Pollexten, who as counsel argued most ably for the earl of Derby the issue in tail, afterwards declared his private sentiments to be against the earl on that statute. But it should be adverted to, that, though the majority of the judges were against lord Derby on this point, they gave judgment for him on a secondary one, which was, that the intail, being of the gift of the crown, fell within the protection of the 34. H. 8. Therefore their opinion on the 4. H. 7. finally proved to be wholly extrajudicial. But we do not know of any case, in which the controversy has been again agitated. A third effect of fines is passing the estates and interests of married women in the inheritance or freehold of lands and tenements. Our common law bountifully invests the husband with a right over the whole of the wife's personalty, and entitles him to the rents and profits of her real estate during the coverture. It further gives him an estate for his own life in her inheritance, if the husband is actually in possession, and there is born any issue of the marriage capable of inheriting. But the same law, which confers so much on the husband, will not allow her, whilst a feme-covert, to enlarge the provision for him out of her property, or to strip herself of any claims which the law gives her on his. On the contrary, jealous of his great authority over her, and fearful of his using compulsion, it creates a disability in her to give her consent to any thing, which may affect her right or claims after the coverture, and makes all acts of such a tendency absolute nullities. By the rigour of the ancient law, we take this rule to have been so universally applicable, that a married woman could in no case bind herself or her heirs by any direct mode of alienation. But accident gave birth to two indirect modes, namely, by fines and common recoveries. Though it might be proper to incapacitate the wife, from being influenced by the husband to prejudice herself by any conveyances or agreements during the coverture, yet justice to others required, that such, as might have any claim on the wife's freehold or inheritance, should not be forced to postpone their suits till the marriage was determined; for if they should, then, to use the words of Bracton, in explaining why the husband's infancy would not warrant the parol to demur in a suit for the wife's land, *mulier implacitata de jure suo si propter minorem ætatem viri posset differre judicium, ita posset qualibet mulier in fraudem nubere*. Bract. lib. 5. tract. 5. c. 21. fo. 423. a. Probably it was on this principle, the common law allowed a judgment against husband and wife in a suit for her land to be as conclusive, as if given against a feme sole; which was carried so far, that, till the statute of Westminster the second, even judgment against them, on default in a possessory action for the wife's freehold, drove the wife after the husband's death to a writ of right to recover her land. 2. Int. 342. From enabling the husband and wife to defend her title, and making the judgment on such defence to be conclusive, permitting them to compound the suit by a final agreement of record, in the same manner as other suitors, was no great or difficult transition; more especially when its considered, that in the case of femes covert fines are never allowed to pass, without the court's secret examination of them apart from their husbands, to know, whether their consent is the result of a free choice, or of the husband's compulsive influence. Such, we conceive is the true source, whence may be derived the present force of fines and common recoveries as against the wife, who joins in them; for, whatever in point of bar and conclusion was their effect, when in suits really adverse, of course attended them, when they were signed, and in that form gradually rose into modes of alienation, or, as the more usual phrase is, *common assurances*. The conjecture

*the case in the case of Johnson v. ...*

and those we have already mentioned in addition, there are four others which still remain to be noticed. The first of these is guardian by election of the infant himself. But the right of making such an election only arises, when

*see de curatore*

*in the Roman law: see 1. Heineccii Syntagma. lib. 1. tit. 23. s. 6.*

Sect. 187.

**ITEM** si un vil-  
lein prent frank  
feme a feme, et ad  
issue enter eux, lif-  
sues ferront villeines.  
Mes si niese prent  
franke home a sa ba-  
ron, lour issues serra  
franke.

\* Et cest contrarie  
a le ley civil; car la  
est dit, partus sequi-  
tur ventrem \* (1).

**ALSO** if a villeine  
taketh a free wo-  
man to wife, and have  
issue betweene them,  
the issues shall be vil-  
leines. But if a niese  
taketh a freeman to  
her husband, their is-  
sue shall be free.

\* This is contrarie  
to the civill law; for  
there it is said, partus  
sequitur ventrem \*.

man is enfranchised during the coverture (3); and therefore by the issue is free (4).

[t] Si mulier serua copulata sit libero, &c. quod partus habebit hereditatem, & mater nullam dotem, quia mortuo viro suo libero redit in pristinum statum servitutis, nisi haeres ei dotem fecerit de gratia (5). And when a bondman marieth a free woman, they are all one person in law, and due animae in carne una, and uxor subiecta est viro, & sub potestate viri (6).

[u] Observatur in com' Cornubiæ de tali consuetudine, quæ talis est, quod si liber homo ducat nativam aliquam in uxorem ad liberum tenementum & liberum thorum, si ex ea duæ procreantur filiae, una erit libera & altera villana, quia ibi partiti sunt pueri inter liberum patrem & dominum uxoris villanæ.

[x] Qui vero procreantur ex nativa unius & nativo alterius, proportionabiliter inter dominos sunt dividendi. [x] Glanvill lib. 5. cap. 6.

*Et ceo est contrarie al ley civil.* (7) For true it is, that by that law partus sequitur ventrem, as well where a free man takes a bond woman to wife, as where a bondman takes a free woman to wife. In the first case the issue is by the civill law bond, and in the other free; both which cases are contrarie to the law of England. But this is no part of Littleton; and therefore we in this manner pass it over.

Sect. 188.

**ITEM** nul bas-  
tard poit estre  
villein, si non que il  
voile soy conufter es-  
tre villeine en court  
de record; car il est  
en ley quasi nullius  
filius, pur ceo que il ne  
poit enheriter a nulluy.

**ALSO** no bastard  
may be a villeine,  
unless he will ac-  
knowledge himselve to  
be a villeine in a court  
of record; for he is in  
law quasi nullius filius,  
because he cannot be  
heir to any.

**Nullius** [a] filius. [a] Vide sect. 399. 13. E. 1. tit. Villein 36. (Ante 3. b. Post. 244. b.)  
Cui pater est populus, pater est sibi nullus & omnis.

Cui pater est populus, non habet ille patrem.

[b] Some hold that the bastard of a niese shall be a villeine. [c] And others hold, that if a villeine hath a bastard by a woman, and after marieth the woman, that this bastard is a villeine. But the

common law is a bastard, and consequently, quasi nullius filius, as Littleton here saith. [d] Though a bastard be a reputed sonne, yet is he not such a sonne, in consideration whereof an use can be raysed, for the reason that Littleton here yeelds; because in judgment of law he is nullius filius. [e] (8) And, [e] 13. Eliz. Dier 296.

(1) The sentence between the stars is not in L. & M. Rob. or P.—(2) Siens, or, according to the modern spelling, cion, signifies the shoot of a tree, and is derived from the French word scion, which is the same as furculus in Latin.—(3) According to Fitzherbert, the marriage enfranchises the woman for ever; and he cites as an authority Britton, who considers it as a negligence in the lord not to have prevented the marriage. F. N. B. 78. G. Brit. 79. b. But Bracton, in the passage cited by lord Coke two or three lines further, confines the enfranchisement to the coverture; and there are several authorities, which concur with him. Bro. Villenage 23. Pasch. 33. E. 3. Statham tit. Villenage. Fitzh. Abr. Villenage 21. 30. 46. Lord Coke was aware of this contrariety in the books; for in a subsequent part he takes notice of it, but calls the opinion, that the enfranchisement ceases with the coverture, the better one. Polt. 136. b. 137. b. However he inclines to except the case of the nief's marrying with her own lord. But even this is denied by Perkins. Perk. sect. 314. It is a strong argument against this latter writer, that, in other cases of constructive manumissions, though in some the ground of inference was not so strong as the lord's marriage with his nief, the enfranchisement was perpetual. It is a still more forcible reason, that reviving the slavery on the lord's death, if he left an heir by his nief, would have necessarily induced the unnatural consequence of making the mother the slave of her own issue.—(4) It was unnecessary to resort to this reason to prove the issue of such a marriage free. The rule of our law being, that the child shall follow the father's condition, consequently, whether the nief was free or bond during the coverture, made no difference to her issue.—(5) In the chapter of Dower lord Coke represents a nief marrying a free-man to be dowable. Ante 31. a. But this passage from Bracton is direct to the contrary. Perkins distinguishes, allowing dower to the nief from a stranger, but not from her lord. Perk. sect. 314.—(6) Here lord Coke omits explaining what effect the marriage of a villein with a free woman has on his condition. As Britton writes, if the villein marries his own lady, it enfranchises him for ever. Brit. 78. b. If the marriage is with any other woman, it is clear from Littleton's declaring the issue villeins, that the father remained a slave as before.—(7) This difference between our and the civil law is the subject of the chapter in Fortesc. de Laud. Leg. Angl. cited in the margin. See also Mr. Selden's and Mr. Gregor's notes in the 8vo. ed. of 1775.—(8) This point was so held in Worsey's case of 23. Eliz. in Dyer, which lord Coke refers to in the margin. According to Dyer judge Periam was of a contrary opinion. But Anderson, who reports the same case, informs us, that the judges were agreed. 1. And. 75. In the queen against an illegitimate son of sir John Perrot, and in Frampton against Gerrard, two subsequent cases of the same reign, the judges recognized the doctrine. 2. Rol. Abr. 785. 791. and Mo. 735. However it should be observed, that, though a bastard is not a son, for whom the consideration of blood will raise an use, yet, on an estate otherwise effectually passed, an use may be as well declared to a bastard being in esse and sufficiently described as to another person; and so Rolle in his Abridgment, states the law to be, but at the same time cites the case of Frampton and Gerrard as determined to the contrary. 1. Ro. Abr. 791. Gilb. on Uses 207. The reason, why the use to the bastard is raised in the first instance and not in the second, depends on the common, but perhaps obscure, distinction, between uses raised by transmutation of the possession, as on a feoffment grant fine or common recovery, and those raised without, as a covenant to stand seised or bargain and sale; or, to express it in more intelligible terms, between declaring uses on a possession or estate actually transferred to a third person, and declaring them on a possession or estate retained in the party himself. In the former case the estate is passed completely

Continuation of notes to 127. a.

jecture we have thus hazarded to illustrate, how it happens, that a married woman may alienate her real rights by fine, though not

from a defect of the law, the infant finds himself wholly unprovided with a guardian. This may happen to be the case, either

Lib. 2. Cap. 11. Of Villenage. Sect. 189, 190.

14. Eliz. Dier 313. 18. Eliz. for the same reason, where the statute of 32. H. 8. of wills, speaketh of children, bastard children are not within that statute, and the bastard of a woman is no child within that statute, where the mother conveys lands unto him.

[f] Trin. 18. E. 1. rot. 61. [f] It was found by verdict, that Henry the sonne of Beatrice, which was the wife of Robert Radwell deceased, was borne *per undecim dies post ultimum tempus legitimum mulieribus constitutum*. And thereupon it was adjudged, *quod dictus Henricus dici non debet filius prædicti Roberti secundum legem & consuetudinem Angliæ constitutæ* (1). Now *legitimum tempus* in that case appointed by law at the furthest is nine moneths, or forty weeks (2); but she may be delivered before that time, which judgement I thought good to mention. And this agreeth with that in Eldras. *Vade & interroga prægravantem, si quando impleverit novem menses suos, adhuc poterit matris ejus retinere partum in semetipsa? & dixi, non potest, domine.*

Sect. 189.

**C**Hescun villeine est able & franke **I**TEM chescun villein est able & franke de suer, &c. **A**LSO every villein is able and free to sue all manner of actions against everie person, except against his lord, to whom he is villeine. And yet in certaine things he may have against his lord an action of appeale for the death of his father, or of his other ancestors, whose heire he is.

[g] Braet. lib. 4. fol. 196. Britton cap. 49. fo. 125.

[b] 14. E. 4. 6 b. 15. E. 4. 33. 20. E. 3. tit. Villein 10. 38. E. 3. 21.

[i] Fleta lib. 2. cap. 4.

(1. Inst. 131.) [k] Brit. cap. 22. fo. 38. Bracton lib. 1. fo. 6.

[l] 18. E. 3. 32. 11. H. 4. 93. 1. H. 4. 6. 29. H. 6. tit. Coron. 17. [m] Fleta li. 1. c. 5. 1. H. 4. 6.

*de suer, &c.* [g] In an action brought by a villeine, *versus non dominum, non valet ei exceptio, quia est servus alienus, ex quo nihil ad ipsum utrum liber sit an servus.* [b] And it is to be observed, that he, that hath but a particular estate in a villeine, as tenant for life or for yeares, shall disable the villeine, if he brings an action against him; but the lessor shall not (as it is said) disable him. [i] *Examinatio villenagii non tenet, nisi ex ore veri domini fuerit pronunciata.* *Appeale.* *Appellum* cometh of the French word *appeller*, that signifieth to accuse or appeach. An appeach. [k] An appeale is an accusation of one upon another; with a purpose to attain him of felonie by words ordained for it. *De mort* [l] for a villeine shall not have an appeale of robbery against his lord; for that he may lawfully take the goods of the villein as his own. [m] And if in an appeale of death it be found for the plaintife, he is enfranchised for ever. *Hinc enim est, quod eo ipso sunt hujusmodi domini servos suos amissuri, cum de injuriis fuerint convicti.* And there is no diversitie herein, whether he be a villein regardant, or in grosse, although some have said the contrary.

Sect. 190.

[n] Mirror ca. 1. sect. 12. cap. 3. de R. & cap. 4. de Homicide. (3. Inst. 60.) **R**APE. [n] *Raptus* is, when a man hath carnall knowledge of a woman by force and against her will. **A**UXY un niese, que est ravie per sa seignior, poit aver un appeale de rape envers luy. **A**LSO a niese, that is ravished by her lord, may have an appeale of rape against him.

(\*) W. 1. ca. 13. W. 2. ca. 35. 6. R. 2. ca. 6. 11. H. 4. cap. 13. 1. E. 4. cap. 1. [o] 29. H. 6. tit. Coron. 17. Br. cl. lib. 3. fol. 147.

*Appeale de rape.* By the generall purview of the statutes, (\*) that give the appeale of rape, the niese shall have an appeale of rape against the lord. [o] And it seemeth by the ancient authors of the law, that this so hainous an offence was severely punished by losse of eyes, and privy members; but of old time it was felony, which you may reade at large in the second part of the Institutes W. 1. ca. 13.

[p] And

pletely from the grantor or donor, without the aid of a court of equity; and therefore it is immaterial, whether the use declared on the estate is gratuitous or not, it being sufficient, that the grantee or donee receives it coupled with a trust or use. But in the latter case, the transaction rests in covenant or agreement between the covenantor or bargainer and the cestuique use; and if the covenant or agreement was not founded on the consideration of blood or a valuable consideration, such as marriage or money, our courts of equity, which till the 27. of H. 8. had the sole cognizance of uses, would not interpose to compel the performance. In fewer words, Chancery would enforce uses annexed to a perfect gift, however gratuitous they might be, but not those resting only on a naked contract, without even so much as the consideration of blood to maintain them. The authorities in proof of this distinction are abundant; nor do we know of any seeming to impeach it, except the single case of Frampton and Gerrard already cited from Rolle, which, if it did turn on such a point, is sufficiently controled by other cases to make the doctrine indisputable. Mo. 102. Ow. 40. 1. Leon. 197. 1. Co. 176. b. W. Jo. 346. Cart. 143. 12. Mod. 161. Gilb. on Uses 113. 207. Add to this the disfavour of our law to bastardy, in not recognizing any but legitimate blood to be a good consideration, and the whole secret of the rule as to uses to bastards will be disclosed. On a covenant to stand seized, an use will not rise to a bastard; because, the use depending on contract, some consideration is requisite, and lawful blood and marriage are the two considerations peculiar to such a covenant, which necessarily excludes bastardy. But on bargains and sales of land, in which the essential consideration to raising an use is money or a price, or on any conveyances, on which, the estate being passed out of the grantor and therefore not depending on his contract, uses may be declared without any consideration, bastards stand precisely on the same footing with other persons, and are equally capable of having uses limited to them. To give the sum of this elucidation in one sentence, where the use will not rise without the consideration of blood, if derived through any but the pure channel of marriage, however near the blood may be, it will not avail.

(1) Lord Hale, in a note on a passage about legitimacy in fol. 8. a. gives a fuller extract of this case from the record, than is here expressed. His words are these:

Trin. 18. E. 1. Coram rege, rot. 13. Bedford, et M. 22, 23. E. 1. rot. 2. In assise by John Radwell against Henry son of Beatrice, who

Continuation of notes to 121. a.

not by any instrument or act strictly and nominally a conveyance, leads to proving, that the common notion of a fine's binding comes covert merely by reason of the secret examination of them by the judges is incorrect. If the secret examination of itself was so operative, the law would provide the means of effectually adding that form to ordinary conveyances, and so make them conclusive to comes covert equally with a fine. But it is clearly otherwise; and, except in the case of conveyances by custom, there must be a just depending for the freehold or inheritance, or the examination being extrajudicial is ineffectual. In the second Institute

before fourteen, when the infant has no property such as attracts a guardianship by tenure, and the father is dead without having

[p] And this word *rape*, which our author here useth, is so appropriated by law to this case, [p] 9. E. 4. 26: Mirror ca. r. as without this word (*rapuit*) it cannot be expressed by any periphrasis or circumlocution; for sect. 13. carnaliter cognovit eam or the like, will not serve.

Sect. 191.

*AUXY si un vill soit fait executor a un autre, & le seignior del villeine fuit en dette a le testator en un certaine somme d'argent, que nest my paie, en ceo case, le villeine, come executor de le testator, avera action de det envers son seignior; pur ceo que il ne recovers le det a son use demesne, mes al use le testator.*

ALSO if a villeine be made executor to another, and the lord of the villeine was indebted to the testator in a certain sum of money, which is not paid, in this case, the villein, as executor of the testator, shall have an action of debt against his lord; because he shall not recover the debt to his owne use, but to the use of the testator.

OF this matter (Doc. Plac. 388.) sufficient hath beene spoken in this chapter before. The villein shall have an action as executor against his lord, and it is no plea for the lord, to say, that the plaintife is his villeine; for he shall not be enfranchised by the user of this action; because he hath it by a gift in law to the use of the testator, and not to his owne use.

Sect. 192.

*ITEM le seignior ne poit prendre hors del possession de tiel villein, que est executor, les biens le mort; et si face, le villeine come executor avera action de trespassse de mesmes les biens issint prises envers son seignior, & recoupera damages al use le testator. Mes en tous tielx cases il covient, que le seignior, que est defendant en tielx actions, face protestation, que le plaintife est son villein; ou autrement le villeine sera enfranchise, co-*

ALSO the lord may not take out of the possession of such villeine, who is executor, the goods of the deceased; and if he doth, the villeine as executor shall have an action for the same goods so taken against his lord, and shall recover damages to the use of the testator. But in all such cases, it behoveth, that the lord, which is defendant in such actions, maketh protestation, that the plaintife is his villein; or otherwise the villeine shall be infran-

*LE seignior ne poit prendre hors del possession, &c. Of this also sufficient hath beene said before.*

*Et recoupera damages al use le testator.*

[7] Note damages recovered by the executor in an action of trespassse shall be assets; and yet they were never in the testator. And so it is in other like cases, as by our bookes it appeareth.

[7] If an executor hath a villeine for yeares, and the villein purchases land in fee, the executor entred, he shall have the whole fee simple; but because he had the villein in *autre droit*, viz. as executor to the use of the dead, it shall be assets in his hands. Note a diversity between the quantity of the estate, and the quality of it; for the law respecteth not the quantity of the estate, for not only

[7] tenant

who was wife of Robert Radwell, quia compertum est, quod dictus Henricus fuit natus per 11 dies post 40 septimanas, quod tempus est usitatum mulieribus pariendi, ex quo praedictus Robertus non habuit accessum ad praedictam Beatricem per unum mensem ante mortem suam, praesumitur dictum Henricum esse bastardum, ideo judgment for the plaintiff. Hal. MSS.

If this state of the case is correct, lord Coke's is erroneous in several particulars of consequence. 1. He is short in not expressing, that the record mentions *forty weeks*, and so leaving it to be deemed an *inference* of his own, as which it has been accordingly treated. 2. He exceeds the record, by representing it to file *that time the latest* for a woman's going with child, when the record only calls it the *usual period*. 3. He wholly omits the husband's having had *no access to the wife for one month before his death*; a fact very material, it being very easy to allow *eleven days* after the *usual time*, but requiring a strong case to warrant

Continuation of notes to 121. a.

Institute lord Coke represents this to be the *general law*, and, amongst many authorities cited to prove it, refers to a case of Hen. 7. reported by Keilwey, in which, whether the examination of a feme covert, on the enrolment of a bargain and sale to the king, sufficed to bind her, was largely debated. 2. Inst. 673. Keilw. 4. a. to 20. a. The just explanation therefore of the subject is, that the *pendency of a real action* for the freehold of the land, in consequence of previously taking out an original writ, without which preliminary even at this day a fine is a nullity, should be deemed the *primary cause* of the fine's binding a feme covert; and that the *secret examination* of her, on taking the acknowledgment of the fine, is only a *secondary cause* of this operation.

Such are the *three chief effects*, by reason of which, fines, no longer used, according to their original, as recorded agreements for conclusion of *actual suits*, have been changed into, and are still retained as *feigned proceedings*; and being thus accommodated to answer purposes, to which ordinary conveyances cannot be applied, it is no wonder, that they should not only be considered as a species of conveyance, but also be deemed a principal guard to the titles to real property, and as such be ranked amongst the most valuable of the common assurances of the realm.

In this digression on the properties of a fine, we have purposely omitted to consider its operation, either as an *esoppel*, except so far as it may be said to be one to the issue in tail by force of the 4. H. 7. and 32. H. 8. or as a *discontinuance*, or lastly in respect of the comoror's warranty, which is always inserted in it. The virtues of a fine, in the three points of view we have examined it, namely to extinguish dormant titles, to bar the issue in tail, and to pass the interests of femes covert; these constitute the more peculiar qualities, on account of which it is most usually, if not always, resorted to. As to the three other effects, it may be enough to observe here, that they are equally incident to feoffments, or any other deeds having warranties annexed. The distinct consideration of them is reserved for another occasion.—(1) If binding the parties, or even privies, exclusive of heirs in tail, was the only effect of a fine, it would scarce be preferable to less solemn agreements; for, without doubt they also are so far binding. The most distinguishable properties of a fine are barring *strangers* unless they claim within five years, barring the issue in tail immediately, and binding *femes covert*, as we have explained in the foregoing note.—(2) *In gro* not in L. and M. or Roh.—(3) *Et c.* in L. and M. and Roh.—(4) *Court* instead of *Et c.* in L. and M. and Roh.—(5) But see 1. Lev. 100. and 1. Sid. 298.

ing executed his power of appointing a guardian for his child, or after fourteen, when the custody of the guardian by force terminates

*from "the use of"*  
*As to discontinuance from the effect of a fine by the tenant for life, see Inst. fol. 251. b. 332*  
*a. p. 2.*

[1] L. 5. E. 4. 61.

[2] 21. H. 3. 61. 37.  
(Ante 127. a.)

[3] 41. E. 3. 21.

[4] 18. E. 3. 29.

Vide sect. 193.

[5] Pl. Com. 276. b. In Greif-  
brok's case.

[5] tenant in taile, and tenant for life of a villeine, shall have the perquisite of the villeine in fee, but [1] tenant for yeares, and tenant at will also shall have it in fee.

But the law respecteth the quality, for in what right he hath the villeine, in the same right shall he have the perquisite; as in the case of the executor abovesaid, and in the case of the bishop [2] that hath the villeine in right of his church, he shall have the perquisite in the same right.

[3] So if a man hath a villeine in the right of his wife, he shall have the perquisite also in her right. But if the purchase be after issue had, then the baron shall have the perquisite to him and his heires; because by the issue he is intituled to be tenant by the curtesie in his owne right.

**Protestation.** [4] *Protestatio* is an exclusion of a conclusion that a party to an action may by pleading incurre; or it is a safeguard to the party, which keepeth him from being concluded by the plea he is to make, if the issue be found for him. But in this case without a protestation, albeit the issue be found for the lord, the villeine shall be enfranchised, as it appeareth hereafter in this section.

## Sect. 193.

Brit. fol. 79. 125. b. 126. a.

**CEO serra trie en le countie, &c.**

Be tryed, that is, as it is intended by the verdict of twelve men, that is called in law a triall *triatio*.

[a] 7. E. 50. 26. E. 3. 73. 38. E. 3. 34. 40. E. 3. 36. 43. E. 3. 4. 31. 44. E. 3. 36. 47. E. 3. 26. 22. H. 6. 52. 35. H. 6. 12. 39. H. 6. 24. Vide sect. 534.

[a] In this case the law doth favour the villein in the issue; for otherwise by the rule of law in like cases he ought to answer to the special matter, *viz.* to the regardancy; but in favour of liberty he may reply, that he is free and of free estate, and consequently this issue concerning the person shall be tryed where the writ is brought. [b] The like law it is, if issue be joyned upon the ideocy of the plaintife or defendand, it shall be tryed where the writ is brought; because it concerneth the person.

[b] 2. Mar. Dier 112.  
(Post. 125. 7. Co. 1.)

**In favorem libertatis.** It is commonly said, that three things be favoured in law; life, liberty, dower.

(F. N. B. 77. f.)  
[c] Fortescue cap. 42.

[c] *Impius & crudelis iudicandus est, qui libertati non favet. Angliæ jura in omni casu libertati dant favorem.*

Tryall is to finde out by due examination the truth of the point in issue or question betweene the parties, where-

**ITEM si villeine fuist un action de trespasse, ou un auter action envers son seignior en un county; et le seignior dit, que il ne serra respondus, pur ceo que il est son villein regardant a son manor en auter county (1); & le plaintife dit, que il est franke et de franke estate, et nemy villeine; ceo serra trie en le county lou le plaintife avoit conceive son action, et nemy en le county lou le manor est: et ceo est in favorem libertatis. Et pur cel cause un estatute fuit fait an. 9. R. 2. cap. 2. le tenor de quel ensuist en tiel forme. Item pur la ou plusors villeins, et neifes, sibien des graundes seigni-**

**ALSO** if a villeine sueth an action of trespasse, or any other action, against his lord in one county; and the lord saith, that he shall not be answered, because he is his villeine regardant to his mannour in another county; and the plaintife saith that he is free, and of a free estate, and not a villein; this shall be tryed in the county where the plaintife hath conceived his action, and not in the county where the mannour is: and this is in favour of liberty. And for this cause a statute was made *anno 9. R. 2. ca. 2.* the tenor whereof followeth in this forme. Also for that where many villeins and neifes,

(1) &c. in L. and M. and Roll.

rant extending such liberality to nearly *six weeks*. 4. The word *presumitur*, which lord Coke passes over, is of importance; for it indicates, that, notwithstanding the great excess of time, it was conceived to create only a *presumption* for the bastardy, and consequently, if very cogent circumstances, to account for the protraction of the birth, and in favour of the wife's chastity, had occurred, the judgment might have been for the legitimacy.

So far we had advanced, when on looking into Rolle's Abridgment, we found this same ancient case of Radwell more at large, than either in lord Coke or lord Hale. But Rolle agrees with the former as well in respect to the record's not mentioning the *forty weeks*, as to its stating the birth to be eleven days after the *latest time in law for a woman's going with child*; and as from Rolle's particularity he seems to have most minutely attended to the record, his authority, till the whole record appears, seems most decisive. However the two last particulars, in which lord Coke differs from lord Hale, still remain, to which Rolle adds these further circumstances, that the *husband languished of a fever a long time before his death*; that on the taking of an inquisition afterwards in the court of a lord, of whom he held lands by knight's service, the *wife swore she was not pregnant*, and to prove it uncovered herself in open court; and that, in consequence of all this, the lord received a *collateral relation* as heir. The words describing the wife's exposure of her person are remarkable; for the record states, that she, being interrogated, *juramento asserbat, se non esse pregnantem; et, ut hoc omnibus manifeste liqueret, vestes suas ad tunicam exuebat, et in plena curia sic se videri permisit*. 1. Ro. Abr. 356. pl. 3. and 18. E. 1. rot. 13. in B. R. there cited. It reflects great discredit on the lord's court, which permitted such a gross indecency; and still more on the king's judges, who suffered it to be recorded as one of the grounds for a verdict before them. How laudably contrariant is the proceeding on the writ *de ventre inspiciendo*. This remedy for the heir against the pretence of pregnancy, so well known to be of earlier date than the reign of Edward the first, as it was framed in the times of Bracton Britton and Fleta, delicately requires the widow to be inspected by a jury of *her own sex*; and though in subsequent times the sheriff was ordered to summon a jury composed both of men and women, yet still the *search* was to be made by the latter only. Bract. 69. a. Brit. 165. b. Flet. lib. 1. c. 15. Reg. Br. Orig. 227. a. What harsh ideas of the times might we be led to adopt, if the early introduction of the writ *de ventre inspiciendo* did not demonstrate, that the unseemly record we are observing upon was a *singularity*, and so many other testimonies of a more advanced refinement in judicial proceedings did not concur, to rescue the age of our English Justinian, from the suspicion of a *general practice* of such barbarism.

Let us then suppose the record to be as it is in Rolle, which is the more probable to be the truth; because a contemporary judge, who reports its having been *produced* on a trial of legitimacy, represents it much in the same way. Cro. Jam. 541. But still it will not warrant lord Coke's inferring from it, that *forty weeks* constitute the latest time our law allows for a woman's going with child. On the contrary no particular time being mentioned, what period was meant, must be found out through some other *medium*; and as the record states *other unfavourable circumstances besides the excess of time*, and that the jury *presumed*

terminates, and from the want of the father's appointment there is no other ready to succeed to the trust and to take care of the infant

ors, come des auters gentes, sibiens spiri-  
 tuals come temporals,  
 s'enfuent, deins cities,  
 villes, & lieux en-  
 franchise, come en la  
 citie de Londres, &  
 auters semblables, &  
 feignont divers suits  
 envers leur seigniors,  
 a cause de eux faire  
 franks per le respons  
 de leur seigniors: ac-  
 corde est et assentus,  
 que les seigniors, ne  
 auters, ne soyent my  
 forbarres de leur  
 villeines per cause  
 de leur respons en  
 ley. Per force de quel  
 estatute, si ascun vil-  
 leine voylloit suer  
 ascun maner de acti-  
 on a son use demesne  
 en ascun county, ou  
 il est fort a trier en-  
 vers son seignior, le  
 seignior, poyt eslyer de  
 pleader, que le plain-  
 tife est son villeine, ou  
 de faire protestation,  
 que il est son villeine,  
 & de pleder son auter  
 matter en barré. Et  
 si ils sont a issue, &  
 l'issue soit trove par le  
 seignior, donque le vil-  
 lein est villein, come il  
 fut devant per force  
 de mesme lestatute.  
 Mes si le issue soit  
 trove par le villeine,  
 donque le villeine est  
 franke; pur vco que le

aswell of great lords as  
 of other men, aswell  
 of spirituall and tem-  
 porall, flye and go in-  
 to cities, townes, and  
 places franchised, as  
 into the city of Lon-  
 don and other like  
 places, and feine di-  
 vers suits against their  
 lords, because they  
 would make them-  
 selves free by the an-  
 swer of their lords: it  
 is accorded and assent-  
 ed, that lords nor  
 others shall not be fore-  
 barred of their villeins  
 by reason of their an-  
 swer in law. By force  
 of which statute, if any  
 villeine will sue any  
 manner of action to  
 his own use in any  
 countie, where it is  
 hard to try against his  
 lord, the lord may  
 chuse whether he will  
 plead, that the plain-  
 tife is his villeine, or  
 make protestation that  
 he is his villeine, and  
 plead his other matter  
 in bar. And if they be  
 at issue, and the issue  
 be found for the lord,  
 then the villeine is a  
 villeine, as he was be-  
 fore by force of the  
 same statute. But if the  
 issue be found for the  
 villeine, then the vil-  
 leine is free; because  
 that the lord tooke

upon judgement may be gi-  
 ven. And as the question be-  
 tweene the parties is two-  
 fold, so is the triall thereof:  
 for either it is *questio juris*,  
 (and that shall be tried by the  
 judges either upon a de-  
 murrer, special verdict or ex-  
 ception, for *cuilibet sua arte  
 perito est credendum; & quod  
 quisque norit in hoc se exerce-  
 at*; and it is commonly and  
 truly said, *ad questionem juris  
 non respondent juratores*) or it  
 is *questio facti* (1). And the  
 triall of the fact is in divers  
 sorts, whereof a light touch is  
 given before, sect. 10. Of these  
 a triall by xii. men (here in-  
 tended by Littleton) is the  
 most frequent and common.  
 And some few rules of law,  
 are necessary here to be re-  
 membered (for the better un-  
 derstanding of the booke of  
 law hereafter) where and  
 from what place, *viz. de quo  
 vicineto*, out of what neigh-  
 bourhood the jury shall come,  
 a necessary poynt to be  
 knowne; for if there be a  
 mis-tryall, (that is) if the  
 jury commeth out of a wrong  
 place, or returned by a wrong  
 officer and give a verdict,  
 judgement ought not to be  
 given upon such a verdict.  
 [d] Wherein the most general  
 rule is, that every tryall shall  
 be out of that towne, pa-  
 rish, or hamlet, or place  
 known out of the towne, &c.  
 within the record, within  
 which the matter of fact if-  
 suable is alledged, which is  
 most certaine and neereft  
 thereunto, the inhabitants  
 wherof may have the better  
 and more certaine knowledge  
 of the fact (2). As if the fact  
 be alledged in *quadam platea  
 vocat King-street in civitate  
 Westm. in cons' Midd.* In this  
 case the visne cannot come out  
 of *platea*; because it is neither  
 town, parish, hamlet, nor  
 place out of the neighbour-  
 hood whereof a jury may  
 come by law. But in this case  
 it shall not come out of West-  
 minster, but out of the parish  
 of St. Margaret, because that  
 is the most certaine. But

Vide sect. 234.

Vide sect. 102.

Vide sect. 234. more of this mat-  
ter.

(6. Co. 47. 5. Co. 36. b. Cro.  
Cha. 480.)

[d] 3. E. 3. 73. 20. H. 6. 10. 7.  
H. 4. 27. 9. H. 5. 8. 8. H. 6.  
34. 7. H. 6. 27. 17. E. 3. 56.  
43. E. 3. 5. 47. E. 3. 6. 34. H.  
6. 1.  
(2. Rol. Abr. 518. Cro. Jam.  
150. 326. 513. 676. Hob. 76.  
9. Co. 66. b. 11. Co. 25. b. 6.  
Co. 14.)

sumed against the child's being the issue of the deceased husband, it seems fair to suppose, that the law was understood, not to be so strict in the time alluded to, whatever that time might be, as indiscriminately to condemn as illegitimate all children not born within it, but rather to consider every excess, unless very extraordinary indeed, as only raising a presumption against them. This construction is clearly most consistent with the terms of the record in question. In the next note, we shall attempt to satisfy the reader, that the rule resulting from it is most conformable to other precedents and authorities, as well as to the reason of the thing.

After the case of Radwell from the record of E. 1. lord Hale gives the four following cases.—Rot. Parl. 9. E. 2. m. 4. Gilbert de Clare comes Glouc. obit 30. Junii 7. E. 2. in parlamento tent. quindena, Hil. 9. E. 2. the sisters and coheirs pray livery. Matilla, qhw suit uxor comitis, pretends to be big by the earl, which was accordingly found per inquisitionem. The coheirs reply, that si comitilla pregnant esset, tantum tempus elapsum est, ut secundum cursum pariendi non potest dici impregnari a comite. Yet they could not obtain livery till Pasch. 10. E. 2. but the question hung in deliberation.—Note 18. R. 2. where a woman in such a case immediately after the death of the first husband took a second husband, and had issue born forty weeks and eleven days after the death of the first husband, and it was held to be the issue of the second husband.—M. 17. Jac. B. R. Alsop and Stacey. Andrews dies of the plague. His wife, who was a lewd woman, is delivered of a child forty weeks and ten days after the death of the husband. Yet the child was adjudged legitimate and heir to Andrews; for partus potest protrahi ten days ex accidente.—M. 4. Car. in Cur. Ward. and afterwards P. 5. Cnr. B. R. Thecar marries a lewd woman, but she doth not cohabit with him, and is suspected of incontinency with Duncomb; Thecar dies; Duncomb within three weeks after the death of Thecar marries her; two hundred and eighty-one days and sixteen hours after his death she is delivered of a son. Here it was agreed, 1. If she had not married Duncomb, without question the issue should not be bastard, but should be adjudged the son of Thecar. 2. No averment shall be received that Thecar did not cohabit with the wife. 3. Though it is possible, that the son might be begotten after the husband's death, yet, being a question of fact, it was tried by a jury, and the son was found to be the issue of Thecar. Hal. MSS.

Lord Hale's case of E. 2. appears very extraordinary, the time from 30. June 7. E. 2. when the earl of Gloucester died, to the quindena of Hilary, or 19. Jan. 9. E. 2. when the livery to his sister was further postponed in parliament, being within one day of a year and seven months; which is a much later date for the delivery of a live child, than the most liberal in their calculations have hitherto assigned. However, on reading the printed copy of the original record, in the rolls of parliament lately published, we find lord Hale's note quite accurate. See Rot. Parl. v. 1. p. 553. As to the case of R. 2. it confirms the doubt we have elsewhere stated of the opinion, that, if a widow marries again and has a child within nine months after the death of the first husband, the child may choose his father; and is an authority for deciding according to the proof of the woman's condition when her first husband died. Ante fo. 8. a. note 7. Terms of the Law, first edit. tit. Bastard, and Cowel Inst. lib. 1. t. 9. Lord Hale's two other cases are reported in several books, Alsop and Stacey being in Cro. Jam. 541. Godb. 281. Palm. 9. 1. Ro. Abr. 356. and Thecar's in Cro. Jam. 684. Winch. 71. Litt. Rep. 177.

(1) See Post. 159. b. 228. a. (2) Both in civil and criminal suits the common law is very nice in requiring every issuable fact to be alledged, not only within a county, but also within a parish, town, or hamlet, or, for want of either of those, some other known place of the same county, not being a hundred, which probably was excluded as too large a division; and if this rule was not observed, it might be pleaded in abatement, or otherwise taken advantage of, by either party, according to the stage of the suit. Cro. Eliz. 260. Theil. Dig. Br. lib. 2. c. 15. to 18. Com. Dig. Abatement H. 13. Pleador C. 20. The necessity of having the county

of some day  
 the wife was  
 in the night  
 with the  
 husband  
 from the  
 the wife  
 in the  
 case  
 cited from  
 the MSS.  
 1791. 199

infant or his property. Lord Coke only takes notice of such an election, where the infant is under fourteen, and as to this omits



therein also it is to be noted, that if it had been alledged in Kingstreet in the parish of St. Margaret in the county of Middlesex, then should it have come out of Kingstreet, for then should Kingstreet have been esteemed in law a town[e]; for whensoever a place is alledged generally in pleading (without some addition to declare the contrary, as in this case it is) it shall be taken for a town[e]. [f] And albeit *parochia* generally alledged is a place incertaine, and may (as we see by experience) include divers townes; yet, if a matter be alledged in *parochia*, it shall be intended in law, that it containeth no more townes than one, unlesse the party doth shew the contrary. [g] But when a parish is alledged within a city, there without question the visne shall come out of the parish, for that is more certaine then the city. [h] If a trespassse be alledged in D, and *nil tiel ville* is pleaded, the jury shall come out *de vicineto de S*, for that is the more certaine. So if a matter be alledged within a manor, the jury shall come *de vicineto manerii*; but if the manor be alledged within a town[e], it shall come out of the town[e], because that is most certaine, for the manor may extend into divers townes. And all these points were resolved by all the judges of England upon conference betweene them in the case of John Arundel esquire indited for the death of William Parker\*.

(7. Co. 1. 1. Sid. 9. 88. Hob. 89. 1. Sid. 10. 2. Ro. Abr. 609. 1. Roll. Rep. 369. Cro. Eliz. 818.)  
[c] 4. E. 3. 30. 8. E. 3. 68. 39. H. 6. 13. Brooke Pleading 61.  
[f] 4. E. 4. 41. 5. E. 4. 20. 22. E. 4. 2. 35. H. 6. 30. 22. H. 6. 47. 1. Co. 162. Digges case 11. Co. 25. 6. Co. 14. (Hob. 190. 2. Rol. Abr. 616.)  
[g] 1. E. 3. 8. 7. H. 6. 38.  
[h] 22. E. 4. tit. Visne s. 27. 6. H. 7. 3. b. 11. H. 7. 22. b. 9. E. 4. 3. a. 3. E. 4. 26. 39. H. 6. Treip 93. 4. E. 3. 30. (Hob. 89. 266. 6. Co. 65. b. 1. Leon. 109. Cro. Car. 17. Cro. Jac. 302, 303. 308.)

[\*] 6. Co. 14. Arundel's case.  
[i] 45. E. 2. 5. a. 46. E. 3. 6. & 7. Gernon's case. 18. E. 3. 58. 11. H. 4. 56. b. 57. 17. E. 3. 36. b. 39. Aff. 10. 38. Aff. 30. 35. Aff. 7. (Cro. Jac. 239.)

[k] Mich. 31. & 32. Eliz. Rot. 365. in the King's Bench, inter Edan & Frankline, adjudge 3. Mar. Dier 129. 18. Eliz. Dier 353. 17. Eliz. Dier 342. (1. Rol. Abr. 604. Plowd. 232. Cro. Jam. 239. 9. Co. 47. a.)

[l] 8. E. 4. 24. 9. H. 6. 46. 47. 21. H. 6. 4. 18. Aff. 7. 30. E. 3. 16. 17. 7. E. 4. 31. 27. H. 8. 30. 11. H. 4. 68.  
[m] 15. E. 4. 25. b. 9. H. 6. 46. 26. E. 3. 7. E. 4. 31. 39. E. 3. 16. 17. (Cro. Jac. 134. 1. Sid. 76. Hob. 54. 66. Noy 144. 2. Rol. Abr. 103.)

[n] 9. H. 6. 46. 39. E. 3. 16. 17.

[o] 10. Co. 54. and the bookes there cited.  
[p] Mich. 21 & 22. Eliz. Dier 367. 5. Co. 36. b. Bainham's case. 39. E. 3. 2. b. 44. E. 3. 6. 11. H. 6. 13. 5. Co. 40. Dornier's case. (5. Co. 36. b. Hob. 5. 1. Sid. 193. 2. Rol. 625. 1. Sid. 339.)

seignior ne prist al not at the beginning  
commencement pur son for his plee, that the  
plee, que le villeine villeine was his vil-  
fuit son villeine, mes leine, but tooke this  
ceo prist per protesta- by protestation, &c.  
tion, &c.

[i] In a reall action, where the demandant demands land in one county, as heire to his father, and alledges his birth in another county, if it be denied that he is heire, it shall not be tryed where the birth was alledged, but where the land lyeth, for there the law presumes it shall be best knowne who is heire. But if the defendant make himself heire to a woman, for that is the furer and more certaine side, and the mother is certaine, when perhaps the father is incertaine, and therefore there it shall be tryed, where the birth is alledged; because they have more certaine conufance then where the land lyeth. And so it is where generally bastardy is alledged, the tryall shall be in like case *mutatis mutandis*. [k] If a man plead the king's letters patents, and the other party plead *non concessit*, it shall not be tryed where the letters patents beare date, for they cannot be denied, but where the land lyeth.

Every tryall must come out of the neighbourhood of a castle, manor, town or hamlet, or place known out of a castle, manor, town or hamlet, as some forrefts and the like, as before and by the authorities thereupon quoted appeareth.

Every plea concerning the person of the plaintife, &c. shall be tryed where the writ is brought, as it appeareth before.

When the matter alledged extendeth into a place at the common law, and a place within a franchise, it shall be tryed at the common law.

[l] In an action against two, the one pleads to the writ, the other to the action, the plea to the writ shall be first tryed; for, if that be found, all the whole writ shall abate, and make an end of the businesse.

[m] In a plea personall against divers defendants, the one defendant pleads in barre to parcell, or which extendeth only to him that pleadeth it, and the other pleads a plea which goeth to the whole, the plea, that goeth to the the whole, (that is) to both defendants, shall be first tried; and of this opinion was Littleton in our bookes, for the tryall of that goeth to the whole; and the other defendant shall have advantage thereof, for in a personall action the discharge of one is the discharge of both. As for example, if one of the defendants in trespassse pleade a release to himselfe, (which in law extends to both) and the other pleads not guilty (which extends but to himselfe) or if one pleads a plea which excuses himselfe onely, and the other plead another plea which goeth to the whole, the plea, which goeth to the whole, shall be first tryed; for, if that be found, it maketh an end of all, and the other defendant shall take advantage hereof, because the discharge of one is the discharge of both. But in a plea reall it is otherwise; for every tenant may lose his part of the lands. [n] As if a *præcipe* be brought as heire to his father against two, and one plead a plea which extendeth but to himselfe, and the other pleads a plea which extends to both, as bastardy in the demandant, and it is found for him, yet the other issue shall be tryed, for he shall not take advantage of the plea of the other, because one joyntenant may lose his part by his misplea. [o] But where an issue is joynd for him, and a demurrer for the residue, the court may direct the tryall of the issue, or judge the demurrer first at their pleasure.

[p] If a *venire fac.* be awarded to the coroners where it ought to be to the sherife, or the visne commeth out of a wrong place, yet if it be *per assensum partium*, and so entred of record, it

county named is very obvious; as otherwise it could not be known, whether the court had jurisdiction, who was the proper officer to direct the process of the court to, or whence the jury was to come, and consequently the cause could not go on. Nor is it difficult to account for stating a particular place in the county. One reason might be, that, if there was no other explanation of the case where the cause of action or ground of defence arose, than by reference to the extensive limits of a county, the allegation might fail in that certainty so essential to its being either well understood or properly controverted; and the rule, so far as it may have this foundation, still continues unchanged. But the other and principal reason was, that, if issue was taken on the fact alledged, it might be tried by a jury of the *visne* or neighbourhood, which our ancestors conceived to be more likely to be qualified to investigate and discover the truth, than persons living at a distance from the scene of the transaction. For this purpose the *venire facias* always directed the sheriff to summon a jury from the neighbourhood of the *parish* or *place*, within which the fact to be tried was alledged; and this was not mere form; for it was the sheriff's duty to attend to the direction; and if at least four of the hundred, in which the place was situate, were not included in the panel returned by him, it was a good cause of challenge to the *array* or *whole panel*; or if four such persons did not attend to be sworn, the *polls*, or particular jurors, might be challenged for the same default. Post. 157. a. 48. E. 3. 30. 48. Aff. 5. 7. H. 4. 46. 21. E. 4. 59. b. Nay, so very essential did the common law deem the having some of the neighbours on the jury, that, if the *visne* appeared on the record to be from a wrong place, whether in consequence of the party's alledging the fact in a place not proper for a *visne*, or of the court's mis-awarding it, in both cases it was equally a mis-trial, and a good ground for a motion to arrest the judgment or for reversing it by error. Cro. Eliz. 260. Hob. 5. But thus restricting every *visne* to a particular part of the county, though well intended, was followed with great inconveniencies. It encouraged the losing party after a trial, to make trivial objections to the *visne*, in order to disappoint his adversary of the fruits of a just verdict; and either because the rules for laying the *visne* were in themselves vague, or because they were perverted by an over curious interpretation, such objections not only became very common, but often succeeded, as appears from the profusion of cases and learning to be met with on the subject in our reports. See Roll. Abr. and Vin. Abr. tit. *Trial*. At length the grievance became so intolerable to suitors, that parliament interposed to relieve them; for which purpose several statutes were made. The 21. Jam. c. 13. gives aid after verdict, where the *visne* is partly wrong, that is, where it is awarded out of too many or too few places in the county named. The 16. & 17. Cha. 2. c. 8. goes further; and cures the defect of the *visne* wholly, so that the cause was tried by a jury of the proper county, without any regard to the part of the county from which the jury came. Still, however, either party was at liberty to object to the default of hundredors at the trial, which was found to be very troublesome on account of the difficulty of always having four jurors so qualified. The 4. & 5. An. c. 16. therefore directs, that every *venire facias* shall be awarded from the *body* of the county, in which the action is triable. But these statutes do not extend to *indictments* or other criminal suits; nor has any act been yet made to include any such, except the 24. G. 2. c. 18. which only applies to actions on penal statutes. Why a regulation so convenient should be thus confined principally to civil cases, seems unaccountable. However, though the ancient law continues in force as to trials for crimes, yet it hath been long deviated from in practice; lord Hale taking notice, that even during his time he never knew an instance of a challenge for want of hundredors in treason or felony; and the sheriffs, as we are well informed, now always summoning juries from the county at large, without the least regard to the *visne* of each indictment. 2. Hal. Hist. Pl. C. 272. Under such circumstances, retaining the form of a *visne* from the particular place of the county, in which the crime is alledged, merely serves

to state how and before whom it should be made, nor have we yet met with any prior or cotemporary writer who, supplies the defect

it shall stand; for omnis consensus tollit errorem. (1) And thus much of these excellent points of learning: and if you desire to know the institution and right use of this trial by twelve men, and of the antiquitie thereof, and more of this matter, reade the 234. section hereafter, which is worthy of your observation.

Estatute. Or statute. This commeth of the Latine word statutum, which is taken for an act of parliament made by the king, the lords and commons, and is divided into two branches generall and speciall: This statute here mentioned is a generall statute, and darkely and obscurely penned.

Et filis joint a issue. [q] Issue, exitus, a single, certaine, and materiall point issuing out of the allegations or pleas of the plaintife and defendant, confisting regularly upon an affirmative and negative to be tried by twelve men. And it is twofold, a speciall issue, as here in the case of Littleton; or generall, as in trespasse, not guilty, in assise, nul tort nul disseisin, &c. And as an issue naturall commeth of two severall persons, so an issue legal issueth out of two severall allegations of aduers parties.

And to make our bookes more easie to be understood concerning this point, it is good to set downe some necessary rules (among many other) concerning joyning of issues. An issue being taken generally referreth to the count, and not to the writ. As in an account the writ chargeth him generally to be his receiver, the count chargeth him specially to be his receiver by the hands of T; the defendant pleadeth, that he was never his receiver in manner and forme, &c. this shall referre to the count, so as he cannot be charged but by the receipt of the hands of T.

[r] A speciall issue must be taken in one certain materiall point, which may be best understood, and best tryed.

[s] An issue shall not be taken upon a negative pregnant, which implyeth another sufficient matter, but upon that, which is single and simple. As ne dona pas per le fait imply a gift by parol; therefore the issue must be Et dona pas modo & forma.

[t] An issue joynd upon an absque hoc, &c. ought to have an affirmative after it. Two affirmatives shall not make an issue unless it be, lest the issue should not be tried.

[u] Some issues be good upon matter affirmative and negative, albeit the affirmative and negative be not in precise words. As in debt for rent upon a lease for yeares, the defendant pleades, that the plaintife had nothing at the time of the lease made; the plaintife replyeth that he was seised in fee, &c. this is a good issue.

[w] Where the issue is joynd of the part of the defendant, the entry is et de hoc ponit se super patriam; but if it be of part of the plaintife, the entry is et hoc petit quod inquiratur per patriam.

[x] There be some negative pleas, that be issues of themselves, whereunto the demandant, or plaintife, cannot reply, no more than to a generall issue, which is, et predictus A. similiter. As if the tenant do vouch, and the demandant counterplead that the vouchee or any of his auncestors had any thing, &c. whereof he might make a feoffment, he shall conclude, et hoc petit quod inquiratur per patriam, & predictus tenens similiter. So in a fine pleaded by the tenant, &c. the demandant may say, quod partes finis nihil habuerunt, & hoc petit quod inquiratur per patriam, & prad tenens similiter. And so in a writ of dower, the tenant pleads unques seiscie que dower, he shall conclude, et de hoc ponit se super patriam, et prad, petens similiter; and so in many other cases; and of this opinion was Littleton in our bookes.

[y] A man leaves his wife enseint with a child, issue shall not be taken, that she was not enseint by her husband on the day of his death, for filiation non potest probari; but the issue must be, whether she was enseint the day of his death (2).

[z] A protestation availeth not the partie that taketh it, if the issue be found against him; and therefore if the issue be found for the villeine, he is infranchised for ever. And yet in some special case, albeit the issue be found against him that maketh the protestation, yet he shall take benefit by his protestation. (\*) As if a man entreteth into warrantie, and taketh by protestation the value of the land, albeit the plea be found against him, yet the protestation shall serve him for the value.

Vid. 25. E. 3. ca. 18. F. N. B. 77. c. 26. E. 3. 73.

[q] Vid. sect. 414. 7. H. 6. 43. 9. E. 4. 36. 36. H. 6. 15. 5. E. 4. 26. 11. H. 4. 79. (Mo. 80. 1. Ro. Rep. 86. 1. Leon. 78. 9. Co. 110. Cro. Cha. 164. 80. Doct. Plac. 256, 257. Cro. Jam. 87. 560. Doct. Plac. 187. Cro. Jam. 580. 586, 589. Hob. 253.) 7. E. 3. 34. (Cro. El. 372)

[r] 20. E. 3. Issue 31. 22. Ed. 4. 28. 8. E. 3. 8. 9. H. 6. 18. 38. E. 3. 33.

[s] 21. H. 6. 9. b. 16. E. 4. 5. 24. E. 3. 32. 33. 75. 31. E. 3. Issue 17. 13. E. 3. 1b. 27. 27. E. 3. 49. 30. E. 3. 8. 10. E. 3. 32. 22. E. 3. 13. 18. E. 3. Issue 35. 5. H. 7. 8. 31. Aff. 25. 12. E. 4. 4. 8. 2. H. 4. 23. 38. H. 6. 22. 40. E. 3. 5. 5. E. 3. 24.

[t] 12. El. Dyer 253. 22. H. 6. 19. 32. H. 6. 23. 2. R. 3. 6. H. 7. 5. 11. H. 4. 79.

[u] 2. H. 7. 4. 5. H. 7. 12. 26. 11. H. 4. 83. 6. E. 4. 6. b. 26. H. 8. Dyer 6. in Formedon. 28. H. 8. Dyer 31. 18. H. 6. 8. 9. 15. E. 4. 32. 32. H. 6. 23. 7. H. 6. 27. 43. Aff. 4. 9. E. 4. 36. Pl. Com. 172. a. 36. H. 6. 15. (6. Co. 24)

[w] 26. H. 8. 3. 18. El. Dyer 353. (1. Sid. 215. 290. 340. 341. Cro. Cha. 164.)

[x] 22. H. 6. 57. 59. 33. H. 6. 21. 3. H. 7. 9. 12. E. 4. 13. 17. E. 3. 53. 77. 78. 22. E. 3. 16. 17. 24. E. 3. 50. 40. E. 3. 19.

[y] 41. E. 3. 11. b.

[z] 10. E. 4. Protest. 5. 10. E. 4. 12. 32. Aff. 9. 30. E. 3. 14. 9. H. 6. 59. Vid. sect. 192. (Plowd. 276. Cro. Cha. 365. Doct. Plac. 295.)

(\*) 30. E. 3. 14.

Sect. 194.

ITEM le seignior ne poet mayhemer son villeine; car sil maihema son villein, mayme his villeine,

ALSO the lord may not mayme his villeine; for if he

Mayhemer, [a] or mobaigner, a French word, of which cometh mayhim, mabemium (id est) membri mutilatio, and

[a] Stamf. lib. 1. ca. 47. Glanvil. lib. 14. ca. 7. Braet. lib. 3. fol. 144. 145. Brit. cap. 25. fol. 48. 49. Flet. lib. 1. ca. 38. (Post. 288. 1. Sid. 215.)

serves to create delay and embarrassment in the distribution of criminal justice, whenever an accused person may chuse captiously to exert his right of challenging for default of hundredors, &c.

(1) The cases to this point disagree; but the most modern are with lord Coke. See Vin. Abr. Trial S. a. 2. (2) The case cited from the Year Book of 41. E. 3. is a direct authority to this purpose. However it may be doubted, whether the doctrine continues to be law. At least it fails in principle, if it is founded on the notion that the presumption of the husband's being the father of every child, the wife bears or conceives during the marriage, cannot be repelled by evidence to the contrary. Such a position indeed is asserted more than once by lord Coke in the present work, and may be met with in other books. Post. 244. a. 373. a. Vin. Abr. Bastard A. 2. & B. But it never was an universal rule, lord Coke and all the authorities agreeing, that, if the husband is beyond sea during the whole time of the wife's going with child, the issue is a bastard. Nor is the position in any degree true at present; for ever since Pendrell's case in the 5. G. it has been settled, that not only proof of being out of the kingdom, but also every other kind of evidence, tending to prove the impossibility or even improbability of the husband's being the father, is admissible. 1. Blackst. Comment. 5. edit. 457. 2. Stra. 925. 3. P. Wms. 365. Bott's Poor Laws, 2d. ed. 105. Our books do not state on what grounds Pendrell's case was determined. But very ancient authorities are not wanting to justify over-ruling the doctrine, which prevailed in lord Coke's time. Braet. taking notice of the presumption, that marriage proves legitimacy, adds, et semper stabitur hinc presumptio, donec probetur contrarium, ut, ecce, maritus probatur non concubuisse aliquamdiu cum uxore, infirmus vel alia causa impeditus, vel erat in ea in valetudine ut generare non possit. Braet. fo. 6. a. In another place the same author is still more explicit, for he states it to be a violent presumption against the child's legitimacy, if the husband is proved, propter aliquam infirmitatem, vel frigiditatem, vel aliam impotentiam coeundi, per multum tempus non concubuisse cum uxore, or si probetur, quod extra regnum vel provinciam per bicinium & ultra longe extiterit, quod vehementer presumi possit, quod ad uxorem a se non potuit. Braet. fo. 63. b. There are also other passages to a like effect both in Braet. and Fleta. Braet. fo. 70. b. 278. a. Flet. lib. 1. c. 15. It is worthy remark too, that not only these limitations of the rule of pater est quem nuptia demonstrant, but even the words of them are in a great degree borrowed from the text of Justinian. See Dig. lib. 1. tit. 6. l. 6. But this by no means ought to lessen their value with our common lawyers. On the contrary, it should be deemed an additional reason for deferring to them; because the trial of general bastardy belongs to the ecclesiastical courts, and these, in this instance, as well as in others, are much swayed by the authority of the Roman law. See further on this subject Godolph. Repertor. Canon. 477. Bryd. Law of Bastard. 83. Voet ad Pandect. lib. 1. tit. 6. sect. 6. Ayl. Parerg. tit. Bastardy, and same title in the Abridgments.

(1) Ou instead of et in L. and M. (2) But by the 17. E. 3. de prerogativa regis, the king's grant of a manor will not pass an advowson appendant without express mention of it. Yet there are some cases, which have been deemed not within the reason of the statute; such as the crown's restitution of lands to wards at their full age and to the heirs of idiots, or of temporalities to new bishops. Staundf. Prerog. 43. a. Doder. Advowf. 36. Even words of reference have been held sufficient; as where the king granted a manor with all its appurtenances, as fully as the same came to and were possessed by the crown, and an advowson was appendant to the manor. Adjudged in Whittler's case, 10. Co. 63. a. It is agreed in our old books, that before the statute de prerogativa regis, the king's grant of a manor would pass an advowson appendant, without naming it, or so much as using the word appurtenances. Staundf. Prerog. 43. a. 10. Co. 64. a. But in the History of Westmorland, lately published by Mr. Nichol-

defect. Ante 87. b. As to a guardian after fourteen, it appears from the ending of guardianship in socage at that age, as if the

Collins before and cited in Salk. 123. Case of the King v. S. Margueret. Mich. 5. Ann. B. R. Salk. 123. 1. Jones v. Holden. G. 2. B. R. 2. 2. v. Reading. P. R. 2. Ann.

Mirror cap. 1. sect. 9.

Vide sect. 1. (4. Co. 39. b.)

[b] Lamb. Just. of Peace.

[c] Vide 1. H. 4. 6. b. (4. Co. 43.)

[d] Fleta lib. 1. cap. 40. Britt. cap. 25. Braet. 145. Mirror cap. 3.

[e] Regist. Judic. 25. 8. Co. 59. Beecher's case. (8. Co. 38.)

[f] Vide sect. 74. 174. 441. (11. Co. 42.) [g] 8. Co. 59. Beecher's case. F. N. B. 76.

(J. R. Abr. 238.) [h] Glanvil. lib. 9. cap. 11. Magna Charta cap. 14. Fleta lib. 2. cap. 43. & 60. & lib. 1. cap. 43. Braet. lib. 3. fol. 116.

[i] 22. E. 3. 1. & 2. 14. E. 3. Amerciam. 16. 8. R. 2. ibid. 26. &c.

[k] Pl. Com. 401. Cole's case. 37. H. 6. 21. 5. Co. 49. Vaughan's case.

[l] Vaughan's case ubi supra. Beecher's case ubi supra. (1. Roll. Rep. 11.)

and *membra est pars corporis habens destinatum operationem in corpore.* Mayhemum vero dici poterit, ubi aliquis in aliqua parte sui corporis effectus sit inutilis ad pugnam. And the law hath so appropriated this word *mayhem*, which our author here useth, to this offence, as *mayhemavit* cannot be expressed by any other word, as, *mutavit*, *truncavit*, or *detruncavit*, or the like.

*Il serra indite*, or rather *endite*, and so is the original; for it commeth of the French word *enditer*, and signifieth in law an accusation found by an enquest of 12 or more upon their oath; and the accusation is called *indictamentum*. And, as the appeale is ever the suite of the partie, so the inditement is alwaies the suite of the king, and as it were his declaration. [b] Some derive it from the Greeke word *ἰνδίκιον* to accuse.

[c] *N'averá &c. appeale de mayhem.* Because in that appeale he shall recover but damages, which the lord after execution might take againe, and so the judgement *inutile* and illusory, and *sapiens incipit à fine*. And the law never giveth an action, where the end of it can bring no profit or benefit to the plaintife. But here it is to be observed, that, albeit the party grieved can have no action for the mayhem, yet at the king's suite he shall be punished therefore, for the reason hereafter expressed in this section. [d] And in ancient time there were appeales *de plagis & de imprisonmento*; but they are out of use and turned to actions of trespass.

*Finis, finis.* Here *finis* signifieth a pecuniarie punishment for an offence, or a contempt committed against the king, and regularly to it imprisonment appertaineth. And it is called *finis*; because it is an end for that offence. [e] And in this case a man is said *facere finem de transgressione*, &c. *cum rege*, to make an end, or *finis* with the king for such a transgression. It is also taken for a summe given by the tenant to the lord for concord, and an end to be made. [f] It is also taken for the highest and best assurance of lands, &c. Here it is good to see, what a *fine* differeth from an *amerciament*. [g] *Amerciament* in Latine is called *miseriordia*; for that it ought to be assessed mercifully. And this ought to be moderated by assentment of his equals, or else a writ *de moderata misericordia* doth lie. And thereof Glanvil saith thus. [h] *Est autem misericordia domini regis, qua quis per juramentum legalium hominum de vicineto catentis amercandus est, ne aliquid de suo honorabili contentemento amittat.*

[i] The cause of an *amerciament* in plea reall, personall or mixt (where the king is to have no fine) is, for that the tenant or defendant ought to render the demand (as he is commanded by the king's writ) the first day: which, if he do, he shall not be amerced. So as for the delay; that the tenant or defendant doth use, he shall be amerced. [k] And albeit the *amerciament* cannot be imposed, nor the king fully intited thereunto, until judgement be given, because by the judgement the wrong is discerned; yet a pardon before judgement, after judgement given, shall discharge the party, because the originall cause, *viz.* the delay, &c. is pardoned [l] What then if a *precept* be brought against an infant, and, hanging the plea, he commeth of full age?

He son and Dr. Burn, the record of a case of *duress presentment* of the 15. E. 1. is cited, in which the court adjudged, that a grant of the manor of Burgh, with its *appurtenances*, being from the crown, would not pass the advowson of the chapel though appendant to the manor; and thence the 17. E. 2. is concluded to be only declaratory of the common law. See vol. 1. p. 564, 565. The case appealed to seems full in point. But then there is a strong current of authorities the other way; for the case of 43. E. 3. 23. is to the contrary; and so are the instances of things appendant not within the statute. Staundf. Prærog. 42. a. 10. Co. 64. a. (3) *On for et in L. and M.*—(4) See note 2. to 122. a.—(5) Acc. 1. Ventr. 407.—(6) *Adjunctum* is rather a term of the logicians. The *accessorium* of the civil law answers best to our terms of *regardant*, *appendant*, *appurtenant*, and *incident*. How these differ from that, which is *part* or *parcel* of a thing, is explained in judge Dodderidge's Treatise on Advowsons. See p. 38.—(7) This position is not universally true. It sometimes fails as to things appurtenant. *Return of writs* or a *let* may be appurtenant to an *hundred*; so may *wolf and stray* to a *let*; and yet in these instances both subjects are *incorporeal*. Ante 121. a. 8. H. 7. 21. 2. 3. Roll. Rep. 128. The true test seems to be the propriety of relation between the *principal* and the *adjunct*; which may be found out, by considering, whether they so agree in nature and quality, as to be capable of union without any incongruity. See 1. Ventr. 386.

Notes to 122. a.

(1) Acc. Dy. 70. b. and two adjudged cases in marg. of ed. 1688. Acc. also by Dyer in 2. Leon. 422. The same point was agitated in *Long and Heming*, 31. Eliz. of which case the reports differ so much, that it is difficult to say, what was decided by the court. But it rather seems to have ended with an opinion consonant to lord Coke's. Stat. 103. Cro. Eliz. 209. 1. Leon. 287. 4. Leon. 216. Dodder. Advow. 41.—(2) This may at first seem to clash with the doctrine before, that *appendants are ever by prescription*. Ante 121. b. n. 2. But they may be reconciled; for, as appendancy cannot be without prescription, the former always implies the latter; and therefore if one pleads common appurtenant, it is unnecessary to add the usual form of prescribing.—(3) See Fulb. Præpar. 68. b. and 1. Saund. 321.—(4) But not if there is a grant to show; common appurtenant being claimable by grant, as well as by prescription. Adj. Cro. Cha. 482.—(5) It has been denied, that common in gross can be *sans nombre*. See 1. Saund. 346. But see Fulb. Præpar. 70. b. and the books there cited.—(6) For the cases above *sola vestitura* see ante 4. b. n. 1. As to *several pastures*, whether a prescription for it can be made against the owner of the soil, has been the subject of argument in three different cases since lord Coke's time. In the first the court of Common Pleas was equally divided. North and Cox, Mich. 20. Cha. 2. Vaugh. 251. 1. Lev. 253. In the second the court of King's Bench inclined to think such a prescription good; but the demurrer, on which the point arose, being over-ruled by consent, in order to try the fact, and a verdict being found against it, a decision of the question of law became unnecessary. Potter and North, Easter 21. Cha. 2. 1. Ventr. 383. 1. Saund. 327. 1. Lev. 268. But in the third case, which was on a motion to arrest judgment, the whole court of King's Bench adjudged for the prescription. Hopkins and Robinson, East. 23. Cha. 2. Pollexf. 13. 1. Mod. 74. 1. Saund. 314. 2. Leach. 2. Since this last case lord Coke's doctrine seems to have been generally acquiesced in.—(7) According to this passage, ownership of the soil is not necessarily included in a *several fishery*, and *common of fishery* and *free fishery* are the same thing. But one, whose works will be admired, as long as it good taste for literary compositions or gratitude for the pleasure and instruction derived from them shall

Notes to 121. b. here postponed to 124. b.

common law deemed a guardian afterwards unnecessary. However, since the 12. of Cha. 2. enabling the father to appoint a guardian

he shall be amerced for the delay after his full age. So likewise if the demandant or plaintive be nonsuit or judgement given against him, hee shall be likewise amerced *pro falso clamore*. (5. Co. 49. a. Cro. Cha. 410. 8. Co. 62. b.)

[m] And for the payment of this amerciament the defendant or plaintive, &c. shall finde pledges; and those demandants or plaintives, that shall finde no pledges, (as the king, the queene, an infant, &c.) shall not be amerced. And therefore when such are demandant or plaintive, the writ shall not say, *Si rex, &c. fecerit te securum de clamore suo prosequendo*.

[m] F. N. B. 31. f. 47. c. & 101. a. Bract. lib. 4. fol. 254. 17. E. 3. 75. 18. E. 3. 2. Br. tit. amerciam. 53. 43. Aff. 45. &c.

[n] If a writ doe abate by the act of the demandant or plaintive, or for matter of forme, the demandant or plaintive shall be amerced; but if it abate by the act of God, as by the death of one, where there is two or the like, there shall be no amerciament. And to an amerciament, imprisonment belongeth not, as it doth to a fine or ransome. If you desire to read more of fines and amerciaments, Vide 8. Co. 38. 39. &c. Greflye's case: & 11. Co. 43. 44. Godfrey's case (1):

[n] Beecher's case 8. Co. 60. b. (1. Ro. Abr. 213.)

[o] It is to be knowne that *wit*, *wita*, is an old Saxon word, and signifieth an amerciament, as *stedwite* an amerciament for fleeing or being a fugitive, and so is *stemfwite*, *blodwite* an amerciament for drawing of blood, *ferdwite* concerning warfare, and so *letherwite*, *childwite*, *wardwite*, and the like. Sometime it signifieth forfeiture; sometime freedom, or acquittal.

[o] Fleta lib. 1. cap. 47. Stat. de exposit. verborum.

[p] And *bote* is also an ancient Saxon word, and sometime signifieth amerciament, or compensation, as *theshbote*, *manbote*; or freedom from the same, as *brighbote*, *castlebote*, *burgbote*.

[p] Lam. explication of Saxon words. Leges Inz. cap. 19.

*Wera* or *were* [q] sometime signifieth amerciament or compensation, but properly *Wera Anglice idem est in Saxonis lingua viz. pretium vite hominis appetitatum*; which and the like words you shall often reade in ancient charters.

[q] Lamb ubi supra, & Fleta lib. 1. cap. 47.

*Ransome*. [r] *Redemptio* is here taken for a grand summe of money for redeeming of a great delinquent from some heynous crime, who is to be captivate in prison untill he payeth it. Some hold it to amount to his whole estate, and others hold that ransome is a treble fine. [s] But in legall understanding a fine and ransome are all one; for, upon the statute of Merlebridge, cap. 3. upon these words *Non ideo puniatur dominus per redemptionem*, the tenant shall not have (where the lord distraineth within his fee where nothing is behind) an action of trespass *quare vi & armis* against his lord; for therein the lord should be punished by redemption, that is, by fine, and in that action the fine is very small. And this is manifest by many authorities in all succession of ages: and this appeareth by our author in this place, for he saith, *Il ferra pur ceo un grievous fine & ransome*, where fine and ransome must of necessitie, in his opinion, be taken for all one; for if the fine and ransome were divers, then should the party, that mahemed the villeine, pay two summes, one for a fine, and another for a ransome, which never was done. And aptly a redemption and a fine is taken to be all one; for, by the payment of the fine, he redeemeth himself from imprisonment, that attendeth the fine, and then there is an end of the businesse.

[r] Dier. 6. Eliz. 232.

[s] See the second part of the Institutes Merlebr. cap. 3.

(2. Inst. 106. Plowd. 66. b. F. N. B. E. 4. Co. 11. b. Post. 281. b.)

[t] 5. H. 7. 10. 48. E. 3. 5. 6.

41. E. 3. 26. 44. E. 3. 13. 2. H.

4. 4. 11. H. 4. 78. 1. H. 6. 6.

9. H. 7. 14. 8. E. 4. 15. 10. E.

4. 7. 20. E. 4. 3. 21. E. 4. 3.

Mich. 17. & 18. Eliz. Bevel's

case, 4. Co. 11. & 9. Co. 76.

Comb's case.

It signifieth properly a summe of money paid for the redemption of a captive, and is compounded of *re* and *emo*, that is to redeeme or buy again. And it is to be knowne, that [u] by the ancient law of England, if the defendant in an appeale of mayhem had been found guilty, the judgement against the defendant had beene, that he should lose the like member, that the plaintive lost by his means; as if the plaintive had lost an hand, the defendant also should lose one, & sic de cæteris, in respect whereof the writ saith, [w] *felonice mahemavit*, for that the defendant should lose a member.

[u] 40. Aff. 9. Mirror cap. 4. &

ca. 5. Sect. 18. Britton cap. 25.

fol. 48. Bract. lib. 3. fol. 144.

145. Fleta lib. 1. cap. 38.

[w] Bract. ubi supra. Britt. cap.

3. fol. 77. b.

(4. Co. 43. Post. 288. a.)

Alwaies at the common law, when the defendant should lose life or member, the writ saith *felonice*, &c. And now albeit the law be changed (for at this day, the plaintive shall, as our author saith, recover but dammages) yet the writ of appeale saith still *felonice*.

Note the life and members of every subject are under the safeguard and protection of the king, for, as Bracton [x] saith, *Vita & membra sunt in potestate regis*. And therewith agreeth a notable record, Pasch. 19. E. 1. coram rege Rot. 36. Northt. *vita & membra sunt in manu regis*, to the end that they may serve the king and their countrie; when occasion shall be offered. Nay, the lord of the villeine, for the cause aforesaid, cannot mayheme the villeine, but the king shall punish him for mayheming of his subject (for that hereby he hath disabled him to do the king service) by fine, ransome, and imprisonment untill the fine and ransome be paid. So as there is a manifest diversity between a ransome and an amerciament; for ransome is ever when the law inflicted a corporal punishment by imprisonment, (and so is also a fine) but otherwise it is of an amerciament, as hath bin said. And [y] ancients have said, that *ransome nest forsqe redemption de paine corporel per fine des deniers*. This offence of mayhem is under all felonies deserving death, and above all other inferior offences; so as it may be truly said of it, that it is, *Inter crimina majora minimum, & inter minora maximum* (2). And in my circuit in anno 11. Jacobi regis, in the county of Leicester, one Wright, a young strong and lustie

[x] Bract. lib. 1. fol. 6. Pasch.

19. E. 1. coram Rege. Rot. 36.

Northt.

[y] Mirror. cap. 5. Sect. 1. & 3.

rogue, shall have any influence, gives a very opposite explanation; for, according to him, ownership of soil is essential to a several fishery; and a free fishery differs both from several fishery and common of fishery, from the former by being confined to a public river and not necessarily comprehending the soil, from the latter by being exclusive. 2. Blackst. Com. 8. ed. 39. But we doubt, whether this distinction may not be in a great degree questionable.—1. In respect to a several fishery, where is the inconsistency in granting the sole right of fishing with a reservation of the soil and its other profits? Bracton expressly takes notice of such a grant; for his words are, that one may *servitutem imponere fundo suo, quod quis possit piscari cum eo, et ita in communi, vel quod alius per se ex toto*. Bract. fo. 208. b. There are also numerous other authorities for it; the old books of entries agreeing, that one may prescribe for a several fishery against the owner of the soil, to which should be added the three cases of Elizabeth cited by lord Coke. See Lib. Intrat. 162. b. 163. a. Rast. Entr. 597. b. and the books cited under the letter d in fol. 4. b. and under m here, and the cases referred to under the \* on the other side. Nor do we understand, why a several piscary should not exist without the soil, as well as a several pasture, as to which latter we have already shown the doctrine to be settled. Supra note 6. The chief reasons, which occur against lord Coke, seem to be these.—Several writs, never applicable except to the soil, lie for a piscary; such as a *præcipe quod reddat, monstraverunt de rationabilibus divisis, and trespass*, which latter writ is particularly insisted upon by lord chief justice Holt. Dav. 55. b. Hugh. Comm. Orig. W. 11. W. Jo. 440. 1. Ventr. 122. 2. Salk. 637. Skinn. 677. *Suum liberum tenementum* is a good plea to trespass for fishing in a several piscary. 17. E. 4. 6. 18. E. 4. 4. 10. H. 7. 24. 26. 28. The soil will pass, as it is said, by the grant of a piscary. Plowd. 154.—But all these objections may be repelled.—The writs relied on will not always lie for a piscary. Thus if a *præcipe quod reddat* is brought of a piscary in the water of another person, the writ is bad, and a *quod permittat* is the proper remedy. Fitz. Abr. Briefe 861. F. N. B. 23. i. and note b. of the 4to. ed. Besides, in the cases of actions for trespass in a several piscary, or at least in some of them, the writ seems in effect to state a several piscary in the plaintiff's own soil, which therefore proves nothing as to the sense of several piscary without further explanation. Reg. Br. Orig. 95. b. Carth. 285. Skin. 677. The plea *liberum tenementum* may be replied to by prescribing for a several piscary. See the books before cited as to such a prescription. Though the grant of a piscary generally may, perhaps, pass the soil, yet it will not, if there are any words to denote a different intention; as where one seized of a river grants a several fishery in it, which is the case put by lord Coke in another place; and much less will the soil pass, when there is an express reservation of it. Ante 4. b. & n. 2. there.—Hence, as it should seem, the arguments are short of the purpose; for at the utmost they only prove, that a several piscary is presumed to comprehend the soil, till the contrary appears, which is perfectly consistent with lord Coke's position, that they may be in different persons, and indeed

For notes to this side of fol. 127. see 127. b.

guardian to his children till twenty-one, it has been usual for want of such a guardian to allow the infant to elect one for himself; and according to one book, this practice seems to have prevailed in some degree before the Restoration. Phil. Tenend. non Tollend. 160. Such election is said to be frequently made before a judge on the circuit. 2. Ves. 375. But we do not conceive this form to be essential. The last lord Baltimore, when he was turned of eighteen, having no testamentary guardian, and being under the necessity of having one for some special purposes relative to his proprietary government of Maryland, named

U u u

*Handwritten note:* I have very often called upon my wife to do what a guardian should do. — viz. to Blackst. 1. ed. note of guardian by elect. upon 14. see also 3. Bro. Abr. Cas. 500.

rogue, to make himselfe impotent, thereby to have the more colour to begge off to be relieved without putting himselfe to any labour, caused his companion to strike off his left hand; and both of them were indited, fined, and ransomed therefore, and that by the opinion of the rest of the justices for the cause aforesaid.

*Voyde, &c.* Here by (&c.) is implied a maxime in law, *quod inutilis labor & sine fructu non est effectus legis.* And againe, *Non licet, quod dispendio licet.* And *sapiens incipit à sine,* and *lex non præcipit inutilia.* [2] Therefore the law forbiddeth such recoveries, whose ends are vaine, chargeable, and unprofitable.

Sect. 195.

**D**Emaundant, *petens,* is hee which is actor in a reall action, because hee demandeth lands, &c. And *plaintife, querens* in actions personals and mixt, *quia queritur de injuria, &c.* Tenant, *tenens* in reall actions, and *defendant, defendens* in actions personall and mixt.

**Defence.** (2) Cometh of the word *defendo,* so called of the manner of the pleading, *viz. prædict. A. B. defendit vim & injuriam, &c.*

For example, in a personall action brought by A. B. against C. D. the defence is, *& prædictus C. D. defendit vim & injuriam quando, &c. & dampna, & quicquid quod ipse defendere debet, &c.*

In this defence there be three parts to be considered. First, when he defendeth

**I**T E M si un vil-  
lein soit demandant  
en action real, ou  
plantife en action per-  
sonal, envers son seig-  
nior, si le seignior voile  
pleder en disabilitie de  
son person, il ne peut  
faire pleine defence;  
mes il defendera fors-  
que tort & force &  
demanderajudgement,  
sil serra respondus, &  
monstra son matter  
maintenant, comment  
il est son villein, & de-  
mandera judgment sil  
serra respondue.

**A**L S O if a villeine be demandant in an action real, or plain- tiffe in an action person- all against his lord, if the lord will plead in disabilitie of his person, he may not make plaine (1) defence, but he shall defend but the wrong and the force, and de- mand the judgement, if he shall be answer- ed, and shew his mat- ter by and by, how he is villeine, and demand judgement if he shall be answered.

the wrong and the force, this hath a double effect, viz. to make himselfe partie to the matter, and this is the reason, that the defendant in this and the like actions can plead no plea at all, before he makes himselfe partie by this part of the defence, as it appeareth here by Littleton, that [a] if the defendant will plead in disabilitie of the person of the plaintiffe, he must first make himselfe partie by this first part of the defence. Neither can he plead to the jurisdiction of the court without this part of the defence (3). Secondly [b] by the defence of the damages, he affirmeth that the plaintiffe is able to sue, and (upon just cause) to recover damages. (4) Thirdly, and by the last part, viz. and all that which he ought defend, when and where he ought, he affirmeth the jurisdiction of the court, *& sic de simili- bus.* And of such necessitie is it for the tenant or defendant to make a lawfull defence, as [c] albeit he appeareth and pleads a sufficient barre without making defence, yet judgement shall be given against him.

[d] If villenage be pleaded by the lord in an action reall, mixt or personal, and it is found that he is no villaine, the bringing of a writ of error is no enfranchisement; because theroby he is to defeat the former judgement; and if, in the mean time, the plaintiffe or de- mandant bring an action against the lord, he need make no protestation, so long as the re- cord remains in force, for at that time he is free, but the lord shall be restored to all by a writ of error.

Sect. 196.

**U**N est lou vil-  
leine suist acti-  
on, &c. Littleton here

**I**T E M 6 maners  
de homes y sont,  
(5) queux, sils juont ac-

**A**L S O there are fixe  
mannerofmen, who,  
if they sue judgement  
tion

[a] 40. E. 3. 36. 14. H. 6. 18.  
35. H. 6. 12. 1. E. 4. 15.

[b] 29. E. 3. 23. 8. H. 6. 3.

[c] 36. H. 6. judgement 58.

[d] 18. E. 4. 6. & 7.

[e] Bracl. lib. 5. fol. 421. Brit-  
ton. cap. 49. fol. 125. Mirror.  
cap. 2. Sect. 18.

indeed appears to us the true doctrine on the subject.—2. Both parts of the description of a *free fishery* seem disputable. Though, for the sake of distinction, it might be more convenient to appropriate *free fishery* to the franchise of fishing in *public rivers* by derivation from the crown; and though in other countries, it may be so considered; yet, from the language of our books, it seems, as if in our law practice had extended this kind of fishery to all streams whether *private* or *public*, neither the Ré- gister, nor other books, professing any discrimination. Reg. 95. b. Fitzh. N. B. 88. g. Fitzh. Abr. Ass. 422. 4. E. 4. 28. 17. E. 4. 6. b. 7. a. 7. H. 7. 13. b. Cro. Cha. 554. 1. Ventr. 122. 3. Mod. 97. Carth. 285. Skinn. 677. Again, it is true, that in one case the court held *free fishery* to import an *exclusive* right equally with *several piscary*, chiefly relying on the writs in the Reg. 95. b. and the 44. E. 3. 24. But then this was only the opinion of two judges against one, who strenuously insisted, that the word *libera, ex utermini*, implied *common*, and that many judgments and precedents were founded on lord Coke's so construing it. 2. Salk. 637. Carth. 285. That the dissenting judge was not wholly unwarranted in the latter part of his assertion, appears from two determinations a little before the case in question. See *Upton* and *Dawkins* 3. Mod. 97. and *Peake* and *Tucker* cited in Carth. 286. in marg. We may add to this the three cases cited by lord Coke as of his own time; and that there are passages in other books, which favour his distinction. See Cro. Cha. 554. 17. E. 4. 6. b. 7. a. 7. H. 7. 13. b.—These remarks on *several* and *free fishery* may serve the student as a notice of the doubts on the subject, and also assist in any future discussion for removing them; which, in truth, is the whole scope of the annotation.

(1) It should be *full*.—(2) It has been well observed, that *defence*, as applied in our law pleadings, means, not a *justification*, which is the ordinary signification, but a *denial*. 3. Blackit. Comm. 8th. ed. 296. Had this occurred to the author of the book on *real actions*, he would not have been at a loss for the reason of the *tenant's defending the demandant's right* in a writ of right. Booth on Real Actions 112.—(3) Held *contra* by three judges against Holt chief justice. Carth. 220.—(4) Adjudged Acc. on Demurrer, Carth. 229.—(5) In L. & M.—Roh.—P.—& Red. the reading is *contre queux*.

Notes to 127. 4.

(1) In very ancient times amercements were a considerable object in our law, as appears by the *Great Charter's* prohibiting their exorbitancy, and the writ of *moderata misericordia* for relieving against excessive amercements in courts not being of record. F. N. B. 75. a. But so far as regards amercements on judgments in civil suits in the king's courts of record, they have long been *mere form*. Yet in lord Coke's time it was error to omit the entry of them. 5. Co. 49. a. Now indeed by the 16. & 17. Ch. 2. c. 8. such an error is amendable.—(2) Since lord Coke's time, *premeditated maiming*, accompanied with *laying in wait*, has been made a *capital felony*. See 22. & 23. Ch. 2. c. 1. commonly stiled the *Coventry act*.

Notes to 122. b.

(1) See ante 117. b. n. 3.—(2) This replication was given by the 37. E. 3. c. 16. before which statute the plea of being a villein to a stranger to the writ could not be denied.—(3) *lit nief* in L. & M.—& Roh.—(4) See ante 68. b. n. 1. 2. to which add Post. 172. b. Spelm. Gloss. voc. *fidelitas* 2. Inst. 73. Britt. cap. 29. Cow. Inst. l. 2. t. 3. f. 14. Flet. l. 2. c. 52. l. 3. c. 16. Mirr. c. 3. foet. 35. 7. Co. 6. b. 7. a. Calvin's case Fyrr. Biblioth. Polit. 4th. ed. 907. Ellesmere's argument in Calvin's case 76.

a guardian by deed. This mode was adopted by the advice of two eminent barristers; for though one of them at first doubted, whether

tion, judgement *poit estre demand, sils seront respondus, &c.* One is, where a *Un est, lou villeine suist action envers son seignior, come en le cas avantdit.*

may be demanded, if they shall be answered, &c. One is, where a villeine sueth an action against his lord, as in the case aforesaid.

reheareth six kind of disabilities of the person, disabling him to sue any action reall, personall, or mixt.

*Sils ferront respondus.* This is the legall conclusion of the plea, when the plea is in disability of the person. And of the verbe *respondere* came *responsalis* often

used in the ancient authors of the law. [f] *Responsalis* was he, that was appointed by the tenant or defendant, in case of extremity and necessitie, to alleage the cause of the parties absence, and to certifie the court upon what tryall he will put himselfe, viz. the combate or the country. So as his power was more than the *essoignor*, which casteth an *essoigne* only to excuse the absence of the party, as an estranger, which casteth a protection, doth. For by the common law, the plaintife or defendant, demandant, or tenant, could not appeare by attorney without the king's special warrant by writ or letters patent, but ought to follow his suite in his owne proper person (by reason whereof there were but few suites.) [g] *Abusum est a retiner attorney sans breve de la chancerie.* And therefore Bracton saith truly, [b] *attornatus hæc omnia facere potest* (that is, plead all manner of pleas). *Est igitur magna differentia inter attornatum & responsalem.* So as the statutes, that give the making of attorneyes, have worne out *responsales*. Now what manner of men attorneyes ought to be, or rather what they ought not to be, heare what antiquity hath said, [i] *attorneyes poient estre tous ceux, aux queux ley voile suffer. Feme ne poient estre attorneyes, ne enfans, ne serfs, ne nul que est en garde ou autrement faut de foy, ne nul crimineux, ne nul essoigne, ne nul que nest a le foy le roy, ne nul que ne poet estre counter, &c.*

13. H. 4. Suerty, 12. a Gardian shall disable.

(Post. 352. b.)  
[f] Bract. lib. 4. fo. 212. b. & lib. 5. fol. 349. Fleta lib. 6. ca. 11. Glanvill lib. 11. cap. 1. Britton cap. 126. Vid. W. 1. c. 43. F. N. B. 25. C. Regist. 9. (E. N. B. 156. E.)  
[g] *Beame & Manville p. 275. n. 1.*  
[h] Bract. lib. 4. fo. 212. b. & lib. 5. fol. 349. Fleta lib. 6. ca. 11. Glanvill lib. 11. cap. 1. Britton cap. 126. Vid. W. 1. c. 43. F. N. B. 25. C. Regist. 9. (E. N. B. 156. E.)  
[i] *Mirr. ca. 5. sect. 1.*  
[b] Bracton ubi supra.

Section 197.

*LE 2. est, lou un home est utlage sur action de det, ou trespas, ou sur autre action, ou indictment, le tenant, ou defendant, poit monstrier tout le matter de record, & lutlagarie, & demaunder judgement, sil serra respondue; pur ceo que il est hors de la ley de fuer ascun action durant le temps que il soit utlage.*

THE 2. is, where a man is outlawed upon an action of debt or trespasse, or upon any other action or indictment, the tenant, or the defendant may shew all the matter of record, and the outlawry, and demand judgement if he shall be answered; because he is out of the law to sue an action during the time that he is outlawed.

*LE 2. est [k] lou un home est utlage, &c.* But these generall words receive a distinction, viz. [l] if an executor or an administrator sueth any action, utlary in the plaintife shall not disable him: because the suit is *in auter droit*, that is, in the right of the testator, and not in his owne right. And for the same reason, [m] a maior and communitie shall have an action, though the maior be outlawed. [n] In a writ of error to reverse an utlary, utlawry in that suit, or at any strangers suite, shall not disable the plaintife, because if he in that action should be disabled, if he were outlawed at

[k] Bracton. lib. 5. fol. 421. Britton ca. 22. fol. 39. *Mirr. ca. 3. de exceptions a provors ca. 4. defaults punishable.*

[l] 21. E. 4. 49. b. 21. H. 6. 30. b. 14. H. 6. 15.

[m] 12 E. 4. fol. 12.

[n] 7. H. 4. 40.

[o] 23. H. 8. c. 3. 2. H. 7. 7. (1. Sid. 43. Cro. Jam. 425. 616.)  
[p] *Mirr. ca. 3. acc. 12. E. 4. 16. 33. H. 6. ca. 2.*  
[q] Bract. lib. 3. fo. 125. 3. H. 5. Utlagary 11. 38. E. 3. 5.  
[r] Britton fo. 39.  
[s] 20. E. 2. Coron. 212. 19. Aff. p. 10. 3. H. 6. 15. b. 37. H. 6. 23. 5. H. 7. 6. Eliz. Dyer 228. F. N. B. 244. Stauf. Pl. Coro. 105.  
shew (Noy. 74. 143.)

several mens suits, he should never reverse any of them. [o] In an attaint outlary in the plaintife cannot be pleaded in disability of the person (1). [p] Outlary in Chester or Durham shall not disable the plaintife in any court at Westminster, &c. [q] *Minor vero, & qui infra aetatem 12 annorum fuerit, utlagari non potest, nec extra legem poni; quia ante talem aetatem non est sub lege aliqua nec in decenna.* [r] He that is abjured the realme may be disabled; for that he is *extra legem*; and yet he is not properly outlawed.

*Monstrier tout le matter de record.* Here note two things first by this word, (*monstrier*) that, [s] when any man pleads an utlary in disability of the person, hee must shew

(1) Rot. Parl. 20. H. 6. n. 18. c. 2. Hal. MSS.

whether the administration of the government of the province was not devolved upon the crown during the infancy, yet he afterwards retracted this idea, and concurred in thinking, that the guardian named by the infant might act as lord proprietor. Indeed it seems, as if there was no prescribed form of an infant's electing a guardian after fourteen, any more than there is before; and therefore election by *parol* might perhaps be sufficient, though it would be wrong to trust to a mode so unsolemn. But we do not wonder at the deficiency; because guardianship by election of the infant is of very late origin, it being, we believe, not only unnoticed by any writer before lord Coke, except Swinburn, but there still being no cases in print to explain the powers incident to it, or whether the infant may change a guardian so constituted by himself. Swinb. Testam. ed. 1590. fol. 97. b. Even lord Coke, we see, though professing to enumerate the different sorts of guardianship, and though he had before mentioned this latter one, omits it here; whence it may be probably conjectured, that, in his time, it was in strictness scarcely recognized as legal.

The second is guardian by appointment of the lord chancellor. How this jurisdiction was acquired by him is not easy to state. The usual manner of accounting for it appears to us quite unsatisfactory. See Gilb. Eq. Rep. 172. Saying, that his jurisdiction over idiots and lunatics is undoubted, furnishes an argument against his having any over infants; for he derives the former from a separate commission under the sign manual, but there is not any such to warrant the latter. The writs of *ravishment of ward* and *de recto de custodia* prove as little: for were not these returnable in the courts of common law; or, though they had not

shew forth the record of the outlawrie *maintenant sub pede sigilli*, (because the plea is but dilatorie) unlesse the record be in the same court. But if he plead an outlawrie in barre, if it be denied, he shall have a day to bring it in.

(8 Co 142. b.)

[r] 28 Aff. 49. 12. E. 3. Utlarie 3. M. 4. & 5. El. Dyer 222. 38. E. 3. 13. (PoR. 288. b. 5. Co. 111.)

Secondly [r] before the defendant can disable the plaintife, the outlawrie must appeare of record; and the judgement after the *quinto exactus* given by the coroners in the county court, is not sufficient, untill the writ of *exigent* be returned, and the outlawrie appeare of record: which is manifest by Littleton's owne words, (*viz.*) *matter de record*, whereof see more hereafter, sect. 503.

[u] Tr. 44. El. in Com. Banc. inter Mere & Dolburie. 33. H. 6. i. 11. H. 4. 34. Dyer 3. El. 192. 5. El. 223. 4. H. 4. le 1. case. 8. H. 4. f. 7. 37. H. 6. 17. 33. E. 3. Err. 77. 21. H. 6. 20. (No 73.) [w] 33. H. 6. 19. b. &c.

It is to be observed, that there be two kind of appearances before the *quinto exactus*, to avoid the outlawry, *viz.* an apparence in deed, that is, to render himselfe, &c. And the other is by an apparence in law, [u] that is, by purchasing a *superfedeas* out of the court where the record is, which is an apparence of record: and therefore, though it be not delivered to the sherife before the *quinto exactus*, yet it shall avoid the outlawrie; and so are the bookes, that speake hereof, to be intended.

[v] 44. E. 3. 27. (D.ctr. Plac. 162. 396.)

[w] If a man be outlawed at the suit of one man, all men shall take advantage of this personall disability. And so it is in case of *alien nce*, and of *excommungement*. But otherwise it is in case of villenage; for that disability is onely given to the lord.

[y] 9 El. Dyer 262. 7. H. 4. 4. b. Stat. Pl. Coron. 188. 5. Co. 109. in Foxleye's case. 28. E. 3. 62. 29. Aff. p. 47. 63. 30. H. 6. 5. (Doctr. Plac. 395.) [z] Mir. c. 1. sect. 3. & c. 3. & 4. saepe cap. 5. Sect. 1.

*Durant le temps que il est utlage.* [x] If the defendant plead an outlawrie in the plaintife, in disability of his person, and the plaintife after that plea pleaded purchase a charter of pardon; because the charter hath restored him to the law, the defendant shall answer. So note, the disability abateth not the writ, but disableth the plaintife, untill he obtaineth a charter of pardon, and so it appeareth here by Littleton.

[\*] Fleta lib. 1. ca. 27. Bract. li. 5. fol. 421. Britton fol. 20. b. [a] Mir. ca. 4. sect. 4. defaults punishable.

*Judgement fil serra respondue.* [y] If the ground or cause of the action bee forfeited by the outlawry, then may the outlawry bee pleaded in barre of the action; as in an action of debt, detinue, &c. But in reall actions, or in personall, where dammages be incertaine, (as in trespassse of batterie, of goods, of breaking his close, and the like) and are not forfeited by the outlawry, there outlawry must be pleaded in disability of the person.

[b] Lamb. fol. 128. [c] 2. Aff. P. 3. a. E. 3. tit. Cotton. 148.

[z] And it is to be observed, that, in the reign of king Ælfred, and untill a good while after the conquest, no man could have been outlawed but for felonie, the punishment whereof was death. But now the law is changed, as it appeareth by that which hath beene sayd. And hereby you shall understand old bookes and records, which say, that an outlawed man had *caput lupinum*; because he might be put to death by any man, as a wolfe that hateful beast might. [\*] *Utlagatus & waiwiata capita gerunt lupina, quæ ab omnibus impunè poterunt amputari; merito enim sine lege perire debent, qui secundum legem vivere recusant.* And another

[\*] Bracton. lib. 5. fo. 421. 8. H. 6. 9. b. 40. E. 3. 5. 35. H. 6. 6. 40. E. 3. 2.

saith, [a] *utlage pur felonie teigne leu pur loup, & est criable woolfesbered, pur ceo que loupe est beaist hay de tous gents, & de ceo en avant list al ascun de le occider al foer del loup, dont custome soloit estre de porter les testes al chiefe lieu del county, ou de la franchise, & soloit la avoir demy mark del countie. pur chefcun teste de utlage & de loupe.* And this agreeth with the law before the conquest, [b] *utlagus lupinum gerit caput, quod Anglice woolfeshead dicitur; & hæc est lex communis & generalis de omnibus utlagatis.* [c] But, in the beginning of the raigne of king Edward the third, it was resolved by the judges, for avoyding of inhumanity, and of effusion of Christian blood, that it should not be lawfull for any man, but the sherife onely, (having lawfull warrant therefore) to put to death any man outlawed, though it were for felonie; and if he did, he should undergoe such punishments and paines of death, as if he had killed any other man; and so from thenceforth the law continued untill this day. (Nota, *woolfeshead*, and *wulferfod* is all one). [\*] And after in Bracton's time, and somewhat before, processe

*Put in the Reeves' Hist. of Engl. L. 22. c. 1. A.D. 1215. in Henry Guillelmus; note in li. 1. of New Str. tit. out-lawry.*

of outlawry was ordained to lie in all actions, that were *quare vi & armis*, which Bracton calleth *delicta*; for there the king shall have a fine (1). But since, by divers statutes, processe of outlawry doth lie in account, debt, detinue, annuity, covenant, *action sur le statute de 5. Rich. 2. action sur le case*, and in divers other common or civill actions. But now let us heare what Littleton will say unto us.

Section 198.

[3] Bract. li. 5. fol. 415. 427. Mir. c. 1. sect. 3. c. 5. sect. 1. & ca. 3. except a provors. Flet. li. 6. c. 47. Brit. fo. 29. 13. E. 3. Bre. 677. 25. E. 3. de Natis ultra mare. 31. E. 3. Cofinage 5. 42. E. 3. 2. 9. E. 4. 7.

**ALIEN.** [a] *Alieni-gena* is derived from the Latine word *alienus*, and according

**LE 3. est un a-** **THE** third is an a- **lien, que est née** **lien**, which is born **hors de la ligeance** out of the ligeance of **nostre**

(1) Whether the common law gives processe of outlawry against crimes, being merely *constructive* breaches of the peace, was questioned in a late case before the King's Bench on a *libel*. But the chief justice, in delivering the court's judgment, spoke at large to prove, that such processe lies against crimes *universally*. Mr. Wilkes's case 4. Burr. v. 4. page 2537. However, the reasoning, on which this opinion is grounded, stands opposed by a former judgment of the Common Pleas on a prior case relative to the same gentleman. 2. Will. 151. But it was adopted by both houses of parliament, when, in his case, they resolved, that privilege of parliament doth not extend to *libels*. See Annual Reg. for 1764. The arguments for the contrary opinion are forcibly expressed in a protest by some of the lords, who were against making such a resolution. Journ. Dom. Proc. 29. Nov. 1763.—(2) *Ubi natus in partibus transmarinis shall not be an alien, see Hill. 13. E. 1. rot. 1. Hal. MSS.*

not been so, how doth a jurisdiction, to decide between contending competitors for the right of guardianship, prove a power of appointing a guardian, where it happens, that one is wanting? The writs *de custode admittendo*, in the Register, only relate to guardians *ad litem*. Reg. Br. Orig. 198. n. The assertion, that the appointment of guardians belonged to the chancellor before the erection of the Court of Wards, remains to be proved; or at least we, after a diligent search, do not find any authority in print. The passage referred to in *Fleta* and the doctrine in *Beverley's case* 4 Co. by no means warrant the use made of them; for in neither is any notice taken of *infants*. Though the case of infants, as well as of ideots and lunatics, should be admitted to belong

nostre seignior le roy, si tiel alien voile fuer un action reall ou personall, le tenant ou defendant doit dire, que il suit née en tiel pais, que est hors de la ligeance le roy, & demaunder judgement si il serra respondue.

our soveraigne lord the king, if such alien will sue an action reall or personal, the tenant or defendant may say, that he was borne in such a country, which is out of the king's allegiance, and aske judgement if he shall be answered.

to the etymologie of the word, it signifieth one borne in a strange country, under the obedience of a strange prince or country, (and therefore Bracton saith, that this exception, propter defectum nationis, should rather be propter defectum subjectionis) or as Littleton saith, (which is the surest) out of the liegeance of the king. Note, here Littleton saith not Hors del realme, but hors de ligeance; for he may be borne out of the realme of England, yet within the

11. H. 4. 26. 14. H. 4. 19, 20. 3. H. 6. 55. 22. H. 6. 38. Stat. Pl. Cor. 197. a. 7. Co. 1. Calvin's case. Pl. Com. 268. per Sanders. Vid. sect. 1. 439. 440. 441.

liegeance. And he that is borne within the king's liegeance is called sometime a denizen, quasi deins née, borne within, and thereupon in Latine called indigena, the king's liegeman; for ligens is ever taken for a naturall borne subject. - But many times in acts of Parliament, denizen is taken for an alien borne, that is enfranchised or denized by letters patent, where- by the king doth grant unto him, [b] quod ille in omnibus tractetur, reputetur, habeatur, tenetur, & gubernetur, tanquam ligens noster, infra dictum regnum nostrum Angliæ oriundus, & non aliter, nec alio modo. But the king may make a particular denization: [c] as he may grant to an alien, quod in quibusdam curiis suis Angliæ audiatur ut Anglus, & quod non repellatur per illam exceptionem, quod sit alienigena & natus in partibus transmarinis, to enable him to sue onely. The severall senses of which word must be gathered, ex antecedentibus, adjunctis, & consequentibus; and they that take him in that sense, derive the word from donaison (i. e.) donatio, because his freedome is given unto him by the king.

(2. Inst. 741.) He also ant. fol. 2. b. in the marginal note, & it is all. the same word. b. 3. ch. 4. [c] Rot. Parl. 22. E. 1. Elias de Deubene.

There is another kind, and that is an alien naturalized, and that must be by act of Parliament. And this alien naturalized to all intents and purposes, is as a naturall borne subject (1), and differeth much from denization by letters patent; for if he had issue in England before his denization, that issue is not inheritable to his father; but if his father be naturalized by parliament, such issue shall inherit. So if an issue of an Englishman be borne beyond sea, if the issue be naturalized by act of Parliament (2), he shall inherit his father's lands; but if he be made denizen by letters patent, he shall not; and many other differences there be betweene them.

The roll of parliament above referred to is in Paris, & I apprehend, he my opinion is over of 30. Oct. 1866. in case referred to me as a barrister, limited denization as it is above stated. In the original here is added. The line of the word is all correct. Read early 196. These words are not in the 1st or 2nd or 4th or 5th. The 6th I have not seen. Vide Calvin's case ubi supra. with this view, set in 5th 6th or 9th ed. by

Ligeance. A ligando, being the highest and greatest obligation of dutie and obedience that can be. Ligeance is the true and faithfull obedience of a liegeman or subject, to his liege lord, or soveraigne. Ligeantia est vinculum fidei, ligeantia est legis essentia.

[d] 13. El. Dierfo. 300. b. Doctor Storie's case.

Ligeantia domino regi debita est duplex. Perpetua. Temporanca aut

- 1. Originaria, sive naturalis, sive nata, [d] and this is always absolute and incident inseparably. Nemo patriam, in qua natus est, exuere, nec ligeantia debitum ejurare possit.
  - 2. Data, aut per denizationem, aut per naturalizationem (ut supradictum est) & ista ligeantia per denizationem potest esse sub conditione.
- Localis, quia quilibet alienigena, qui in hoc regno sub protectione regis degit, domino regi ligeantiam debet. And if he be indicted of high treason, the indictment shall say, [e] contra ligeantia sua debitum; & ideo dicitur temporanea & localis, quia non durat, nisi quousque infra regnum moratur.
- Limitata, as when one is made denizen for life, or in taile. [f] But one cannot be naturalized, either with limitation for life, or in taile, or upon condition: for that is against the absoluteness, puritie, and indebility of naturall allegiance.

(Hob. 271.) [e] 3. & 4. P. & M. Di. 144. 7. Co. 6. &c. Calvin's case. [f] 9 E. 4. 7. Calvin's case ubi supra. (Cro. Jam. 539. 2. Ro. Rep. 95) [\*] 13. E. 3. Br. 264. 20. E. 3. Annuity 24. 17. E. 3. 21. 4. E. 3. 10. 27. All. 48. 14. H. 4. 37. 22. E. 4. 44. 21. H. 7. 7. Stat. Praer. 54. L'etat. de Carliste. but 35. E. 1.

[\*] An abbot, prior, or prioress alien, shall have actions reall, personall, or mixt, for any thing concerning the possessions or goods of his monastery here in England, though hee be an alien borne out of the king's liegeance; because hee bringeth it, not in his owne right,

(1) But now by the 12. & 13. W. 3. c. 2. naturalized persons are incapacitated from being of the privy council, members of either house of parliament, or enjoying any office or place of trust, civil or military, or from having any grant of lands or other hereditaments. The 1. G. 1. goes still further; for it enacts, that no bill of naturalization shall be received without a clause to this effect. 1. G. 1. st. 2. c. 4. l. 2. But when any foreigner, distinguished by eminence of rank or services, is naturalized, it is usual, first to pass an act for the repeal of these statutes in his favour, and then to pass an act of naturalization without any exception. - (2) This imports a special act of parliament to be necessary. But, whatever the law might be in lord Coke's time, now, by several modern statutes, persons born beyond sea, if their fathers, or paternal grandfathers, were natural born subjects, are likewise made so, though with an exclusion of some unfavoured persons. 7. Ann c. 3. 4. G. 2. c. 21. 13. G. 3. c. 21. See ante fo. 8. a. note 1.

Continuation of notes to 123. b. from 125. a.

(2) If our law was really as strict in point of time, as is here represented, it would not sufficiently conform to the course of nature. The physicians, it is true, generally call nine months, each being of thirty days, the usual period for a woman's going with child. But then they allow, that, as a delivery may be accelerated by accidental causes, so it is frequently protracted, not only for ten days beyond the nine months, but to the end of the tenth month, and sometimes for a considerably longer time. See Zacch. Quest. Medico legal. lib. 1. tit. 2. Justice therefore requires, that, in the case of posthumous children, an excess of the usual time should not operate further, than by raising a proportional presumption against the legitimacy. The Roman law was very liberal in this respect; for the decemviri allowed, that a child may be born in the tenth month; and though a law of the Digest excludes the eleventh, yet the emperor Adrian, after consulting with the philosophers and physicians, decreed even for this, where the mother was of good and chaste manners. See Dig. 1. 4. 12. Paul. Sentent. lib. 4. t. 9. l. 5. Nov. 39. c. 2. l. 17. with

belong to the crown, yet something further is necessary to prove, that the chancellor is the person constitutionally delegated to act



but in the right of his monastery, and not in his naturall but in his politique capacity (1).

(Doctr. Plac. 8. Dy. 2. b.)

[b] Britton 426. 427. 430. 8. E. 3. 51. 5. E. 2. Aiel 8. 13. E. 3. Bre. 677. 22. E. 3. 14. 20. 21. E. 3. Cofinage 5. 42. E. 3. 2. 13. E. 4. 9. 11. H. 4. 26. 9. E. 4. 7. 19. E. 4. 7. 20. E. 4. 6. 13. E. 4. 9. 10. 32. H. 6. 23. 38. H. 8. Br. Denizen 10. 1. E. 6. Nonhab. Br. 13. & 62. Vid. 4. H. 3. Dower 179. 6. E. 3. 263. 31. H. 6. ca. 4. Livre de Entries in cest. 7. 6. H. 8. Dier 2. 6. H. 7. 15. [\*] 29. E. 3. Br. Denizen 15. Vid. Stanf. Pl. Co. 197. a.

**Reall ou personall.** [b] In this case the law doth distinguish betweene an alien, that is a subject to one that is an enemy to the king, and one that is subject to one that is in league with the king; (2) and true it is that an alien enemy, shall maintaine neither reall nor personall action, *donec terræ fuerint communes*, that is untill both nations be in peace (3); but an alien, that is in league, shall maintaine personall actions, for an alien may trade and traffique, buy and sell, and therefore of necessity he must be of ability to have personall actions; but he cannot maintaine either reall or mixt actions. An alien, that is condemned in an information, shall have a writ of error to relieve himselfe, *et sic de similibus*.

[\*] If an alien be made a prior or abbot, the plea of *alien née* shall not disable him to bring any reall or mixt action concerning his house; because he is *in auter droit*, as before is said (4).

**Hors del ligeance nostre seignior le roy.** Here Littleton doth not say, out of the realme or beyond the sea, (5) (as he doth sect. 439. 440. 441. 677.) but out of ligeance; for (as hath beene said before) a man may be borne out of the realme, viz. of England, as in Ireland, Jersey, and Gernsey, &c. (6) and yet seeing he is not borne out of the ligeance of the king, as Littleton here speaketh, he is no alien. But hereof there is so much, and so plentifully spoken in our bookes, and especially in the case of Calvin *ubi supra*, as this shall suffice.

**Et demaunder judgement sil serra respondue.** So as the tenant or defendant shall neither plead alien *née* to the writ or to the action, but in disability of the person, as in case of villenage and outlawrie before. [i] And Littleton is to be intended of an alien in league; for if hee be an alien enemy, the defendant may conclude to the action.

[i] Livre d' Entries Alien 1. (Doc. Plac. 89. Dy. 2. b.)

## Sect. 199.

(3. Inf. 119.)

For Statutes.  
Vid. 35. E. 1. Stat. de Carlisle.  
25. E. 3. c. 22. 25. E. 3. Stat. de  
Provilors. 27. E. 3. c. 1. 38. E.  
4. c. 3. 2. R. 2. c. 12. 3. R. 2.  
c. 3. 12. R. 2. c. 5. 16. R. 2. c.  
5. 2. H. 4. c. 3. & 4. 6. H. 4. c. 1.  
24. H. 8. c. 12. 25. H. 8. ca.  
19. 20. 26. H. 8. c. 16. 1. Eliz.  
ca. 1. 5. Eliz. c. 1. 13. Eliz. ca.  
1. 2. 8. 27. Eliz. ca. 2. 39. Eliz.  
ca. 18.

For Presidents.  
Vide Mich. 29. E. 3. coram  
Rege in Theaur. Pasch. 44. E.  
3. ibid. Melbourne's case. Mich.  
38. H. 6. ibid. The case of Rich.  
Beauchamp and others, Hil. 25.  
H. 8. Coram rege. The case of  
Nic. B shop of Norwich. Trin.  
36. H. 8. Rot. 9. coram Rege.  
The case of the Bishop of Ban-  
gor. Mich. 26. & 27. Eliz. coram  
Reg., Perrot against D. Be-  
vance and other, booke of En-  
tries, fo. 429. & 430. & ibid.  
Mich. 9. H. 7. f. 23.

Booke cases.  
21. E. 3. 40. B. 18. H. 6. 6.  
9. E. 4. 2. 35. E. 3. 7. 24. H. 8.  
tit. Præmunire 16. 10. H. 4.  
12. 27. E. 3. 84. 6. H. 7. 14.  
44. E. 3. 36.

**PRæmunire.** Some hold an opinion that the writ is called a *præmunire*; because it doth fortifie *jurisdictionem jurium regiorum coronæ suæ* of the kingly lawes of the crown against fo-reine jurisdiction, and against the usurpers upon them, as by divers acts of Parliaments appeare. But in truth it is so called of a word in the writ; for the words of the writ be *præmunire facias præfatum A. B. &c. quod tunc sit coram nobis, &c.* where *præmunire* is used for *præmonere*, and so doe divers interpreters of the civill and canon law use it; for they are *præmuniti* that are *præmoniti*. By the statutes before quoted in the margent you shall perceive what statutes were made before Littleton wrote, and what have beene ordained since to make offences in danger of a *præmunire*.

**Hors del protection le Roy.** The judgement in a *præmunire* is, that the defendant shall bee from thence forth out of the king's protection, and his lands and tenements, goods and chattels

**LE 4. est un home, que per judgment done envers luy sur un briefe de præmunire facias, &c. est hors de protection le roy. Si il fust ascun action, & le tenant ou le def. monstra tout le record envers luy, il poit demaunder judgement sil serra respondue; car la ley le roy, & les briefs le roy sont les choses, per queux home est protect & aide, et issint, durant le temps que home en tiel cas est hors de la protection le roy, il est hors de estre aide ou protect per la ley le roy, ou per brief le roy.**

**THE 4. is a man, who by judgement given against him upon a writ of præmunire facias, &c. is out of the king's protection. If he sue any action, and the tenant or defendant shew all the record against him, he may aske judgement if he shall be answered; for the law and the king's writs be the things, by which a man is protected and holpen; and so, during the time, that a man in such case is out of the king's protection, he is out of helpe and protection by the king's law, or by the king's writ.**

(1) Here, as also generally where lord Coke mentions *professed* persons, he must, we conceive, be understood to write, as of the law before the dissolution of monasteries, and the consequent establishment of the protestant faith. See *ante* 3. b. note 7 — (2) Et nota it shall be tried by the record, if he be in amity or not, viz. a proclamation of war. But a proclamation prohibiting commerce, as anciently between the emperor and the queen, doth not disable a German in a personal action. Trin. 41. Eliz. C. B. — Hal. MSS. — (3) But now, on declaring war, the king usually, in the proclamation of war, qualifies it, by permitting the subjects of the enemy resident here, to continue so long as they peaceably demean themselves; and, without doubt, such persons are to be deemed alien friends in effect. — (4) *A jeme alien shall have dower.* Rot. Parl. 8. H. 5. n. 15. 9. H. 5. n. pro comitissa Arundell. Hal. MSS. — See *ante* 31. b. note 9. — (5) See *ante* 107. a. n. 6. there and post. 244. a. — (6) Rot. Parl. 9. H. 6. n. 20. *indulization of one born in Wales.* Simile Rot. Parl. 23. H. 6. n. 26. Co. 2. Int. 741. on stat. 2. H. 4. — Hal. MSS.

with Gothofred's learned notes on those two texts of the Roman law. Cod. lib. 6. t. 29. leg. 2. Aul. Gell. lib. 3. cap. 16. Huber. Prælect. in Dig. lib. 1. tit. 6. A like liberal discretion probably prevails in most countries of Europe; for an instance of which, we appeal to a writer of great authority, who reports a decision by a majority of judges in the supreme court of Friedland, by which a child was admitted to the succession, though not born till three hundred and thirty-three days from the day of the husband's death, which period wants only three days of *twelve lunar months*. Sand. Decis. lib. 4. tit. 8. Definit. 10. Nor will our own law, notwithstanding what lord Coke advances, if the authorities are duly collected and considered, be found deficient on this interesting subject. Indeed there is a passage in Britton, which gives countenance to lord Coke's limitation of forty weeks; for this writer excludes from

act for the king. It is no wonder therefore, that lord chancellor Hardwicke took occasion to disapprove of comparing the court's jurisdiction over infants with that over idiots and lunatics. 2 Atk. 315. As to the writs relative to the appointment and removal of guardians in the Register, they merely relate to *suits*; which is of very different consideration from *general guardians*. See Index to Reg. Brev. Orig. tit. *Custodes*. Nor will it answer the purpose, to attempt including guardianship in the idea of *trusts*, which are the peculiar objects of equitable jurisdiction, as it must be seen, that this is an overstrained refinement; for, though

forfeited to the king, and that his body shall remaine in prison at the king's pleasure. So odious was this offence of *præmunire*, that a man, that was attainted of the same, might have bin slaine by any man, without danger of law; because [k] it was provided by law, that a man might doe to him as to the king's enemy, and any man may lawfully kill an enemy. But queene Elizabeth and her parliament [\*], liking not the extreme and inhumane rigor of the law in that point, did provide, that it should not be lawfull for any person to slay any person in any manner attainted in or upon any *præmunire*, &c. Tenant in taile is attainted in a *præmunire*, he shall forfeit the land but during his life; for albeit the statute of 16. R. 2. ca. 5. enacteth, that in that case their lands and tenements, goods and chattels, shall be forfeit to the king, that must bee understood of such an estate as he may lawfully forfeite, and that is during his owne life. And these generall words doe not take away the force of the statute *de donis conditionalibus*, but hee shall forfeit all his fee simple lands, states for life, goods and chattels; and so was it resolved in Trudgin's case.

*Car la ley le roy & les briefes le roy, &c.* There be three things, as here it appeareth, whereby every subject is protected, *viz. rex, lex, & rescripta regis*, the king, the law, and the king's writs. The law is the rule, but it is mute. The king judgeth by his judges, and they are the speaking law, *lex loquens*. The proceffe and the execution, which is the life of the law, consisteth in the king's writs. So as he, that is out of the protection of the king, cannot be aided or protected by the king's law, or the king's writ. *Rex tuctur legem, & lex tuctur jus*. [l] Besides men attainted in a *præmunire*, every person, that is attainted of high treason, petit treason, or felony, is disabled to bring any action: for he is [\*] *extra legem positus*, and is accounted in law *civiliter mortuus*.

It is to be understood, that there is a generall protection of the king, whereof Littleton here speaketh; and this extends generally to all the king's loyall subjects, denizens and aliens within the realme, whose offences have not made them uncapable of it, as before it appeareth. And there is a particular protection by writ, which is one of the king's writs, that Littleton here speaketh of. This particular protection is of two sorts; one, to give a man an immunity or freedome from actions or suits; the second for the safetie of his person, servants and goods, lands and tenements, whereof he is lawfully possessed, from violence, unlawfull molestation or wrong. The first is of right, and by law; the second are all of grace, (saving one) for the generall protection implyeth as much. Of the first sort some are *cum clausula (volumus)* so called, because the writ hath this word (*volumus*) in it, *viz. volumus quod interim sit quietus de omnibus placitis & querelis, &c.* and the other a protection *cum clausula (nolumus)* so called for the like reason. Of protections *cum clausula (volumus)* for staying of pleas and suites there be foure kindes, *viz. quia profecturus* (so called by reason they are part of the words of the writ). 2. *Quia moraturus* (so named for distinction for the like cause). 3. *Quia indebitatus nobis existit* of the matter. 4. When any sent into the king's service in warre is imprisoned beyond sea. The former are for staying of actions and suits in generall. The third is for staying of suits of the subject for debts and duties due by the king's debtor to them. Of the fourth you shall reade hereafter in this place. For the former two these nine things are to be observed. First, for what cause they are to be granted. 2. For what persons they are allowable. 3. A three fold time is to be considered, *viz.* the time of the purchase of them, the time of the continuance of them, and the time when they shall be cast. 4. In what place the service is to be performed. 5. In what actions these protections are allowable. 6. Under what seale and to whom they are directed. 7. Who is to allow, or disallow of them. 8. By whom they are to be cast, and in what manner. 9. How upon just cause they may be repealed or disallowed. I must but point at these matters to make the studious reader capable of them, and referre him to the bookes and other authorities at large being excellent points of learning.

As to the first, it is of two natures, the one concerne services of war as the king's souldier, &c. the other wisdom and counsell, as the king's ambassador or messenger *pro negotiis regni*. Both these being for the publique good of the realme, private mens actions and suites must be suspended for a convenient time; for, *jura publica anteferenda privatis*; and againe, *jura publica ex privatis promiscue decidi non debent*. [a] And the cause of granting of the protection must be expressed in the protection, to the end it may appeare to the court that it is granted *pro negotiis regni & pro bono publico*, [b] or as some others say, *pur le common profit del realme*. And Britton saith, *nostre service, sicome estre en nostre force, & le defence de nous & de nostre people, &c.* [\*] A man in execution in *salva custodia* shall not be delivered by a protection.

[c] To the second, these protections are not allowable onely for men of full age, but for men within age, and for women (1), as necessary attendants upon the campe, and that in three cases, *quia lotrix, seu nutrix, seu obstetrix*.

[d] Corporations aggregate of many are not capable of these two protections either *profectura*, or *moratura*; because the corporation it selfe is invisible, and resteth onely in

11. H. 7. tit. Præmunire, p. 5.  
17. H. 7. Justice Spilmans in Turberville's case, Kelwey, fo. 195. Doct. & Stud. Lib. 2. cap. 32. Brooke, tit. Præmunire, 21. Temps E. 6. Bishop Barloe's case. [k] 24. H. 8. Brooke Coron. 196.  
[\*] 5. Eliz. ca. 1. Hil. 21. El. Trudgin's case resolved per les Justices. 7. H. 4. 20. Simon Beverley's case. (Post. 391. 2. Ro. Abr. 177.)

[l] 4. E. 4. 8. 1. E. 4. 1. b. 30. E. 3. 4. 8. Eliz. Dier 245.  
[\*] Mich. 9. E. 3. coram rege Rot. 84. Warw.  
Protection. { Generall.  
                  { Particular.  
Of the generall, vid. 7. Co. Calvin's case per totum. (F. N. B. 28. B. 1. Leon. 185. Mo. 239. 2. Ro. Abr. 32.)

[a] 39. H. 6. 39. 3. H. 6. tit. Protection 2. 13. R. 2. ca. 16.  
[b] Mirror cap. 3. Sect. 23. Britton fo. 281. Fleta lib. 6. cap. 7. 8. &c. Bracton.  
[\*] 5. Marie Dyer 162. (Cro. Cha. 389.)  
[c] 19. H. 6. 51. 30. E. 3. 21. F. N. B. 28. l. 11. E. 3 Rot. pat. 3. part for the Countesse of Warw.  
[d] 30. E. 3. 1. 21. E. 4. 36. con- 21. E. 3. 97.

(1) A respectable writer, considering women as not requisite in a camp, thinks, that here lord Coke mistakes protections for effoins. Barr. on Ant. Stat. Ir. ed. 154. But, as we apprehend, those, who have been accustomed to a camp-life, will bear testimony to the necessity of each of the three capacities mentioned by lord Coke.

the inheritance posthumous children not born within forty weeks from the husband's death. Britt. 166. n. However, even this writer seems to extend in some degree beyond the forty weeks; unless he meant to make the wife's conception exactly of equal date with the husband's death, which surely is not a very reasonable construction. But without dwelling on such a nicety, it is sufficient, that the principal of the few other authorities in our books are against so rigid a rule. Bracton is very cautious, illegitimizing only the issue born so long after the husband's death, as to create an improbability of its being his child, without naming any fixed period. Bract. lib. 5. fo. 417. b. As to the determined cases, the only authorities of this sort, we meet with, are enumerated in the preceding annotation; and these duly weighed, will not be found, it is apprehended, to warrant lord Coke's conclusion. In Radwell's case, the finding against the issue is expressed to have been grounded merely on presumption; and besides, if we construe the record properly, the presumption arose from proof of the husband's non access to the wife for a month before his death. The case of 9. E. 2. is an instance of allowing so much time beyond forty weeks, that it seems too strong to have much weight; but so far as it can claim any, it counts against lord Coke. The case of 18. Rich. 2. at first seems full for lord Coke's rule, the child, though born only seven days beyond the forty weeks having been declared not the issue of the deceased husband. But when it is further considered, there will be found nothing to prove a positive general rule; for it was very special, the widow having married a second husband the day after the death of the first, so that the question was,

though guardianship in the common acceptation of the word *trust* may be properly so denominated, yet it as surely is not so in the technical

[e] 35. H. 6. 3. 43. E. 3. 23. consideration of law. [e] Protection for the husband shall serve also for the wife.  
 40. E. 3. 7. 4. H. 5. Protection [f] Albeit the vouchee, tenant by rescuit, pricee in aide, or garnishee, bee no parties to the writ, yet before they appeare a protection may be cast for them; because when the demandant grants the voucher or rescuit, in judgment of law they are made privie. But if the demandant counterplead the voucher or receipt, then untill it be adjudged for them, and so privie in law, a protection cannot be cast for them. And so it is of the garnishee, a protection may be cast for him at the day of the returne of the *scire facias*. [g] No protection can be cast for the demandant or plaintife; because the tenant or defendant cannot sue a re-sommons, or a re-attachment, but the plaintife onely, that sued out the summons or attachment, &c. must sue also the re-sommons or re-attachment. And so it is of an actor in nature of a plaintife, &c. as the garnishee after appearance, and an avowant, and the like. [h] An officer of the king's receipt, or any other officer in any court of record, whose attendance is necessary for the king's service or administration of justice, being sued, cannot have a protection cast for him.  
 [i] In every action or plea reall or mixt against two, where a protection doth lie, a protection cast for the one doth put the plea without day for all. So it is in debt, detinue and account. But in trespassse, or any action in nature of trespassse, which is in law severall, where every one may answer without the other, there a protection cast for the one shall serve for him onely, unless they joyne in pleading; or if they plead severall pleas, and one *venire facias* is awarded against all, there a protection cast for one, shall put the plea without day for all; and therefore in former times the plaintife used to sue out severall *venire facias* in those cases for feare of a protection, &c.  
 [k] As to the three fold time, first, a protection *profectura* regularly must not be purchased hanging the plea. But this faileth, when he goeth in the king's service in a voyage royall; and that is two fold, either touching warre, and that onely is when the king himselfe or his lieutenant, that is *prorex* goeth; or when any goeth in the king's ambassage, *pro negotio regni*, or for the marriage of the king's daughter, or the like, this also is called a voyage royall. But a protection *moratura* may be purchased and cast, *pendente placito*.  
 [l] Regularly a protection cannot be cast, but when the party hath a day in court, and when if he made default, it should save his default. Therefore when execution is to bee granted against body, lands, or goods, no protection can be cast; because the defendant hath no day in court. If a protection be cast at the *nisi prius* for one, if before the day in banke it bee repealed by *innofcimus*, yet because it was once well cast, it shall save his default; but if the protection be disallowed, either for variance, or that it lay not in the action, or the like, there it shall turne to a default.  
 If a man hath a protection, and notwithstanding plead a plea, yet at another day of continuance, after that a protection may be cast; so at a day after an exigent; but after appearance he cannot cast a protection in that terme, untill a new continuance be taken.  
 [n] Thirdly, no protection, either *profectura* or *moratura*, shall indure longer than a yeare and a day next after the *teste* or date of it. And so it is of an *essoigne de service le roy*. If a protection beare *teste 7. die Januarii*, and have allowance *pro uno anno*, the re-sommons, re-attachment, or re-garnishment, may be sued 8. *Januarii* the next yeare; and yet that is the last day of the yeare.  
 And where Britton, treating of an *essoigne* beyond the Græcian sea, in a pilgrimage, &c. saith thus, [o] *ascun gent nequident se purchasent nos letters de protection patents durable a un an, ou a 2 ou a 3 ans, & jalameyns font attorneys generals, ausi per nos letters patents: & ceux font bien & sagement; car nul grand seignior, ne chevalier de nostre realme, ne doit prender che-myn sauns nostre conge, car issint poct le realme remainer disgarny de fort gente.*  
 Three things are hereupon to be observed, first, that this was a protection of grace, whereof more shall be said hereafter. Secondly, that it was for safetic of the great men of the realme, and that they should make generall atornies, so as no actions, or suits should be thereby staid. Thirdly (by the way) that great men could not passe out of the realme without the king's licence. [p] A protection granted to one, &c. untill he returned from Scotland, was disallowed for the incertaintie of the time.  
 [q] To the fourth, the protection, as well *moratura* as *profectura*, must bee regularly to some place out of the realme of England, and that must be to some certaine place, as *super salva custodia Calicie*, &c. and not to Carlisle or Wales, which are within the realme, or to the like. But it may be to Ireland or Scotland; because they are distinct kingdomes; or to Calice, Aquitaine, or the like. But a protection, *quia moratur super altum mare*, will not serve, not onely because (as some thinke) that *mare non moratur*, but for the incertaintie of the place, and for that a great part of the sea is within the realme of England.  
 [r] To the fifth. In some actions, protections shall not be allowed by the common law; and in some actions they are ousted by act of parliament. Actions at the common law, as all actions that touche the crowne, as appeales of felony, and appeales of mayhem. [s] So where

not of legitimacy, but merely to which husband the issue belonged. One of the two only remaining cases considerably extends the time beyond the forty weeks, for, in *Alfop and Stacey* the first of them, the issue was found legitimate, notwithstanding the lapse of forty weeks and *ten days* and the lewd character of the wife; and even as to *Thecar's* case, which is the other of them, the issue having been born two hundred and eighty-two days, there was an excess of the forty weeks, though but a trifling one. The precedents, therefore, so far from corroborating lord Coke's limitation of the *ultimum tempus pariendo*, do, upon the whole, rather tend to shew, that it hath been the practice in our courts to consider forty weeks merely as the more usual time, and consequently not to decline exercising a discretion of allowing a longer space, where the opinion of physicians or the circumstances of the case have so required.—In the course of our enquiries into the subject of this note, we were curious to know the general sentiments of that eminent anatomist, Dr. Hunter, on three interesting questions. These were, what is the usual period for a woman's going with child, what is the earliest time for a child's being born alive, and what the latest. The answer, which he obligingly returned through a friend, we have liberty to publish; and it was expressed in the words following. 1. *The usual period is nine calendar months; but there is very commonly a difference of one two or three weeks.* 2. *A child may be born alive at any time*

technical sense, in which our lawyers use the word, and Chancery exercises a jurisdiction over trusts; for, in this latter, trusts are invariably applied to property, especially real estates, and not to the person. However we must not be understood by these remarks

where the king is sole partie, no protection is to bee allowed; in like manner in a *decies tantum*, where the king and the subject are plaintifes; but, in late acts of parliament, protections in personal actions are expressly ousted. A protection may be cast against the queene the consort of the king.

[f] In a writ of dower *unde nihil habet*, no protection is allowable; because the demandant hath nothing to live upon. Otherwise it is in a writ of right of dower. Likewise in a *quare impedit*, or assise of darreine presentment, a protection lieth not, for the eminent danger of the laps. Neither lieth a protection in an assise of *novel disseisin*; because it is *festinum remedium*, to restore the disseisee to his freehold, whereof he is wrongfully and without judgement disseised. [u] In a *quare non admittit*, a protection is not allowable; because it is grounded upon the *quare impedit*; and the like in a certificate upon an assise for the like reason; and *sic de similibus*. A protection, *quia profecturus*, is not allowable (as hath beene said) in any action commenced before the date of the protection, unlesse it bee in a voyage royall. [w] An infant is vouched, and at the *pluries venire facias*, a protection was cast for the infant; and disallowed, because his age must be adjudged by the inspection of the court.

[x] By act of parliament no protection shall be allowed in an attain; (but at the common law a protection for one of the petite jury hath put the plea without day for all); nor in an action against a gaoler for an escape; nor for victuals taken or bought upon the voyage or service; nor in pleas of trespassse, or other contract, made or perpetrated after the date of the same protection.

[y] In a writ of error brought by an infant upon a fine levied, the plaintife sued a *scire facias* against the conusee, for whom a protection was cast, and the court examined the age of the plaintife, and by inspection adjudged him within age, and recorded the same, and then allowed the protection; and this can bee no mischiese to the plaintife, whereupon it followeth, that, albeit the plaintife dyeth afterwards before the fine be reversed, yet, after his age adjudged and recorded, his heire shall in that case reverse the fine for the nonage of his ancestor. [a] And so it was resolved in the case of Kekewiche (1) in a writ of error brought by him by the opinion of the whole court of the king's bench. Otherwise it is, if the plaintife dyeth before his age inspected.

[b] Note in judiciall writs, which are in nature of actions, where the partie hath day to appeare and plead, there a protection doth lie; as in writs of *scire facias* upon recoveries, fines, judgements, &c. Albeit by the statute of W. 2. essoignes and other delayes bee ousted in writs of *scire facias*, yet a protection doth lie in the same. So it is in a *quid juris clamat*, and the like. But in writs of execution, as *habere facias seisinam*, *elegit*, execution upon a statute, *capias ad satisfaciendum*, *feri facias*, and the like, there no protection can bee cast for the defendant; because he hath no day in court, and the protection extendeth onely *ad placita & querelas*, and must be allowed by the court, which cannot bee but upon a day of appearance.

[c] In a writ of disseit brought against him, that obtained and cast a protection upon an untrue surmise in delay of the plaintife, that protection is allowable. In an action brought upon the statute of labourers a protection doth lie, & *sic de similibus*.

[d] To the sixth, no writ of protection can be allowed, unlesse it be under the great seale, [\*] and it is directed generally.

[e] To the seventh, the courts of justice, where the protection is cast, are to allow, or disallow of the same, bee they courts of record, or not of record, and not the sherife, or any other officer or minister.

[f] To the eighth, the protection may be cast, either by any stranger, or by the partie himselfe. An infant, feme covert, a monke, or any other, may cast a protection for the tenant or defendant. And this difference there is when a stranger casteth it, and when the tenant or defendant casteth it himselfe; [g] for the defendant or tenant casting it, he must shew cause wherefore he ought to take advantage of the protection; but an estranger neede not shew any cause, but that the tenant or defendant is here by protection.

[h] As to the ninth, a protection may be avoyded three manner of wayes. First, upon the casting of it before it be allowed. Secondly, by repeale thereof after it be allowed. (2) By disallowing of it many wayes, as for that it lieth not in that action, or that he hath no day to cast it, or for materiall variance betweene the protection and the record, or that it is not under the great seale, or the like. [i] Thirdly, after it be allowed, by *innotescimus*; as if any tarry in the country without going to the service for which he was retained, over a convenient time after that he had any protection, or repaire from the same service, upon information thereof to the lord chancellor, he shall repeale the protection in that case by an *innotescimus*. But a protection shall not be avoyded by an averment of the partie in that case; because the record of the protection must be avoyded by matter of as high nature.

There

time from three months; but we see none born with powers of coming to manhood, or of being reared, before seven calendar months, or near that time. At six months it cannot be. 3. I have known a woman bear a living child, in a perfectly natural way, fourteen days later than nine calendar months, and believe two women to have been delivered of a child alive, in a natural way, above ten calendar months from the hour of conception.

remarks to controvert the present legality of the jurisdiction thus exercised in Chancery over infants; our intent being simply to shew, that such jurisdiction is not, as far as yet appears, of ancient date; and that, though it is now unquestionable, yet at first it seems to have been an usurpation, for which the best excuse was, that the case was not otherwise sufficiently provided for. Our conjecture, as to the late commencement of this branch of jurisdiction in Chancery, is strengthened by some precedents, which have been obligingly communicated to us by a respectable gentleman in the Register's office. According to these, the first instance to be found of a guardian appointed by the chancellor, on petition without bill, was in 1696, in the case of Hampden.

+ a stamp.  
In a note, of Lord Ch. in Sir Samuel Wilkes's case is the following case.  
"So as to Lord Chancery's of Nov. 6. 1744."  
"Lord Ch. being above 14 years of age, his father having died, and estate with him appointed him a guardian, petitioned to have Sir John appointed his guardian, to have a maintenance allowed him, with a receiver may might be appointed."  
"Lord Ch. Chancellor. — This court had never appointed a receiver without a bill depending; Sir Joseph Jekyll was the first who ever appointed a guardian in this manner, or any way without a bill. Lord Ch. being in court nominated, Sir John, as it was referred to the court to fix the maintenance." See rec. 3. Bro. Civ. Cas. 500.

[f] 39. H. 6. 39. 43. F. 3. 6 & 32. 27. H. 6. 1. F. N. B. 28. 17. E. 3. 23. 4. Co. 35. Broom's case. Bract. lib. 5. fo. 139. 140. (2. Ro. Abr. 325. 326.) [u] 13. E. 3. tit. Protection 52. 12. E. 3. ibid. 69. 31. E. 1. ibid. 112. [w] 19. E. 2. Protect. 111. 32. E. 3. ibid. 54. [x] 23. H. 8. c. 3. 34. E. 1. Protection 38. 7. H. 4. c. 4. 1. R. 2. cap. 8. [y] 21. E. 3. 24. 31. E. 3. Protect. 97. 5. E. 4. 50. 35. H. 6. 43. 46. 8. E. 4. 8. 17. E. 3. 22. 13. E. 3. Protect. 73. (Post. 380. b. Mo. 78. 189. Cro. Jam. 230.) [a] Pasch. 12. Ja. Regis in the King's Bench. Part. 300. [b] 13. E. 3. Protect. 72. Fleta l. 2. c. 12. 40. E. 3. 18. 48. E. 3. 18. 19. 37. H. 6. 32. 21. E. 4. 19. 15. H. 7. 8. 47. E. 3. 5. 17. E. 3. 68. 14. E. 3. Protect. 64. W. 2. cap. 45. [c] 20. E. 3. Protect. 83. [d] 35. H. 6. 2. Artic. super Cart. 6. 46. E. 3. Petition 19. [\*] 2. Co. 17. Lane's case. 8. Co. 68. Trallop's case. 20. H. 6. 25. 2. E. 4. 4. 38. H. 6. 23. [e] 43. E. 3. Protect. 96. [f] 21. E. 4. 18. [g] 38. H. 6. 23. [h] 44. E. 3. 12. 47. E. 3. 6. [i] 13. R. 2. c. 16. 11. H. 4. 70. 7. H. 6. 22. 22. H. 6. 50. 30. H. 6. 3. 19. H. 6. 35. 21. E. 4. 20. 1. H. 6. 6. 42. E. 3. 9. 44. E. 3. 2. 39. E. 3. 4. 5. 20. E. 3. Protect. 80. 34. E. 3. ibid. 119.

[k] 44. E. 3. 4. 12. 47. E. 3. 6. 34. E. 3. Protect. 119. 28. H. 6. 3. 34. H. 6. 22. 30. H. 6. 3. 32. H. 6. 4.

[k] There is a clause in the protection to this effect, *presentibus minime valituris, si contingat ipsum, &c. à custodia castri prædicti recedere. Or si contingat iter illud non arripere, nisi infra illum terminum à partibus transmarinis redire.* Whereupon there be two conclusions to be observed.

First, that though the protection be allowed by the court for a yeare, yet if it be repealed by an *innotescimus*, that the re-fommons or re-attachment shall be granted upon the repeale within the yeare; for the protection that was allowed had the said clause in it. And of that opinion be our latter bookes; and the repeale by *innotescimus* should serve for little purpose, if the law should not be taken so.

Secondly, that albeit he, that had the protection either *moraturæ* or *profecturæ*, returne into England, and haply be arrested and in prison, yet, if he came over to provide munition, habiliments of warre, victuals or other necessaries, it is no breach of the said conditionall clause, nor against the act of 13. Richard 2. cap. 16. for that in judgement of law coming for such things as are of necessity for the maintenance of the warre, *moraturæ*, according to the intention of the protection and statute aforesaid. And thus much of the two first protections, *cum clausula volumus, profecturæ* and *moraturæ*.

[l] Registrum 281. b. F. N. B. 28. b. 33. H. 8. ca. 29. in the Preamble 41. E. 3. tit. Execution 38. 18. E. 3. ibid. 56. 27. E. 3. 88. b. 4. E. 4. 16. 3. Eliz. 1. 197. Rot. Pat. 27. E. 3. part. 1 m. 2. [m] 25. E. 3. cap. 19. (Cio. Cha. 389. 390. Hob. 115.)

[l] As to the third protection *cum clausula volumus*, the king by his prerogative regularly is to be preferred in payment of his duty or debt by his debtor before any subject, although the king's debt or duty be the latter; and the reason hereof is, for that *thesaurus regis est fundamentum belli, & firmamentum pacis.* (1) And thereupon the law gave the king remedy by writ of protection to protect his debtor, that he should not be sued or attached untill hee paid the king's debt. But hereof grew some inconvenience, for to delay other men of their suits, the king's debts were the more slowly paid. And for remedie thereof [m] it is enacted by the statute of 25. E. 3. that the other creditors may have their actions against the king's debtor, and proceed to judgement, but not to execution, unlesse he will take upon him to pay the king's debt, and then he shall have execution against the king's debtor for both the two debtes.

[n] 41. E. 3. 15. 17. E. 3. 73. 29. E. 3. 13. 4. E. 4. 16.

This kind of protection hath (as it appeareth) no certaine time limited in it. But in some cases the subject shall be satisfied before the king; [n] for regularly whensoever the king is intitled to any fine or duty by the suit of the party, the party shall be first satisfied, as in a *decies tantum.* And so if in an action of debt, the defendand denie his deed, and it is found against him, he shall pay a fine to the king, but the plaintife shall be first satisfied, and so in all other like cases. And so it is in bills preferred by subjects in the Star-chamber, there costs and dammages (if any be) shall be answered before the king's fine, as it is daily in experience.

[o] Regist. sæpe. F. N. B. 28. c.

The fourth protection, *cum clausula volumus* is, when a man sent into the king's service beyond sea is imprisoned there, so as neither protection *profecturæ* or *moraturæ* will serve him; and this hath no certaine time limited in it, [o] whereof you shall read at large in the Register, and F. N. B.

[p] Vide 7. Co. 8. 9. Calvin's case.

[p] Now are we at length come to protections *cum clausula volumus*, all which, saving one, are of grace, and, as hath beene said, are implied under the generall protection; for as Fitzherbert saith, every loyall subject is in the king's protection. Of these protections of grace, you shall not read much in our yeare bookes; because they stayed no actions or suites. [q] Of the divers formes of these you shall read at large in the Register, and F. N. B. which were too long and needlesse to be here recited.

[q] Register 280. &c. F. N. B. 29. A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. Register 280. Statut. de 14. E. 3. F. N. B. 30. A.

The protection *cum clausula volumus*, that is of right, is, that every spirituall person may sue a protection for him and his goods, and for the fermors of their lands and their goods, that they shall not be taken by the king's purveyor, nor their carriage or chattels taken by other ministers of the king, which writ doth recite the statute of 14. E. 3.

Of these protections I cannot say any thing of mine owne experience, for albeit queene Elizabeth maintained many warres, yet shee granted few or no protections; and her reason was, that he was no fit subject to be employed in her service, that was subject to other mens actions, lest she might be thought to delay justice (2).

Section 200.

**ENTRE LE 5. est un home** **T**HE fifth is, where a man entred and professed in religion. If

(1) See ante 36. b.—(2) Since lord Coke's time protections have fallen wholly into disuse; lord Cutts, a famous officer in the reign of William the third, being the last person indulged with one, of whom our Reports take notice. 3. Blackst. Comm. 8th. ed. 289. & 3. Lev. 332. However it is still usual in acts of parliament to guard against the use of protections in suits, to which persons acting under the authority of the legislature are parties.

Hampden. But since that time, the court of Chancery hath exercised the power of appointing guardians, without its being once called into question. Therefore in the case of lady Teynham against Mr. Lennard, which was heard on an appeal to the lords in 1724, the counsel for the respondent very properly stated it as a thing fixed, that the lord chancellor was intrusted with that part of the crown's prerogative, which concerned the guardianship of infants. 1. Brown. Cas. in Parl. 544. Under the same idea too, the last marriage-act refers to the chancellor for the appointment of a guardian to consent to marriage, where the infant is without a guardian and the mother is not living. 26. G. 2. c. 33. s. 11.

The third kind of guardian, not hitherto mentioned, is guardian by appointment of the ecclesiastical court. The right of appointing guardians for the personal estate, and, if there is no other guardian by tenure or otherwise, for the person also, is, we understand, claimed by the ecclesiastical court. Swinburne takes notice of such a guardian; but confines his observations, on the appointment and his extent of power, to the custom within the province of York. Swinb. on Testam. 11.

See a case of importance in this subject where the child was illegitimate - made publickly in May 1799. & published by Dr. Clarke in 1800. He also was for

namely, *Horne v. Liddell* and adjudged by Sir Wm. Blackstone in 1799. & published by Dr. Clarke in 1800. He also was for

*fuit un action, le tenant ou defendant, poit monstrer, que tiel est enter en religion en tiel lieu en l'order de Saint Benet, & la est moigne professe, ou en l'order des friers preachers, ou minors, & la est frere professe, & issint des auters orders de religion, &c. & demaunders judgement sil serra respondue. Et la cause est; pur ceo que quant un home entra en religion, & est professe, il est mort en ley, & son fits, ou auter cousin, maintenant luy enherit-  
era, auxy bien sicome il fuit mort en fait. Et quant il entra en religion, il poit faire son testament, & ses executors; les queux excutors averont un action de det due a luy devant lentre en religion, ou auter action que excutors poient aver, sicome il fuit mort en fait. Et sil ne fait ses excutors quant il entra en religion, donques l'ordinarie poit committer l'administration de ses biens a auters homes, sicome il fuit mort en fait.*

such a one sue an action, the tenant or defendant may shew, that such a one is entred into religion in such a place, into the order of Saint Benet, and is there a monke professed, or in the order of friers minors or preachers, and is there a brother professed, and so of other orders of religion, &c. and aske judgement if he shall be answered. And the cause is this; that when a man entreth into religion, and is professed, he is dead in the law, and his sonne, or next cousin, incontinent shall inherit him, as well as though he were dead indeed. And when he entreth into religion, he may make his testament and his executors, and they may have an action of debt due to him before his entry into religion, or any other action that executors may have, as if he were dead indeed. And if that he make no excutors when he entreth into religion, then the ordinary may commit the administration of his goods to other, as if he were dead indeed.

[a] It is to be observed, that a man doth enter into religion at his first comming, and liveth under obedience; but hee is not professed, till a yeare be past, or some time of probation. And he is said to be professed, when he hath taken the habit of religion, and vowed three things, obedience, wilfull poverty, and perpetual chastity. And therefore our authour saith here, *enter & professe.*

*En l'order, des freres preachers, ou [b] mi-*

*nors.* It appeareth in our bookes, that of friers there were foure orders, viz. minors, augustins, preachers, and carmelites; and the *franciscani, capuchini, and observantes,* are included under the title of minors; and they were called observants, because they bee not conventuall or joyned together in a brotherhood, but live separately, and bound themselves to observe more strictly the rights of their order. [c] *Cum quis semel se religioni contulerit, renunciat omnibus quæ seculi sunt, habita distinctione, utrum habitum probationis susceperit, vel habitum professionis.*

[a] Bract. lib. 5. fo. 415. 421. Britt. ca. 22. fo. 39. Fleta lib. 6. ca. 41. 5. E. 2. tit. Nonabil. 26. 3. H. 6. 24. 1. E. 3. 9. 7. H. 4. 2. Doct. & Stud. 141. 21. R. 2. Judgmeat 26. 11. R. 2. ibid. 107. (Post. 136. a.)

[b] 4. H. 4. ca. 17. 25. H. 3. ca. 12.

[c] Bracton. fo. 421. b.

*Il est mort en ley.* *Civiler mortuus, or mortuus seculo.* [d] There is a death in deede, and there is a civill death or a death in law, *mors civilis* and *mors naturalis*, as here it appeareth; and therefore to oust all scruples, Leases for life are ever made during the natural life, &c. (1) If the father enter into religion, then shall his sonne and heire have an assise of Mordanceiter, and the writ shall say, [e] *Si W. pater, &c. die quo obiit habitum religionis assumpsit, in quo habitu professus fuit ut dicitur.*

[d] Bracton, fo. 301. 426. Britton fo. 226. 250. 251. Fleta lib. 6. ca. 41. Post. 131. v.

[e] F. N. B. 196. 5. E. 4. 3.

### Auxibien

(1) See Acc. 2. Co. 48. b. Blackst. Comm. 8. ed. v. 1. p. 132. v. 2. 121. But by lord Coke's observing here, that *natural* is added to oust all scruples, it seems as if he did not conceive it to be absolutely necessary.

11. ed. 99. b. In a case, first before the King's Bench in lord Hale's time, he admitted the right of the ecclesiastical court to appoint a curator of the personal estate; and after his death the court inclined to the same opinion. 2. Lev. 162. T. Jo. 90. In another case soon after, the court of King's Bench allowed the right as to the infant's portion, but denied it over the person. 3. Keb. 384. In the next case on the subject, the question as to the right was largely debated on a plea in prohibition. This alledged, that by the common law used and approved in England, if any person by his will devises any goods to his children, the ordinary, before whom the will is proved, hath used to commit the custody of the sons and their portions till fourteen, and of the daughters and their portions till twelve, except where they are in the custody of any other by reason of any tenure or by the father's appointment; and if any person detained such infants or their portions, the ordinary hath also used to compel the delivery of them by ecclesiastical censures. 2. Lev. 217. But on a demurrer this plea was over ruled and the prohibition ordered to stand; the latter being founded on the libel in the suit in the ecclesiastical court, which had stated the right in a more extensive way; for the libel was, that by the ecclesiastical law, every person having the tuition of any infant under age, by the will of the father or *per judicem competentem*, ought to have the custody of the infant and sit in the ecclesiastical court for the detainer. After this case we find nothing on the subject for a long time. But, in a case of the late King's reign, Lee justice casually takes notice of the ecclesiastical court's appointment without objection, saying, that the court of the spiritual court is, that if the infant is under seven years, they chuse a curator, but if he is seven he chuses Fitzgib.

*Auxibien come il fuit mort en fait.* But yet to three purposes, profession, that is, the civill death, hath not the effect of a naturall death.

First, this civill death shall never derogate from his owne grant, nor be any mean to avoid it. And therefore if tenant in taile maketh a feoffment in fee, and entereth into religion, his issue shall have no formedon during his life; because that should be in derogation of his own grant, and be a meane to avoyd the same.

(F. N. B. 213 A.)

[f] 32. E. 1. Dower 176 31.  
E. 3. Collusion 29. 33. E. 3.  
Entre charge. 52. 21. E. 4. 14.  
(Ante 33. b.)

[f] Secondly, it shall never give her availe, without whose consent he could not have entered into religion, and therefore his wife after his civill death shall not be indowed, untill his naturall death. But if the wife, after her husband hath entered into religion, alien the land which is her owne right, and after her husband is deraigned, the husband may enter and avoid the alienation.

Thirdly, it shall not worke any wrong or prejudice to a stranger that hath a former right; and therefore if the disseisor entereth into religion, and is professed, so as the land descends to his heire, yet this descent shall not tolle the entrie of the disseisee.

[g] 5. E. 4. 3. a.  
[b] 18. H. 6. 33. per Fortesc.

[g] A woman cannot be professed a nunne during the life of her husband. But some do hold a diversitie, [b] that, *ante carnalem copulam*, the husband or wife may enter into religion without any consent, but *post carnalem copulam* neither of them can without consent of other.

[i] 11. E. 3. Collusion 29.  
[k] 34. E. 3. Garranty 71. Vid.  
the chapter of Warranty, sect.

[i] But if a man holdeth lands by knight's service, and is professed in religion, his heire within age, he shall be in ward. [k] If I be disseised, and my brother releaseth with warranty, and is professed in religion, and the warrantie descendeth upon me, this warrantie shall binde me; because I am his heire, and such inheritance as my brother had shall descend upon me.

[l] 21. R. 2. Judgm. 263.  
(Post. 131. b.)

[l] And if one joyntenant be professed in religion, the land shall survive to the other. If a man or a woman be professed in religion in Normandic, or in anie other foraine part, such a profession shall not disable them to bring any action in England; because it wanteth triall, but they must be professed in some house of religion within this realme, for that may be tried by the certificate of the ordinarie, so as of foraine professions the common law taketh no knowledge (1). [m] And yet in some case one that is professed in religion within the realme shall have an action; as if he be made an executor, or if he be an administrator, he shall maintaine an action, not in his owne right, but in right of the dead.

[m] 10. E. 3. 511. 14. E. 3. Ex-  
ecutors 87. 5. H. 7. 25. 21. H.  
6. 30. 3. H. 6. 24.

[n] If a monke be made a bishop, or a parson, or a vicar, he shall have an action concern- ing his bishoprick, parsonage, or vicarage, & sic de similibus.

[n] 44. E. 3. 9. Nonability 3.  
14. H. 8. 16.

[o] And if a monke be farmer of the king, yeelding a rent, he shall have an action concern- ing that farme. And albeit Littleton speaketh generally of one that is professed in religion, yet must it not be understood of the soveraigne or head of the religious house, as of the abbot, prior, and the like; [\*] for albeit they be professed in religion, yet by the policie of the law, they are persons able to purchase, and to implead, and to be impleaded, to sue, and to be sued for any thing that concernes the house of religion; for otherwise the house might be prejudiced, and other men also of their lawful actions. And this is the ancient law of England, as it appeareth in these words, [p] *des biens des gens de religion appent l'action au chief en son nosme pur luy & son convent.* But what if a monke, &c. were beaten, wounded, or imprisoned, &c. doth the law give no remedie therefore? Yes, verily; [q] for in that case the abbot and the monke shall joyne in an action against the wrong doer; and if the writ be, *ad damnum ipsius prioris*, the writ is good; and if it be *ad damnum ipsorum*, it is good also.

[o] 2. H. 4. 7. 8. H. 5. 6. 7. E.  
4. 30. 44. E. 3. 4. 20. E. 3.  
Vill. 10. & Nonability 9. 49. E.  
3. 4.  
[\*] Bract. fo. 415. 416. 429.  
Mir. c. 2. sect. 14. 14. H. 4.  
37. b. 5. H. 7. 26. Vid. sect.  
256. 14. E. 4. 36.

[p] Mir. ubi supra.

Also if a monke be by conspiracie falsely and maliciously indicted of felony and roberie, and afterwards is lawfully acquitted, his soveraigne and he shall joyne in a writ of conspiracy and the like. And where Littleton speaketh of a man that is professed in religion, the same law is of a nunne, *sanctimonialis, mutatis mutandis.*

[q] 22. Ass. 87. 21. E. 3. 41.  
42. 22. E. 3. 2. 37. H. 6. 8. 32.  
H. 6. 36. Bract. l. 5. f. 416.  
420. 13. E. 3. Bre. 261. 22. Ed.  
3. 2. 38. H. 6. 7. h. 24. E. 3.  
34. b. 45. 7. R. 2. Nonability  
3. 9.

[r] 4. H. 3. Bre 766.

[r] A wife is disabled to sue without her husband, as much as a monke is without his so- veraigne; and yet we read in books, that in some cases a wife hath had abilitie to sue and be sued without her husband: [s] for the wife of Sir Robert Belknap, one of the justices of the court of common pleas, who was exiled or banished beyond sea, did sue a writ in her owne name, without her husband, he being alive; whereof one said, *ecce modo mirum, quod femina fert breve regis non nominando virum conjunctum robore legis.*

[s] 2. H. 4. f. 7. a.  
(1. Bullr. 140. Mn. 7. 666.  
851. 1. Ro. Rep. 400.)

[t] 10. E. 3. 53.

[t] King Edward the third brought a *quare impedit* against the lady of Maltravers; and she pleaded, that she was covert of baron; whereunto it was replied for the king, that her husband the lord Maltravers was put in exile for a certaine cause, and she was ruled to answer.

[u] 1. H. 4. 1. b.

[u] King Henrie the fourth brought a writ of ward against Sibel B. who pleaded, that shee was covert baron, &c. whereunto it was replied for the king, that her husband for a crime, that he had committed against the king and the peeres, was relegate or exiled into Gascoigne, there to remaine untill he obtained the king's grace: and Gascoigne chiefe justice, *ex assensu sociorum*, awarded that she should answer.

Sir Tho. Egerton, lord chancellor, in his argument which he published apart by himselfe in Cal-

(1) See ante 3. b. n. 7. to which add the arguments in the case of *Thornby and Fleetwood* 1 Stra. 347. Com. 207. 10. Mod. 113. 356. 406.

177gib. 164. However, in a loose note of a still later case, lord Chancellor Hardwicke is made to say, that only guardians *ad litem* can be appointed by the ecclesiastical court. 14. Vin. Abr. 176. pl. 7. in a note. In another case, the report of which is more to be relied upon, the same respectable judge reprobated it, as a presumption in the ecclesiastical court to appoint a guardian of the person and estate, and declared their appointment of any, except when a suit was depending, to be an interference with his power as chancellor; and so displeased was he in the instance before him, as to conclude with recommending to the attorney-general, to consider, whether a *quo warranto* would not lie against the ecclesiastical court. 3. Atk. 631. Under a like apprehension of the subject, the present chief justice of the King's Bench, in *Miss Catley's case*, spoke of the appointment by the ecclesiastical courts as confined to guardians *in litem*, and therefore as perfectly insignificant. 4. Burr. v. 3. p. 1436. These authorities being brought before the reader, we shall leave him to his own judgment, with this further information only, that, in the warm debates in parliament about the last marriage act, this species of guardianship is said to have been incidentally discussed.

The fourth kind of guardian, not yet enumerated, is the guardian *ad litem*. But of this special guardian it may suffice for the present purpose to observe, that the power of appointing such is incident to all courts; and that the king may, as it is said, by letters patent appoint a guardian to prosecute or defend for an infant in suits generally, though such appointments have been long out of use. F. N. B. 27. L. See further as to guardian *ad litem* Post. 135. b.

In the preceding notes about guardianship, we have purposely confined ourselves to the subject exclusive of the royal family. Their case is too delicate to warrant our touching on the subject without better materials, than we are at present possessed of. Therefore

Calvin's case *de post natis* demanded what former president there was for the warrant of the lady Belknap's case in 2. H. 4. 7. (1) which occasioned me to search, and upon search I Pl. in Parliam. 19. E. 1. found, that the like judgment had bin given before at the parliament holden in Craff. Epip. an. 19. Edw. 1. where the case was, that Thomas of Weyland being abjured the realme for felony in the yeare before, Margerie de Mose his wife, and Richard sonne of the said Thomas, exhibited their petition of right into the parliament, for the manor of Sobbir, wherein her husband had but an estate for life joyntly with her, and the inheritance in Richard the son by fine. The earle of Gloucester, lord of the fee, (who, claiming the land by escheat, had taken the possession thereof) alleged, *quod non fuit juri consonum, quod aliqua femina intraret in aliquas terras vivente marito suo, eo quod præfatus Thomas abjuravit regnum, & adhuc vivit; & asserit idem comes nunquam hujusmodi casum accidisse, & inde petit post multas allegationes, quod possit prædictum manerium tenere ut eschaetam suam. Super quo per ipsum dominum regem præceptum fuit, quod tam justic' sui de utroque banco, quam cæteri de regno suo, tam milites quam servientes, in legibus & consuetudinibus Angliæ experti, mandarentur, quod essent coram rege & ejus consilio, &c. ad certiorandum ipsum regem, qualiter & quomodo in casu isto fuerit procedendum, & qualiter temporibus præteritis & antecessorum suorum, in casibus consimilibus fieri consuevit, & interim scrutantur recorda de consimilibus, ubi recitantur duo vel tres consimiles casus. Et quia, licet prius non videbatur aliquibus juri consonum, fuisse, quod uxor in vita viri secundum sanctam ecclesiam, qualitercunque deliquisset, quoad forum regium, non possit nec deberet à viro suo separari, & sic quicquid foret in possessione uxoris converteretur in potestatem viri sui, & hoc manifeste immineret contra consuetudinem regni; & etiam quia quidam dubitabant, quod de possessionibus & bonis uxoris vir possit aliquo modo sustentari: tamen coram consilio domini regis, vocatis thesaurar' & baronibus & justiciariis de utroque banco, concordatum est, quod prædicta Margeria rehabeat talem seisinam, &c. secundum purportum finis prædicti. &c.* (2) Patet etiam, *confimile exemplum tempore Henrici patris regis.* I have cited this solemne resolution the more at large; because there be many excellent things to be observed in it: so as by that which hath bene said, it plainly appeareth, that this opinion, concerning the hability of the wife of a man abjured or banished, was not first hatched by the judges in Henry the fourth's time. And here is to be observed, that an abjuration, that is, a deportation for ever into a foreine land, like to profession, (whereof our author speaketh here) is a civil death; and that is the reason that the wife may bring an action, or may be impleaded during the naturall life of her husband. And so it is, if by act of parliament the husband bee attainted of treason or felony, and saving his life, is banished for ever, as Belknap, &c. was, this is a civil death, and the wife may sue as a *feme sole*. And hereby you may understand your bookes, which treat of this matter. But if the husband, by act of parliament, have judgement to be exiled but for a time, which some call a relegation, that is no civil death (3). And in 8. E. 2. an abjuration is called a divorce betweene the husband and wife. *Sed opus est interprete;* for by law no subject can be exiled or banished his country, whereby he shall *perdere patriam*, but by authority of parliament, or in case of abjuration, and that must be upon an ordinary proceeding of law, as it was in this case of Weyland.

*See an extract in Lord Coke's account of this case of Weyland in M. J. Reading on Stat. of 29. Hen. 4. ch. 6. concerning recognizance page 21.*

Note the ancient trial of difficult matters in law.

The great authority of judicial records and precedents.

A solemne resolution of the law in this point.

Another example we have in our bookes to this effect. If the husband had aliened the land of his wife, and after had committed felony and bene abjured the realme, the wife shall have *a cui in vita* in his life time, agreeable with the said resolution in parliament: for that the abjuration was a civil death (4).

(3. Inst. 217.)  
8. E. 2. Coron. 425.  
So resolved in parliament upon the making of the statute of 35. E. 1. ca. 1. exilium Hugonis de Spencer patris & filii tempore E. 2. 31. E. 1. Cui in vita 31. (Ante 3. a.)

See in the Register, a woman was banished out of the towne of Calice for adultery, by the law or custome of that place, and there appeareth *carta pardonationis pro muliere bannita. Sed nos non habemus talem consuetudinem.*

Regist. fol. 312. b.

[a] But by the common law, the wife of the king of England is an exempt person from the king, and is capable of lands or tenements of the gift of the king, as no other *feme covert* is, and may sue and be sued without the king; for the wisdom of the common law would not have the king (whose continuall care and study is for the publike, & *circa ardua regni*) to be troubled and disquieted for such private and petty causes: so as the wife of the king of England is of ability and capacity to grant and to take, to sue and be sued as a *feme sole* by the common law.

[a] Vide in my preface to the sixt booke. This was law before the Conquest. 10. E. 3. 26. b. 30. E. 3. 5. 18. E. 3. 1. 22. E. 3. 21. 49. E. 3. 4. 49. Ass. 8. 11. H. 4. 67. 14. Ed. 3. Voucher 110. 20. E. 3. Nona. 9. 31. E. 3. Quar. imp. 146. 3. H. 7. 14. 19. H. 6. 2. 28. H. 6. 13. 7. H. 7. 7. a. 26. H. 6. Aid le roy 24. Flet. li. 2. ca. 63. in Fine. Pl. Com. 231. Stanf. Prær. 10. b. (Ante 3. a.) [b] 18. E. 3. 2. 33. E. 3. Brief 916. F. N. B. 101. a. [c] 18. E. 3. 32. 24. E. 3. 35. 75. [d] 32. E. 3. Bre. 346. 9. E. 3. The 33.

[b] And such a queene hath many prerogatives, as, she shall find no pledges, for such is her dignity, as she shall not be amerced.

The queene, nor the king's sonne, are restrained by the statute of 1. H. 4. cap. 6. concerning grants by the king.

[c] In a *quaro impedit* brought by her, some say, that plenary is no plea, no more than in the case of the king.

[d] If any bailife of the queene's bring an action concerning the hundred, he shall say, *in contemptum domini regis & reginæ.*

(1) See Ellesm. Argum. in the case of the *post nati* 56. — (2) The whole record of Weyland's case is amongst the Collection of Parliamentary Records lately published; and by this it appears, that lord Coke is not very accurate in the words of his extract. 1. Parl. Rec. 66. Amongst other deviations from the record, one is, that he mentions two or three like cases to have been recited, whereas in the record the only one taken notice of is that of Matilda the wife of Robert Cissor, in the reign of Henry the third. — (3) But though it is not a civil death, yet for the time the effect is the same to the wife; and therefore it is equally necessary, that she should have a right to sue alone. For the authorities on this subject, see 4. Vin. 152. 1. Com. Dig. 185. — (4) Vid. Mich. 9. & 10. E. 1. Rot. 46. *A wife shall have a writ of deceit against her husband, who levies a fine in her name.* — Vid. Rot. Parl. 3. & 4. E. 4. n. 42. *Special act to enable the duchess of Exeter to act as a single woman during the life of her husband, who was attainted of treason.* Hal. MSS. — See the act in Ro. Parl. v. 5. p. 548.

Therefore we can only refer to the arguments, in the case on the king's right in respect to the education and marriage of his grand-children, which was referred to the judges in the reign of George the first, See Fortesc. Rep. 401. & Post. 133. b. note 1.



The queene shall pay no tolle.

[c] F. N. B. 235. A.

[c] If the tenant of the queene alien a certaine part of his tenancie to one, and another part to another, the queene may distraine in any one part for the whole, as the king may doe; but other lords shall distraine but for the rate; and therefore where the queene so distrained, there lyeth a writ de onerando pro rata portione. [f] The writ of right shall not be directed to the queene no more than to the king, but to her bailife. Otherwise it is, when any other is lord.

[f] F. N. B. 1. F.

[g] 14. E. 3. Voucher 110. 21. E. 3. 53. 22. E. 3. 3. b. 17. E. 3. 65. 10. E. 3. 17. 5. E. 3. 4. 15. E. 3. Aide del roy 66. 10. E. 3. 18. 26. H. 6. Aide le roy 24. [h] 21. E. 3. 13. 34. E. 3. Protection 142. 11. H. 4. 67. 5.

[g] In case of aide prier of the queene, it is *domina regina inconsulta*, and the cause of the aide prier shall not be counterpleaded no more than in the king's case. And see where the aide shall be granted of the king and queene, and where of the queene onely, and she of the king.

[i] 30. E. 3. 5. [k] L'estat. de 25. E. 3. de Proditionibus.

[h] But a protection shall be allowed against the queene, but not against the king. Neither shall the queene be sued by petition, but by a *præcipe*. [i] The queene is not bound by the statute of Marlebridge for driving a distresse into another county.

[l] Rot. Parliam. 8. H. 6. nu. 7.

[k] If any doe compass the death of the queene, and declare it by any over fact, the very intent is treason, as in the case of the king.

[m] 4. E. 4. 28. 6. E. 4. 4. 45. E. 3. 10. a. 18. E. 4. 19. 22. H. 6. 5. 5. H. 7. 25. b.

[l] No man may marry the queene dowager without the king's licence. (1) But let us now returne to Littleton.

*Il poet faire son testament & ses executors, &c.* [m] If A be bound to the abbot of D. A is professed a monke in the same abby, and after is made abbot thereof, he shall have an action of debt against his owne executors.

*Donques l'ordinary poet commiter administration, &c. sicome il fuit mort en fait.* [n] Note the statute of 31. E. 3. ca. 11. that giveth actions to the administrators, speaketh of a man that dies intestate, which by the authority of Littleton extendeth as well to a civill death as to a naturall.

Section 201.

**E**Xcommenge, excommunicatus, excommunicatio.

**L**E vi. est, lou un home est excommenge per la ley de saint esglise, & il suist un action real ou personal, le tenant ou defendant poet pleder, que celuy, que suist, est excommenge, & de ceo covient monstrier lettre de l'evesque south son seale, tesmoignant l'excommengement, & demaundera judgement, sil serra resposdue, &c. Mes en cest cas, si le demandant ou plaintife ceo ne poet dedire, le breve n'abatera my, mes le judgement serra, que le tenant ou defendant alera quite sans jour,

**T**HE 6. is, where a man is excommunicated by the law of holy church, and he sueth an action reall or personall, the tenant or defendant may pleade, that he, that sueth, is excommunicated, and of this it behoves him to shew the bishop's letters under his seale, witnessing the excommunication, and aske judgment, if he shall be answered, &c. But in this case, if the demandant or plaintife cannot deny it, the writ shall not abate, but the judgment shall be, that the tenant or defendant shall go quite without

[a] Sicut quis poterit habere lepram in corpore, ita & in anima. Excommunicato interdicitur omnis actus legitimus, ita quod agere non potest, nec aliquem convenire, licet ipse aliis possit conveniri.

Excommunicatio est nihil aliud quam censura, à canone vel iudice ecclesiastico prolata & inflicta, privans legitima communione sacramentorum, & quandoque hominum. It is divided into the greater and the lesser. Minor est, per quam quis à sacramentorum participatione conscientia vel sententia arceatur. Major est, que, non solum à sacramentorum, verum etiam fidelium communione excludit, & ab omni actu legitimo separatur & dividit. But either of them both disableth the party. [b] Cum excommunicato, autem, nec orare nec loqui, nec palam, nec absconditè, nec vesci licet, exceptis quibusdam personis. But every excom-

\* F. N. B. 64. F.

[b] Bracton 426. b. acc.

(1) We have searched in vain for the parliamentary roll of 8. Hen. 6. cited in the margin, as an authority for this position. It is neither amongst the printed Statutes at Large, nor amongst the Rolls of Parliament lately published. Yet it is taken notice of as a statute in the Abridgment of Parliamentary Records. Cott. Rec. 589. In another of lord Coke's works, he cites it as of the 8. Hen. 6. See 2. Inst. 18. But we cannot find any such statute in print. It is not meant by this to doubt the existence of such a statute. We only apprise the reader of the inaccuracy in the reference to it. For the doctrine of marriages of the royal family, we refer the curious reader to the opinion of the judges in the reign of George the first, when they were consulted on the prerogative claimed by the king over his grand children; and to the debates, whilst the act of the present reign for regulating the future marriages of the royal family was under the consideration of parliament. See Fortesc. Rep. 401. 12. Geo. 3. c. 11. Ann. Reg. for 1772. and the two protests of the dissentient lords in Journ. Dom. Proc. 3, March 1772.

Roll cited  
2. Inst. 18. & 587.  
For more concerning  
Queen Dowager, see  
of Charles the 2.  
widow Queen  
Katherine  
Henry Esq. Earl  
of Clarendon in  
1600. at the begin-  
ning of vol. 2. of  
Lord Ch. W. War-  
ton's manuscript  
reports.

In 1. Blackst. Com-  
ment. 22 A. Hen.  
same statute is  
mentioned as not  
in print. But in p. 22 b. of same volume a passage is cited from  
that statute of 8. Hen. 6. & there is a reference to Rot. Parl. 589.  
I find the statute at length in the book so referred to. I had  
wrote the note from some adding authority, I was mistaken. I  
recollection of Blackstone's information in my  
attention now to supplying the defect in the refer-  
-ence of an obliging manner to some correspondent.

jour, pur ceo que quant le demandant ou plaintife ad purchase les letters de absolution, & ceux sont monstres a le court, il poit aver un resommons, ou reattachement, sur son original, solongue la nature de son briefe. Mes en les auters v cases le briefe abatera, &c. si le matter monstre ne poit estre dedit.

day, for this, that when the demandant or plaintife hath purchased his letters of absolution, and shewed them to the court, he may have a resummons or a reattachment, upon his originall, after the nature of his writ, &c. But in the other cases the writ shall abate, &c. if the matter shewed may not be gainfaid.

munication disableth not the party. [c] If Bailifes and commons, or any other corporation aggregate of many, bring an action, excommungement in the bailifes shall not disable them; for that they sue and answer by attorney. Otherwise it is of a sole corporation. But if executors or administrators be excommunicated, they may be disabled; because they, which converse with a person excommunicate, are excommunicate also. [d] If a bishop be defendant, an excommunication by the same bishop against the plaintife shall not disable him, and it shall be intended for the same cause, if another be not shewed.

[c] 30. E. 3. 15. 42. E. 3. 13. 21. H. 6. 30. 21. E. 4. 49.  
[d] See Artic. Clerica. 7. 5. E. 3. 8. 8. E. 3. 70. 9. H. 7. 21. 10. H. 7. 8. & 9. 18. E. 3. 58. 28. E. 3. 97. 16. E. 3. Excom. 5. 20. E. 3. ibid. 9. 3. H. 4. 3.

Lettre del evesque de south son seale.

None can certifie excommungement, but only the bishop, unlesse the bishop be beyond sea or in remotis; or one that hath ordinary jurisdiction, and is immediate officer to the king's courts, as the archdeacon of Richmond, or the dean and chapter in time of vacation. [f] But in ancient time every official or commissary might testify excommungement in the king's court; and, for the mischief, that ensued thereupon, it was ordained by parliament, that none should testify excommungement but the bishop only.

[e] Bracton lib. 5. fo. 426. b. 12. E. 4. 15. 20. H. 6. 17. 20. E. 3. Excommungement 20. 33. E. 3. ibid. 29. 44. E. 3. ibid. 23. 11. H. 4. 14. F. N. B. 64. 65. 239. 7. E. 4. 14. 8. H. 6. 3. Registr. 67. (8. Co. 68. 1. Ro. Abr. 883.)

[g] If a bishop certifie, that another bishop hath certified him, that the partie, which is his diocesan, is excommunicated, this certificat upon another's report is not sufficient. [b] If the bishop of Rome, or any other having foraigne authority, doth excommunicate any subject of this realm, and certifieth so much under his seale of lead, this shall not disable the party; for the common law disallowes all acts done in disability of any subject of this realm by any foraine power out of the realme, as things not authentique, whereof the judges should give allowance. [i] If the bishop certifieth the excommunication under seale, albeit he dyeth, yet the certificate shall serve. [k] Si quis innodatus fuerit per excommunicationes diversas pro diversis delictis, & profert literas absolutionis de una sententia, non erit absolutus, quousque de omnibus aliis absolvatur.

[f] 11. H. 4. 62. in Debt. [g] 33. E. 3. Excom. 29. F. N. B. 65. (Dy. 371. b. 4. Inst. 327.) [b] 16. E. 3. Excom. 4. 31. E. 3. ibid. 4. & 6. 30. Ass. 19. F. N. B. 64. 4. H. 7. 15. 12. E. 4. 15. 14. H. 4. 14. [i] 14. E. 3. Excom. 8. 8. E. 2. ibid. 26. [k] Hil. 14. E. 3. Coram rege, London, in Thesaur. (Ante 97. a. Post. 344.)

Evesque. Episcopus, a bishop is regularly the king's immediate officer to the king's court of justice in causes ecclesiasticall, and all the bishopricks in England are of the king's foundation, and the king is patron of them all; [l] and at the first they were donative, and so it appeares by our bookes, and by acts of parliament, and by history, and that was per traditionem annuli & pastoralis baculi. i. e. the crozier (1). And king Henry the first, being persuaded by the bishop of Rome to make them elective by their chapter or covent, refused it (2). [m] But king John by his charter, acknowledging the custome and right of the crowne in former times, yet granted de communi consensu baronum, that they should bee eligible, which after was confirmed by divers acts of parliament. And afterward the manner and order, as well of election of archbishops and bishops, as of the confirmation of the election and consecration, is [n] enacted and expressed in the statute of 25. H. 8. But by the statutes of 31. H. 8. and 1. E. 6. (3) they were made donative by the king's letters patents, both which statutes are repealed (4), and the statute of 25. H. 8. doth yet remaine in full force and effect (5).

[l] 17. E. 3. fo. 40. 25. E. 3. cap. de Provis. 25. H. 8. ca. 10. 3. Co. 73. le Case de Deane & Chapter de Norwich. Mat. Par. pag. 62. Vid. sect. 133. 134. [m] Rot. Patent. 15. January 17. Regis Johannis. Mat. Par. pag. 252. 35. E. 1. Lestat. de Carlisle. 25. E. 3. Lestat. de Provis. 13. R. 2. ca. 2. [n] 25. H. 8. ca. 20.

And where Littleton saith, that the bishop under his seale must testify, &c. it is to be knowne, [o] that none but the king's courts of record, as the court of common pleas, the king's bench, justices of gaole delivery, and the like, can write to the bishop to certifie bastardy, mulierty, loyalty of matrimony, and the like ecclesiasticall matter: for it is a rule in law, that none but the king can write to the bishop to certifie; and therefore no inferiour court, as London, Norwich, Yorke, or any other incorporation, can write to the bishop, but [p] in those cases the plea must be removed into the court of common pleas, and that court must write to the bishop, and then remand the record againe. And this was done in respect of the honor and reverence, which the law gave to the bishop, being an ecclesiasticall judge,

The repeal is constructive by 1. Eliz. cap. 2. 7. which ex- propriate Divines 25 Hen. 8. [o] 2. E. 3. Corone, 160. 8. E. 3. 59. 24. E. 3. 33. 24. E. 3. 28. 8. R. 2. Consuans, 83. (2. Ro. Abr. 589.) [p] 41. E. 3. 42. E. 3. fo. 18. E. 3. 61. 14. H. 4. 25. 3. 11. 4. 12. Regist. 7. a. F. N. B. 6. E. 3. and 6. E. 3. X after impud. &c. on the subject of referred by him. (ord. of Justice for Ham. Coppe. Atty. Gen. & the Lord Ch. Baron & 0. judges they attend on Parliament. The great. of repeal appear to have been very complete. See further the latter end of note 5. here.

(1) Mr. Washington, one of the writers against the dispensing power in the reign of James the second, insists, that in the Saxon times bishopricks were conferred in parliament; and that the king's investiture was subsequent to such election. For proof of this position, one of his chief authorities is the following passage in Ingulphus: A multis annis ante retroactis nulla erat electio prelatorum mere libera et canonica; sed omnes dignitates, tam episcoporum quam abbatum, regis curia pro sua complacentia conferebat. Ingulph. Hist. fol. 309. b. Observat. on Eccles. Jurist. 24. Another instance relied on is the election of Wulstan bishop of Worcester, which Matthew Paris describes in the words following: Ulfstanus, electo ad archiepiscopatum Eboracensem Aldredo, unanimi consensu, tam cleri, quam totius plebis, rege insuper, ut quem vellet sibi eligerent presulem et animarum pastorem, annuente, in episcopum ejusdem loci eligitur. Matth. Par. Hist. 20. (2) After some struggles, Henry gave up the point of investiture; but, according to Mr. Washington, elections of bishops continued as before till king John's time; and he says, there are precedents of many bishops elected in parliament in the reigns of Stephen and Henry the second. Observat. on Eccles. Jurist. 33. & 2. Spelm. Concil. 42. & 119. (3) 31. H. 8. c. 9. & 1. E. 6. c. 2. But the former statute only relates to the new bishopricks erected by Henry. See Rastall's 3. ed. of Stat. (4) But notwithstanding the repeal of the 1. E. 6. the election of bishops is, as that statute emphatically expresses it, mere shadow, colour, and pretence; for by the 25. of Hen. 8. if they do not elect the person recommended by king's letter missive, which accompanies his congé d'élire, they incur the penalties of a pramunire. See s. 7. There is no such statute

and a lord of parliament by reason of the baronie which every bishop hath. (1) And this was

[a] 8. E. 3. 59. 35. H. 6. 33.
[6] 15. E. 3. Conusans 41. Ju-
[7] Bract. lib. 3. 106.
[8] Fleta lib. 5. cap. 14. Britton
fol. 248. b.

the reason. [a] a quare impedit did lye of a church in Wales in the county next adjoyning;
for that the lordship's marchers could not write to the bishop, [b] neither shall conuance be
granted in a quare impedit, because the inferior court cannot write to the bishop. And here-
with agreeth antiquitie. [c] Nullus alius praeter regem potest episcopo demandare inquisitionem fa-
ciendam. [d] And another speaking of loyaltie of marriage, nec alius quam rex super hoc de-
mandaret episcopo, quod inde inquireret. Episcopus alterius mandatum, quam regis, non tenetur ob-
temperare. And therewith agreeth Britton also.

Le briefe n'abatera, &c. Abater is a French word, and signifieth destruer, or
prostruere, to destroy or prostrate. And abatement de briefe is a prostration or overthrowing of
the writ.

[9] Bract. lib. 5. fol. 425. 11. R.
2. Excom. 25. 13. E. 4. 8. 3.
Ass. p. 12. Vide, sect. 691.

[\*] Alera quite sauns jour, &c. That is, to goe quiet without any con-
tinuance to any certaine day; and therefore the defendant is not bound to any certaine atten-
dance, untill the party purchaseth his letters of absolution, and the reattachment or resomons
bee sued, the entry of which award is, ideo loquela praedicta remaneat sine die quo-
usque, &c.

[e] 51. H. 3. cap. 1. & 2. Mar-
lebr. ca. 12. 32. H. 8. ca. 21.

Four. Dies [e] in legall understanding is the day of appearance of the parties, or con-
tinuance of the plea. And you shall understand, that first in reall actions there are dies com-
munes, common dayes, whereof you shall reade in divers ancient statutes.

[f] Articuli super Cart. ca. 15.
28. E. 1.
[g] 8. H. 6. 20. 30. H. 6. 35.
8. Eliz. Dier. 252.
(2. Inst. 567.)

[f] Also in all summons. upon the originall there must be fiteene dayes after the sommons
before the appearance. [g] But if the originall be returned tarde, and sommons alias goeth
forth, there must be nine returnes betweene the teste and the returne. And so in other judi-
ciall processe in reall actions, saving if conusans be demanded to be holden within his mannor,
there processe shall be awarded from three weekes to three weekes.

[9] Mirror cap. 2. sect. 19.
Bract. lib. 5. fol. 334. & lib. 4.
fol. 255. Brit. fol. 279. b. Fleta.
lib. 6. cap. 6. 12. E. 4. 15.

And before the statute of articuli super cartas, in all sommons and attachments in plea of
land there shall be contained the terme of fiteene dayes. [9] And it appeareth as well
by the statute, as by the ancient authors of the law, who wrote before the statute, that this
was the ancient common law: and the reason of these long dayes given in reall actions was
the recovery being so dangerous, that the tenant might the better provide him both of an-
swer and of proofes. [\*] But by consent they may take other than common dayes.

[\*] 11. H. 6. 23. 15. E. 3. Jour.
22. 21. E. 3. 29. 15. Ass.

And it is not amisse to note what the ancient law was in proceeding against a man for his
life. And therefore heare what Britton saith, sur le presentment de cest felony (under which
he includeth also treason) voilons nous (for he wrote in the king's name) que trestous ceux,
que ent serr' endites, face le viscont hastiment prendre, & sagement leur corps en prison garder, &
que ilz sont menes devant nous, ou devant nos justices: & pur ceo que nulluy ne soit disgaruis de
leur respons, voilons que ceux, que issint soient prise, qui ilz oynt temps de purveyer leur res, ons 15
jours au meyns silz le prient, & en demeriers soient sagement gardos. [11] Vide Fortescue of this
matter. And see the Mirror, that in some cases the party convicted had forty dayes, or at
least thirty dayes to shew some matter to disturbe, (that is. to arrest) judgement, which now I
know is gone in desuetudinem, and great expedition is now made in pleas of the crowne con-
cerning the life of man. Sed de morte hominis nulla est cunctatio longa.

Britton fol. 10. b.

[r] Fortescue in libro de Landi-
bus Legum Angliae. Mirror. ca.
4. sect. Sept. choses disturbent
judgement mortels.

[s] And the use of the king's bench at this day is, that, if the offence be committed in
another county than where the bench sits, and the inditement be removed by certiorari, there
must be fiteene dayes betweene every processe and the returne thereof; but, if it be com-
mitted in the same county where the bench sit, they may proceed de die in diem; but so they
will doe rarely. But let us returne againe to the common pleas.

[t] 9. Co. 118. b. Zancher's
case.
(2. Inst. 568.)

[a] Artic. super Cart. ubi supra.
F. N. B. 177. c. 11. Ass. 30. 12.
Ass. 4. 22. Ass. 79. 3. H. 6. Ass.
2. 9. E. 4. 5. a. 27. E. 3. 1. 2.
W. 1. cap. ult.
[\*] F. N. B. 177. D. 7. Ass. 7.
14. Ass. 4. 24. E. 3. 31. 39. E.
3. 20. 9. E. 4. 18. 12. E. 4. 15.
8. H. 5. Error 87.
12. E. 4. 15.

Secondly, there is a day called dies specialis, [a] as in an assise in the king's bench or
common pleas, the attachment need not be 15 dayes before the appearance. Otherwise it is
before justices assigned. But generally, in assises, the judges may give a speciall day at their
pleasure, and are not bound to the common dayes; [\*] and these daies they may give as
well out of terme as within. So upon an imparlance the court may give any speciall or par-
ticular day; but that must be in the terme time; and likewise in a scire facias, upon a fine or
a recovery in a reall action, because it is a writ of execution; and so it is in a per qua servitia
and the like, and in all judiciall writs, in processe against an infant to judge of his age, or
where the husband prayeth in ayd of his wife, or in a pone at the suit of the defendant, there
need not be fiteene dayes. And after demurrer in law, the court may give what day they
will. [b] And it is worthy the noting, that if in an assise the parties be adjourned to Westm.
usquo 15. Paschae, there they be not demandable till the fourth day; but if it be adjourned
usquo diem Lunae, or diem Martis, there the parties are demandable on that day.

[b] 41. E. 3. Jour. 16. 8. E. 4.
4. 1. H. 6. 4. 27. Ass. 33.
[c] 3. E. 2. Avowrie. 188. 15. E.
3. Jour. 20. 22. E. 3. 20. 1. E. 3.
4. 9. Co. 49. Countee de Sa-
lop's case. 33. H. 6. 42.

Thirdly, [c] there is a day of grace, dies gratiae, or a day of courtesie. The name doth shew
of what kind it is; and regularly this day is granted by the court, at the prayer of the de-
mandant

See also 94. a.

(1) Acc. ante 70. b. & 97. a.—We have already taken notice, that, according to lord Hale, the title, by which bishops sit in
parliament, is, not having baronial possessions, but usage and custom; and that his notion had been ably controverted by bishop
Warburton:

statute now in force, in respect to deaneries, which we have observed in a former note; and yet the election to the old deaneries
is in practice controuled by the king's letter missive, as much as the election to bishopricks. See ante 96. a. note 3. It is probable,
therefore, that the letter missiva is of considerably greater antiquity as to both than the statute of Hen. the eighth. Ibid.—(5) This
was once doubted; for the 1. Ma. st. 2. c. 20. which repealed the 1. Edw. 6. was, by an oversight, as it seems, wholly abrogated
by the 1. Jam. 1. c. 25. instead of being abrogated merely so far as relates to the marriage of priests. At length, however, the
judges held, that the 1. E. 6. c. 2. was virtually repealed by the 1. & 2. Ph. & M. c. 8. and 1. Eliz. c. 1. See Tracts by Antiq. Soc.
v. 3. p. 416. 12. Co. 7.—It is observable, that lord Coke, in this his account of the patronage of bishopricks, omits distinguish-
ing those of the old foundation from those of the new. But this is material, the latter being still donative by letters patent, ac-
cording to the statute of 31. H. 8. which authorized their erection. See 31. H. 8. c. 9. in Rastall's edition of the Statutes.—As to the
Irish and Welsh bishopricks, about which lord Coke is silent, the former, by force of the Irish statute of 2. Eliz. c. 4. are made
donative by the king's letters patent; but what the latter are, we cannot at present inform the reader, Mr. Brown Willis's
Survey of the Cathedrals, which is the only book we are possessed of on the subject, not stating, how the Welsh bishops are
created.

But quare in
the new bishopricks
are not in fact
done under a single
title only of 31. Hen. 8. ch. 9
Highness to make bishops by letters patent is given, & the statute is meant
as well repealed, which is according to lord Coke's report in the 124. & the case
case in 12. Co. 7. Therefore at present I am impressed, that I should not have
considered the new English bishopricks as a non donative.

mandant or plaintife in whole delay it is, and never at the prayer of tenant or defendant. But it is worthy of observation, [d] that a day of grace is never granted, where the king is party by aide prayer of the tenant or defendant; nor where any lord of parliament or peere of the realme is tenant or defendant. [e] And sometime the day, that is *quarto die post*, is called *dies gratiæ*; for the very day of returne is the day in law, and to that day the judgement hath relation; but no default shall be recorded till the fourth day be past, unlesse it be in a writ of right, where the law alloweth no day, but onely the day of returne. This day is sometime called *dies amoris*, and sometime a *dies datus*. But it were too long to enumerate all. This shall be sufficient to give the reader a taste to understand the residue concerning this matter.

[f] There is also a day of appearance in court by the writ, and by the roll. By writ, when the sherife returns the writ. By the roll, when he hath a day by the roll, and the sherife returne not the writ, there the defendant, to save himselfe from corporall paine, as by imprisonment, or to prevent the losse of issues, or to save his freehold or inheritance, may appear by the day he hath by the roll.

[g] Note, it is said commonly, that the day of *nisi prius*, and the day in bank, is all one day. That is to be understood as to pleading, but not to other purposes.

There are *dies juridici* (which [b] Britton calleth *temps covenables*) and *dies non juridici*. *Dies juridici* (except it be in assises) are onely in the tearme. [i] And there be also in the tearme *dies non juridici*. As in all the foure termes the sabbath day is not *dies juridicus*; for that ought to be consecrated to divine service. (1) Also in Michaelmasse tearme the feasts of All Saints and of All Soules. (2) In Hillarie tearme, the Purification of the blessed Virgin Marie; and in Easter tearme the feast of the Ascension are not *dies juridici*, but set apart by the ancient judges and sages of the law for divine service. For Trinity tearme, (which sometime had seven dayes of returne, and was as long as Michaelmasse tearme is now: but for avoiding of infection in that hot time of the yeare, and that men might not be letted to gather in harvest, three returnes (since Littleton wrote) *viz. Crastino Sancti Johannis Baptiste, Octabis Sancti Johannis Baptiste, and 15 Sancti Johannis Baptiste* are by the statute of 32. H. 8. cut off and become *dies non juridici*. And in those dayes the feast of Saint John the Baptist was not *dies juridicus*. And the said statute called, *Dies Communis in Banco*, is in divers points (since Littleton wrote) altered, as by the said statute appeareth. And in ancient time respect and reverence was had by law to certaine times, as it appeareth [k] by the statute of W. 1. cap. 51. which hath a short but an excellent preamble: *viz. Et pur ceo que grand charitie ferra de faire droit a tous en tout temps, ou nestior serroit; purvieu est per assentment des prelates, que assises de novel disseisin, mortdauncester, Et darreine presentment, fuissent prises en le advent, en septuagesime, Et en quaresme, auxibien come (le home) prent lenquestes, Et ceo pria le roy, as eveques.*

[l] This statute is expounded in bookes, which I have onely added, to the end the studious reader might understand the bookes that darkly speake of this matter, and be ignorant of nothing that belongs to the understanding of any part of the law. Now *advent* is a moneth before the feast of the Nativity of our Saviour Christ, so called, *de adventu Domini in carne*. *Septuagesima* beginneth ever on the sabbath day, and is the third sabbath before Shrove Sunday, so called; because it is the 70th day before the feast of Easter. *Sexagesima* is the second sabbath before Shrove-Sunday, so named, because it is the 60th day before Easter; and so of *Quinquagesima*, and *Quadragesima*, [m] whereof you shall reade in acts of parliament, and ancient authors. (3) Now as there be *dies juridici*, so there be *horæ convenientes*, whereof the Mirror saith, [n] *abuson, que len tient pleas per demenches (id est sabbaths) ou per auters jours defendus, ou devant le soliel levy, ou noëlantre, ou en dishonest lieu.*

[o] Furthermore, there are (as ancient authors term them) *dies solaris* & *dies lunaris, secundum quod Deus divisit lumen à tenebris, ex quibus duobus diebus efficitur unus dies, qui dicitur artificialis ex die precedente Et nocte subsequente, qui constat ex 24 horis.*

But we at this day, retaining the same method, doe differ in words. For we say, *dierum alii sunt naturales, alii artificiales; dies naturalis constat ex 24 horis, Et continet diem solarem Et noctem*: and therefore in indictments of burglary, and the like, we say, *in nocte ejusdem diei. Iste dies naturalis est spatium, in quo sol progreditur ab oriente in occidentem, Et ab occidente iterum in orientem. Dies artificialis sive solaris incipit in ortu solis, Et desinit in occasu*: and of this day the law of England takes hold in many cases. Now divers nations beginne the day at divers times. The Jewes, the Chaldeans, and Babylonians, beginne the day at the rising of the sunne; the Athenians at the fall; the Umbri in Italy beginne at midday; the Egyptians and Romanes from midnight; and so doth the law of England in many cases. Of all which you shall reade plentiful matter in our bookes, and in my Reports, which by this short instruction you shall the better understand.

[p] There is also *annus minor* and *major*. The lesser yeare consisteth of 365 dayes, and fixe houres, whereby in every fourth yeare there is *dies excrefcens*, which makes that yeare to have

(1) Writ of summons in a common recovery was made returnable in a month from the day of Easter, which happened to be Sunday; and the tenant in tail, who was vouches, died the same day. The judgment was reversed; because it could not be given till the day after the vouches's death, and then it came too late. *Swan and Broome* 4th. part Burr. v. 3. p. 1596. But though Sunday is not *dies juridicus* for giving judgment, or awarding judicial process, yet it is for some other purposes, as for exhibiting an information on the 5. & 6. E. 6. against ingrossing. W. Jo. 156.—(2) In consequence of the abbreviation of Michaelmas term, by the 24. Geo. 2. c. 48. these two days do not now fall within it.—(3) See further, as to *dies non juridici*, Spelman's Treatise on the Terms amongst his Posthuma, page 87.

Warburton. Ante 70. b. n. 2. However, on further investigating the subject, we incline to concur with lord Hale. But then it is with some little addition. In the Anglo-Saxon times the bishops certainly were admitted to sit in parliament; and as this was prior to their holding their estates by a baronial tenure, it could not then be on account of their baronies; nor will it be easy to suggest any other probable reason for their presence during that period, than an usage founded on the propriety of having the heads of the church to guard it from injury, and to assist the other members of the legislature in their deliberations on religion and other ecclesiastical concerns. At the Conquest, as all agree, the possessions of the bishops were converted into baronies; and for a long time after they were summoned to parliament as barons by tenure. But it is no less certain, that, for many centuries past, they have been called to sit, without any regard to their temporal possessions or the tenure by which they are holden; which is more especially true in the instance of the new sees erected by Henry the eighth, the

He [unclear] [unclear]  
 Mr. Keach, 3 m.  
 21. H. 8. c. 13. fol.  
 50. b. m. 57. a.

[d] 14. E. 3. Jour 24. 15. E. 3. ibid. 21. 22. E. 3. 9. 27. E. 3. 88.

[e] 22. E. 4. Jour 39. 18. E. 3. ibid. 20. 38. E. 3. 20. 9. Aff. 21. 21. E. 3. 13. 41. E. 3. ibid. 16. 33. H. 6. 42. 34. H. 6. 27. 10. Eliz. Dier. 269. 39. H. 6. 29. 24. E. 3. 28. 24. E. 3. bieve 356. Braet. lib. 5. fol. 367.

[f] 21. E. 3. 43. 3. H. 6. 2. a. 22. H. 6. 20. 3. E. 4. 15. 6. E. 4. 7. E. 4. 15. 8. E. 4. 18. 3. H. 7. 8. 10. H. 7. 11. h. 27. H. 8. 14. 11. Co. 40. 17. E. 3. 2. 11. Eliz. Dier. 286

[g] 21. H. 6. 10. 20. 4. H. 6. 9. 40. E. 3. 31. (Cro. Jam. 646.)

[h] Britton. fol. 134. a.

(2. Inst. 264.)

[i] Mirror cap. 3. sect. Excep-

tion de temps & cap. 5. sect. 1.

(Plowd. 265. Cro. Cha. 602.

C10. Eliz. 227.)

32. H. 8. cap. 21.

[k] W. 1. cap. ultimo.

[l] 7. Aff. p. 7. 14. Aff. 5.

F. N. B. 177. &c. Britton fol.

134. b.

[m] W. 1. cap. 51. fait anno

3. E. 1. Britton. fol. 134. ca. 55.

[n] Mirror lib. 5. sect. 1.

[o] Braet. lib. 4. fol. 264. Brit-

ton fol. 209. (Cro. Eliz. 43. 1.

Saund. 286.)

Gen. cap. 1. ver. 4. 5.

[p] Braet. lib. 5. fol. 359. Brit-

ton fol. 209. a.

[g] 17. Eliz. Dier. 345. (2. Ro. Abr. 521.) [r] 21. H. 3. stat. de anno bif-

[1] 6. Co. 62. Catesby's case. (2. Ro. Abr. 521. Cro. Jam. 167.) *See b. Dumf. d. East in case of facon: 1. Hooper.*

[t] Bract. lib. 5. fo. 425. Britton ca. 74. 7. Co. 29. 30. (Post. 363. a.)

But in the case of outlawry the writ shall abate if he obtaine not his pardon. 44. E. 3. 27.

have in rei veritate 366 daies, and that is called annus major. [g] A quarter of a year containeth by legall computation 91 dayes, and half a yeare containeth 182 days; for the odde houres in legall computation are rejeeted; and by [r] the statute de anno bifsextili, it is provided, quod computentur dies ille excrefcens & dies proximè præcedens pro unico die, so as in computation that day excrefcens is not accounted. A month, mensis, is regularly accounted in law 28 dayes, and not according to the solar month, nor according to the kalendar [t] unlesse it be for the account of the laps in a quare impedit. There is mensis solaris, and mensis lunaris. Solaris est 12 pars anni, viz. spatium 30 dierum, horarum 10 & minutorum 30 & lunaris est spatium 28 dierum.

Resummons ou re-attachment. These are writs, that the demandant or plaintife, after he hath obtained his letters of absolution, may sue out to bring the tenant or defendant againe into court to have day, to make answer unto him. [t] And these writs doe lye in all cases, when the plea is discontinued or put without day, either in this case, or in case when the demandant or tenant hath his age, or for the non venue of the justices, or in case of a protection or effoine de service le roy, &c. Of these writs there be two sorts, viz. generall and speciall, whereof you may see presidents, and reade more at large in the case of discontinuance of proceffe in my Reports, and need not here to be inferted.

Sur son originall. This is intended of his originall writs, or of that, which is instead of an originall writ. But note, that in the other five cases the writ shall abate; and in the case of excommenagement the writ shall not abate, but the plea to be put without day untill the plaintife purchase his letters of absolution, and sue out his resummons, or re-attachment.

In ancient times more persons seemed to be disabled, then these fixe recited by Littleton, As first he that was a leper, and by the writ de leproso amovendo was propter contagionem morbi prædicti (as the writ saith) & propter corporis deformitatem (as others say) to be removed from the society of men to some solitary place; and thereupon [u] it is said, datur etiam exceptio tenenti, ex persona petentis peremptoria propter morbum petentis incurabilem & corporis deformitatem, ut si petens leprosus fuerit, & tam deformis quod aspectus ejus sustineri non possit, & ita quod à communione gentium sit separatus, talis quidem placitare non potest, nec hæreditatem petere. [x] And herewith Britton agreeeth. Treating of disabled men, as men outlawed, abjured the realme, attainted of felony, &c. he addeth, ne mesel, ouste de common gentis.

[y] And Fleta saith, competit etiam ei exceptio propter lepram manifestam, ut si petens leprosus fuerit, & tam deformis, quod à communione gentium merito debet separari; talis enim morbus potentem repellit ab agendo.

And if these ancient writers be understood of an appearance in person, I thinke their opinions are good law; for they ought not to sue nor defend in proper person, but by attorney; for they are separated à communione gentium propter contagionem morbi & deformitatem corporis.

Before the Conquest this disease was not knowne in England; for master Camden, writing of Burton Lazars, in Leicestershire, saith, [a] primis Normannorum temporibus collecto per Angliam sipe nosocomium hoc constructum ferunt, quo tempore lepra (quæ à nonnullis elephantiasis) gravissimè vi contagionis per Angliam serpsit. And it is called morbus elephantiasis; because the skinnes of lepers are like to elephants. [b] And the law of England, for the removing of the lepers from the society of men to some solitary place, is grounded upon God's law.

[c] Also there was a time, when ideots, madmen, and such as were deafe and dumb naturally, were disabled to sue; because they wanted reason and understanding, (tales enim non multum distant à brutis). But at this day they all may sue; for the suit must be in their name, but it shall be followed by others. [d] And note, that, when an ideot doth sue or defend, he shall not appeare by gardian or prochein amy, or attorney, but hee must bee ever in person; [e] but an infant, or a minor, shall sue by prochein amy, and defend by gardian. (1) But now let us heare what Littleton will say unto us.

Sect. 202.

[a] Mirror cap. 2. sect. 18. Doct. & Stud. fol. 141. 4. E. 4. 25. per Danby. 27. Ass. pl. 49.

CHAPLEINE [a] *seculer* is he, that is *infra sacros ordines*; but he is not regular, (that is) liveth not under certaine rules,

ITEM *si un villein est fait un chapleine seculer, uncore son seignior poit luy*

ALSO if a villeine be made a secular chap'laine, yet his lord may seise him (2) as seiser

(1) Acc. Fitzh. N. B. 27. H. At common law, infants could neither sue or defend, except by guardian; by whom was meant, not the guardian of the infant's person and estate, but either one admitted by the court for the particular suit on the infant's

bishops of these never having had any estates by a baronial tenure, and consequently having no claim to be called to parliament otherwise than as prelates of the church, and by reason of the usage, which had so long before prevailed in respect to their order. If all this be so, then, though the bishops once sat in parliament for their baronies, yet lord Coke's position, which imports, that they still sit by the same title; is not strictly accurate; but we should rather adopt lord Hale's idea of their sitting by usage as more applicable to the present circumstances. Perhaps, indeed, lord Coke only meant to refer to the more ancient reason of their being summoned to parliament, and thence to infer, that in presumption of law they are still deemed to be called on the same account; in which case there is little more than a difference of words between him and lord Hale. As to bishop Warburton's hypothesis on this subject, we still think that he shows great ability; but at the same time we cannot help owning, that he appears to us to have too much indulged in speculation, more adverting to what struck him as the most rational and proper grounds of admitting the bishops into the house of lords, than to the fact of the real title. He represents the bishops to sit as barons by tenure, so far as regards the judicial capacity of the lords, and as prelates of the church, so far as the lords act in a legislative character. But the fact, on which he builds the first part of this distinction, fails him; because, for the reasons already stated, the bishops no longer have baronies by tenure, nor have had any for several centuries past. Besides,

*See letter to Mr Perceval Ch. of the Exchequer on requesting various inculcations published in Sept. 1807. It said to be written by Sir John C. E. Carrington into the Justice of Ceylon.*

*See 2. Inst. 54.*

[u] Bract. lib. 5. fol. 421.

[x] Britton fol. 39. & 88.

[y] Fleta lib. 6. cap. 39. 22. E. 3. in dorf. clau. 20. Part. nu. 14. F. N. B. 234. Register.

[a] Camden in Leicestershire, verbo Burton.

[b] Levit. cap. xiii. verse 44. 45. 46. Numer. cap. v. verse 1. 2. 4. Regum c. 15.

[c] Bract. l. 5. 420. 421. Britton fol. 39. Fleta lib. 6. cap. 37.

[d] 33. H. 6. 18. F. N. B. 27. G.

[e] 27. H. 8. 11. 40. E. 3. 16. 20. E. 4. 2. F. N. B. 27. H. (2. Inst. 261.)

*seifer come son villein, & seifer les biens, &c. Mes il semble, que si le villein entre en religion, & est professe, que le seignior ne poit luy prender ne seisir, pur ceo que il est mort en ley; nient plus que si un frank home prent un niese a sa feme, le seignior ne poit prender ne seifer la feme de le baron, mes son remedy est daver un action envers le baron, pur ceo que il prist sa niese a feme san son licence & volunt, &c. Et issint poit le seignior aver action envers le souverain del meason, qui prist & admittast son villein destre professe en mesme le meason sans licence & la volunt le seignior, & recouvert ses damages a la value de le villein. Car celui, qui est professe moigne, serra un moigne, & come un moigne serra pris per terme de sa vie natural, sinon que il soit deraigne per la ley de saint esglise. Et il est tenu per son religion de garder son cloister, &c. Et sil seignior luy pouvoit prender hors de sa meason, donques*

his villeine, and seife his goods, &c. But it seemeth, that if the villeine enter into religion, and is professed, that the lord may not take nor seife him, because he is dead in law; no more than if a free man taketh a neife to his wife, the lord cannot take nor seife the wife of the husband, but his remedy is to have an action against the husband, for that he took his neife to wife without his licence and will, &c. And so may the lord have an action against the foveraigne of the house, which takes and admitteth his villeine to be professed in the same house, without the licence and leave of the lord, and he shall recover his damages to the value of the villeine. For he, which is professed a monke, shall be a monk, and as a monke shall be taken for terme of his natural life, unlesse he be deraigned by the law of holy church. And he is bound by his religion to keepe his cloyster, &c. And if the lord might take him out of his house,

nor hath vowed those three things above specified.

[b] *Enter en religion & est professe.* [b] Britton cap. 31. fol. 79. Doctor & Student. fo. 141. (Doctr. Plac. 9. Ante 132. a.)

That is intended (as hath been said) when he is regular and profest under certain rules, as to become one of the foure orders of friers (that is to say) *freres minors*, Augustines, Preachers, or Carmelites, or become a monke, cannon or nunne, &c. *Qui ad vivendum regulariter se astringunt, sive sunt monachi, sive canonici regulares, sive sanctimoniales.* For all these are regular and votaries, and are dead persons in law; but so are not the secular persons, as prebends, parsons, vicars, &c.

And therefore it is holden in our bookes, [c] that if a secular priest taketh a wife and hath issue and dyeth, the issue is lawfull and shall inherit as heire to his father, &c. for (as it was then holden) the marriage was not void, but voidable by divorce, and after the death of either partieno divorce can be had (1).

But if a man marieth a nunne, or a monke marieth, these marriages were holden void, and the issues bastards; because (as it was then holden) the marriage was utterly voyde; for that the nunne and the monke (as Littleton here saith) were dead persons in law. And that is the reason yeilded by Littleton, wherefore a villeine, being professed in religion, cannot be seised by the lord; because he is dead in law; and yet his blood or bondage is not thereby altered, but his person, in respect of his profession only privileged. [d] *In decretalibus statutum est, quod nullus episcopus spurios, aut servos, donec à dominis suis fuerint manumissi, ad sacros ordines promoveri presumat.* But notwithstanding his person is privileged till he be disgraced. And so it is holden in

[c] 21. H. 7. 39. 19. H. 7. tit. Bastardy. 33. 5. E. 2. tit. Non-abilit. 26. 47. E. 3. Casu ult. (12. Co. 9. 1. Ro. Abr. 340.)

[d] Glanvil. lib. 5. cap. 5. Britton fo. 79. & 82.

our

(1) See 2. Inst. 687.

infant's personal appearance, or appointed for suits in general by the king's letters patent. T. N. B. 27. H. & L. Sty. 369. Bro. Garden pl. 11. & 17. But this rule was found inconvenient, it sometimes happening, that an infant was secreted by those having the legal custody of him, and so prevented from applying to have a guardian *ad litem* appointed. Hence was seen the necessity of permitting any person to litigate for the infant's benefit, who should be disposed to risque the expence. On this principle the statute of Westminster the first enables any one to sue as *prochein amy* for an infant in an assise, where the infant himself

Besides, independently of this, the whole of the speculation seems to us unfounded in any sufficient authority, and consequently the mere offspring of modern refinement; our simple and unlettered ancestors, when they laid the foundations of the English parliament, not being likely to have acted under the influence of a policy so deep, as the nice distinction thus attributed to them necessarily supposes. At present we have only to add further on this curious and difficult subject, that, as we have touched it so slightly, our observations should be understood as intended to convey only a general idea. Should the reader have occasion to penetrate more deeply into the subject, he must consult the several pieces published in 1679 on the controverted question, whether the bishops can vote in the preliminary steps of a bill of attainder; particularly the tracts by bishop Stillingfleet and Mr. Hunt for the right, and those by lord Hollis against it. See 1. Burn. Hist. fol. ed. 460. 2. Stillingfleet's Eccles. Cas. 128. Hunt's Argument for the Right of the Bishops in Capital Cases 128. Hollis's Remains, 122.—See further Seld. Tit. Hon. ed. 1678. p. 697. Staundf. Pl. C. 153.

See also Whitelock & Mr. Read. 9 on 21. Men. D. ch. 13. fol. 50. v. & 51. a.

[e] Fleta lib. 2. cap. 44. Britton ubi supra.

our old bookes. [e] If a villeine be made a knight, for the honour of his degree his person is privileged, and the lord cannot seize him until he be disgraced. *Nullam vilem personam natione spurium, vel servilis conditionis, ad militice strenuitatis ordinem promoveri licebit; sed cum à dominis suis petantur ut nativi, ipsis primo degradatis, statim ad iudicium procedatur.*

*il ne viveroit come un mort person, ne si longue son religion, le quel serroit inconvenient, &c.*

then he should not live as a dead person, nor according to his religion, which should be inconvenient, &c.

[f] F. N. B. 78. b. 30. E. 1. tit. Villen. 46. 33. E. 3. ibid. 21. (Post. 137. b.)  
18. E. 2. ibid. 30. 46. E. 3. 6.  
4. E. 4. 25. 1. H. 4. 6. 13. E. 1.  
Villen. 36. 18. Ass. 10. Doct. & Stud. 141. Mirror. ca. 2. sect. 18. acc.

*Si un frank home prent un niese.* [f] Some have holden, that by this marriage the wife shall be free for ever; but the better opinion of our bookes is, that she shall be privileged during the coverture onely, unlesse the lord himself marrieth his niese, and then some hold, that she shall be free for ever (1).

[g] 16 H. 3. nuper obiit 17. 8. H. 3. Breve 789.

If a niese be regardant to a manor, and she taketh a freeman to husband by licence of the lord, and the lord maketh a feoffment in fee of the manor, the husband dieth, the feoffee shall not have the niese but the feoffor; for that during the marriage she was severed from the manor. And so is the booke 29. Ass. (which is falsly printed) to be understood.

[h] Vide Britton fol. 82. Forstefc. c. 43. 46. E. 3. 6. a.

[g] If two coparceners be of a villeine, and one of them taketh him to husband, she and her husband shall not have a *nuper obiit* against her coparcener, but after the decease of her husband she shall.

[i] 7. R. 2. tit. Barre 240. (F. N. B. 168. b. 1. Leon. 240.)

[h] *Mes son remedie est daver un action vers le baron, &c.* Albeit marriage is lawfull, yet when it worketh a prejudice to a third person, an action in this case lyeth against the husband to the value of his losse. And albeit he did not know her to be a niese, yet the action lyeth against him; for he must take notice thereof at his perill, [i] unlesse she be out of the service of the lord and vagrant; and then if one not knowing her to be a niese marrieth her, some say, that in that case no action lyeth against the husband. [k] And likewise the lord shall have an action against those that were the meanes to make the villeine a knight.

[k] Britton fol. 82. b.

31. H. 6. ca. 5. 12. H. 7. c. 7. 11. H. 4. 5. b.

*Sovereigne, præcipuus, chiefe,* as here, *sovereigne del meason* is the chiefe of the house.

31. H. 8. cap. 29.

*Si non que il soit deraigne.* This word (*deraigne*) commeth of the French word *derayer*, or *deraigner*, that is to say, to displace or to turne one out of his order; and hereof cometh *deraignment* a displacing or turning out of his order. So when a monke is deraigned, he is degraded and turned out of his order of religion, and become a lay man.

40. Ass. 27. per Finchden.

*Le quel serroit inconvenient.* *Ab inconvenienti* is a good argument in law, as Littleton often observeth. And here Littleton concludeth, that the lord cannot take a monke out of his house, for that it should be inconvenient, which Littleton here sheweth, for divers reasons, and therefore unlawfull. And the inconvenience is, that where a man of religion should live according to his profession in religion, by the taking of him out he should not.

*Si le seignior luy pouvoit prender, &c.* By this it appeareth, that, if a man detaineth a villaine in his house, the lord of the villaine may take him out of the house; for here the impediment, wherefore the lord could not take him out of the house, was, for that the villaine was a monke professed. And so in case of the wardship here next following.

## Section 203.

**BRIEF** de ravisment de garde.

This writ is given by the statute of W. 2. cap. 35. in *verbis conceptis*, the words of which writ be, that the defendant, *talem heredem, cuius maritagium ad ipsum A.*

**EN** mesme le maner est, si soit

gardeine en chivalrie de corps & de terre d'un enfant deins age, si l'enfant, quant

**IN** the same maner it is, if there be a gardian in chivalry of the body and land of an infant within age, if the infant,

il

(1) See ante 123. n. 3. Post. 137. b.

himself is esloigned by his guardian, or otherwise disturbed from suing the assise. 3. E. 1. c. 49. 2. Infl. 261. The statute of Westminster the second extended this provision, by permitting the *prochein amy* to sue in all actions; and though in this statute, as well as in the former, cloignment of the infant was mentioned, yet by construction it is not deemed necessary, but the *prochein amy* may sue, whether that circumstance occurs or not, it being considered merely as an instance of the necessity of the case, and as such only taken notice of by those who framed the statute. 13. E. 1. c. 15. 2. Infl. 390. But notwithstanding these statutes, as there is not any thing in them which prohibits the suing by guardian, we presume, that it remains as lawful as it was before. It is therefore probable, that Fitzherbert and lord Coke, when they tell us, that an infant shall sue by *prochein amy*, did not mean to exclude the election of suing either in that way or by guardian. That Fitzherbert did not mean this, appears from his afterwards mentioning without disapprobation a case of debt, in which suing by guardian was allowed. Coke too, in his report of Rawlyns's case, says, that on search many precedents of infants suing by guardian were found; nor in that case was any objection grounded on its being a suit by guardian. 4. Co. 53. b. But whether we construe the meaning of these two judges rightly or not, a case occurred, in which the point is said to have been so adjudged. *Young v. Young* W. Jo. 177. However the reader

*il vient al age de 14 ans entra en religion, & est professe, le garden n'ad auter remedy (quant a le garde de le corps) forsque breve de ravishment de garde envers le souveraigne de le meason. Et si ascun esteant de plein age, que est cousin & heire delenfant, enter en le terre, le gardein n'ad ascun remedie, quant al garde de la terre, pur ceo que l'entrie del heire lenfant est congeable en tiel case.*

when he comes to the age of 14 yeares, entreth into religion, and is profest, the gardian hath no other remedy (as to the wardship of the body) but a writ of ravishment *de gard* against the sovereign of the house. And if any being of full age, who is cousin and heire of the infant, entreth into the land, the gardian hath no remedy as to the wardship of the land, for that the entry of the heire of the infant is lawfull in such case.

*pertinet, &c. rapuit & abduxit &c. contra pacem.* Now *rapere* signifieth properly to take away by violence and force. And when the sovereign took and admitted the ward into his house to be professed, this in judgement of law is a ravishment of the ward; and as it appeareth in our bookes before the said statute, there lay a generall action of trespas in that case.

9. Co. Doctor Hussy's case fol. 72.

*Apres l'age de 14 ans, &c.* Our author mentioned this age, because it is prohibited by the statute of 4. H. 4. that no childe shall be received into any house of religion before that age without consent of his parents and gardians, &c.

4. H. 4. cap. 17.

*Le gardein n'ad ascun remedie, &c.* Here it appeareth, that, by the profession of the ward, the lord loseth the wardship of the

land, because he is *civilliter mortuus*, a dead man in law, and cannot hold any inheritance; neither can the gardian continue the wardship of the land, because by the civill death of the ward the inheritance is descended to another, who is either to be in ward, or pay reliefe. So as in this case the gardian hath *damnum*, but it is *absque injuria*, because he loseth the wardship of the land by act of law, viz. the descent thereof to another, and therefore the law giveth to him no remedy in this case, neither by any formed writ, nor by action upon his case, for Littleton's words are generall, (he hath not any remedy).

(Noy. 134. 1. Ro. Abr. 107. Post. 197. b.)

Sect. 204.

**I**TEM, *en mults divers cafes le seignior poit faire manumission & enfranchisement a son villein. Manumission est properment, quant le seignior fait un fait a son villein de luy enfranchiser per hoc verbum (manumittere) quod idem est quod extra manum vel extra potestatem alterius ponere. Et pur ceo que per tiel fait le villein*

**A**LSO, in many and divers cafes the lord may make manumission and enfranchisement to his villeine. Manumission is properly, when the lord makes a deed to his villeine to enfranchise him by this word (*manumittere*), which is the same as to put him out of the hands and power of another. And for that that by such deed

**M**ANUMISSION. *Manumittere, quod idem est quod extra manum vel potestatem ponere.*

[1] [1] Glanvil. lib. 5. cap. 5. Britton fol. 78. &c. 32. 97. 110. Fleta lib. 3. cap. 13. & lib. 2. cap. 44.

*Quia quamdiu quis in servitute est, sub manu & potestate domini sui est.*

*Qui in potestate domini sui est, in manu domini sui esse dicitur; sed postquam manumissus est, ab illo liberabitur, ergo dicitur quasi extra manum, id est, extra potestatem domini sui missus.* And here is to be noted (as in many other places is observed) what regard Littleton hath to the true etymologies of words.

[m] **E**nfranchisement. (Hereby Littleton explaineth manumission) and

[m] Mirror ca. 2. sect. 18.

is

reader should at the same time be apprized, that according to another report of the same case, the court delivered no opinion on the point, whether an infant may sue by guardian. Cro. Cha. 86. See further on this subject Palm. 295. & Vin. Abr. Guardian and Ward N. 7.—What we have hitherto advanced as to suing by *prochein amy* applies to the courts of common law only: As to our courts of equity, the usual practice in them is to sue for infants by *prochein amy* and to defend by guardian. But it is said, that they may sue in either way. Pract. Reg. in Chanc. 296.—(2) Vide tamen Pasch. 8. E. 1. rot. 7. the case of Edward Rowald contra.—Hal. MSS.



is derived from the French word *franchise*, that is, liberty; and in the common law it hath divers significations; sometimes the incorporating of a man to be free of a company or body politique, as a free man of a city, or burgesse of a burrough, &c. sometimes to make an alien a denison; and here to manumise a villeine or bondman. So as this word

*est mis hors de la main & de la poier son seignior, il est appell' manumission. Et issint chescun maner de enfranchisement fait a un villein poit estre dit manumission.*

the villeine is put out of the hands and out of the power of his lord, it is called manumission. And so every maner of enfranchisement made to a villein may be said to be a manumission.

(*enfranchisement*) is more general than *manumission*; for that is properly applyed to a villeine; and therefore every manumission is an enfranchisement, but every enfranchisement is not a manumission. [n] There be two kindes of manumissions, one expresse, and the other implied. Expresse, when the villeine by deed in expresse words is manumised and made free. The other implied, by doing some act, that maketh in judgement of law the villeine free, albeit there be no expresse words of manumission or enfranchisement. [o] If a villeine be manumised, albeit he become ingratefull to the lord in the highest degree, yet the manumission remaines good: and herein the common law differeth from the civill law, for *libertinum ingratum leges civiles in pristinam redigunt servitutem, sed leges Angliæ semel manumissum semper liberum judicant, gratum & ingratum.*

[n] Mirror cap. 2. sect. 18.

[o] Fortescue cap. 46.

[p] 39. E. 3. 6. b. F. N. B. 79. a. (Dy. 266. b. 283 b.)

[q] Glanvil. lib. 5. cap. 5. Fleta lib. 2. cap. 44. Brit. fol. 79. Mirror cap. 2. sect. 18. (2. Ro. Abr. 736. 737.) [r] 27. Ass. p. 49. [s] Glanvil. lib. 5. ca. 5. [t] Britton ubi supra. (Ante 136. b.)

Lib. Rub. cap. 78.

There be also some cases where the villeine shall be privileged from the seisure of the lord, albeit he be not absolutely manumised or enfranchised. Sometimes *ratione loci*, [p] as if a villeine remaine in the ancient demeane of the king a yeare and a day without claime or seisure of the lord, the lord cannot have a writ of *nativo habendo*, or seise him, so long as he remains and continues there; and the reason of this was, in respect of the service he did to the king in plowing and tillage of the demeanes, and other labours of husbandry for the king's benefit. And herewith agree old bookes, [q] which say, that this immunity was sometime granted by common consent to the king for his profit, and for the help or ease of his villeins. [r] If a villein be a priest of the king's chappel, the lord cannot seise him in the presence of the king, for the king's presence is a privilege and protection for him. Sometime *ratione professionis*, [s] as if a villeine be professed a monke, or a niese a nun, as hath been sayd. [t] Sometime (as some hath said) *ratione dignitatis*, as if the villeine be made a knight, &c. Sometime *ratione matrimonii*, as if a niese marry a free man, she is privileged during the marriage, but not absolutely enfranchised; for if her husband dye, she is niese againe, unlesse the lord himselfe marrieth the niese, and then she is enfranchised for ever, as hath been said before. (1) And it shall not be amisse to observe the wisdom of our ancients, with what solemnity (for more surety thereof) manumissions were made. *Qui servum suum liberat, in ecclesia, vel mercato, vel comitu, vel hundredo, coram testibus & palam faciat, & liberat ei vias, & portas conscribat apertas, & lanceam & gladium, vel quæ liberorum arma, in manibus ei ponat.* Our author having spoken of an expresse manumission, here followes enfranchisements in law.

## Sect. 205.

(5. Co. 56. a.)

FOR when the lord enableth the villeine to have an action against him as for debt or annuity, &c. or giveth to the villeine a certaine and fixed estate in lands, tenements, or hereditaments, as a lease for yeares, this amounteth to an enfranchisement, not only during the yeares, but for ever; [u] and albeit the lease be made to the villeine without deed, yet it is an enfranchisement for ever.

[u] 50. E. 3. tit. Vil. 25. 11. H. 7. 13.

*AUXI, si le seignior fait a son villeine un obligation de certaine somme d'argent, ou grante a luy per son fait un annuity, ou lessa a luy per son fait terres ou tenements pur terme des ans, le villeine est enfranchise.*

ALSO, if the lord maketh to his villeine an obligation of a certaine sum of money, or granteth to him by his deed an annuity, or lets to him by his deed lands or tenements for terme of yeares, the villeine is enfranchised.

Sect.

(1) Ante 123. a. n. 3.

## Sect. 206.

*AUXY* si le seignior fait un feoffment a son villeine, d'ascun terres ou tenements, per fait ou sans fait, en fee simple, fee taile, ou pur terme de vie ou ans (1) & a luy liver a seisin, ceo est un enfranchisement.

**A**LSO if the lord maketh a feoffment to his villeine of any lands or tenements, by deed or without deed, in fee simple, fee taile, or for terme of life or yeares, and delivereth to him seisin, this is an enfranchisement.

This is evident and agreeth with our bookes.

Vide 24. E. 3. 32. 12. H. 3. tit. Vill. 42.

## Sect. 207.

*MES* si le seignior fait a luy un lease des terres ou tenements, a tener a volunt le seignior, per fait ou sans fait, ceo n'est ascunenfranchisement; pur ceo que il n'adascun manner de certainty, ne suertie de son estate, mes le seignior luy poit ouster quant il voilet.

**B**UT if the lord maketh to him a lease of lands or tenements, to hold at will of the lord, by deed or without deed, this is no enfranchisement; for that he hath no manner of certainty or suerty of his estate, but the lord may oust him when he will.

*PER fait.* So as a deed, made to a villeine by the lord, is no enfranchisement, when the deed transferreth no certaine or fixed estate, but revocable at the lord's will. If the lord release to his villeine all his right in black acre, and the villeine is not thereof seised, this is no enfranchisement; because it is voyd and can give no cause of action. If the lord attorneth to his villeine, this is no enfranchisement. 11. H. 7.

## Sect. 208.

*AUXY* si le seignior suist envers son villein un præcipe quod reddat, s'il recover, ou soit nonsue apres appearance, ceo est un manumission, pur ceo que il pouvoit loyalment entrer en la terre sans tiel suit. En mesme le manner est, s'il suist envers son villeine un action de debt, ou d'account, ou de covenant,

**A**LSO if the lord sueth against his villeine a præcipe quod reddat, if he recover, or be nonsuite after appearance, this is a manumission, for that he might lawfully have entered into the land without suit. In the same manner it is, if he sue against his villeine an action of debt, or account, or of

*SI seignior suist envers son villeine un præcipe quod reddat, &c. ceo est un manumission.* And the principal reason hereof is, for that by his suit he enableth the villeine to be a person able to render him the land by course of law, where the lord without any such suit might have entred. (a) But if the tenant in taylor be of a manor wherunto a villeine is regardant, and enfeoffeth the villein of the manor, and dyeth, the issue shall have a *formedon* against the villeine, and after the recovery of the manor he shall seise the villein. And the

[a] 24. E. 3. Discont. 16. Vid. Britton 78. & 126.

(1) The words *ou ans* not in L. & M.—Roh. or P. They first appear in Redm.

(Ante 122. b. 2. Ro. Rep. 409.) the reason is, for that he could not seise the villeine till hee had recovered the mannor which was the principall, and at the time of the writ brought he was no villeine.

The tenant infeoffes the villeine of the lord and an estranger upon collusion: in this case, although the lord may enter upon the villeine for the moiety, yet, may he have a writ of ward against them both without enfranchisement of the villeine; for, if the lord should enter upon the villeine, then should his feignory be suspended, and then could not he have a writ of ward against the other.

The lord, upon a writ of covenant brought by the villeine, levies a fine to his villeine of land, which is ancient demesne; the lord of whom the land is holden reverseth the fine in a writ of deceit; albeit the authority and jurisdiction of the court is disproved, and that the lord of the villeine shall bee restored to the land given by the fine, yet is it an enfranchisement, for that he answered to the writ of covenant, and the fine was voydable, and not voyde, and therefore, being once an enfranchisement, it cannot be avoided by the reversing of the fine.

*Soit nonsue (id est) non est prosecutus breve suum*, for by the law the plaintife is first agent at every continuance; and therefore the record sayth, *quod potens seu quærens* (naming them) *obtulit se*, who if he bee called, and make default, then he is said to be nonsuit, *id est, non est prosecutus*, &c.

By Littleton here it appeareth, that there is a nonsuite before appearance at the returne of the writ, or after appearance at some day of continuance. [x] The difference

[x] 8. Co. 58. 62. Becher's case. 3. H. 6. 13. Brooke tit. Nonsuit 2. 8. H. 6. 7. 50. E. 3. 12.

between a *nonsuit* and a *retraxit* on the part of the demandant or plaintife is this. A *nonsuit* is ever upon a demand made, when the demandant or plaintife should appeare, and he makes a default. A *retraxit* is ever, when the demandant or plaintife is present in court

(1) *Ou il fuit endict de ceo devant* in Red. but not in L. & M.—or P.—(2) *Ne* in Roh. & Red. but not in L. & M.—or P. (3) *De illis quære* not in L. & M. or Roh.

*ou de trespasse, ou de hujusmodi, ceo est un enfranchisement; pur ceo que il pouvoit emprison le villein, & prendre ses biens sans tiel fuit. Mes si le seignior fust son villeine per appeale de felony, ou il fuit endict de ceo devant, (1) ceo ne enfranchiser a pas le villeine, comment que le matter de l'appeale soit trouve encounter le seignior, pur ceo que le seignior ne pouvoit aver le villein destre pendue sans tiel fuit. Mes si villeine ne (2) fuit endict de mesme le felony, devant l'appeale sue envers luy, & puis est acquite de cest felony, issint que il recovers dammages envers son seignior pur le faux appeal, donques le villeine est enfranchise, pur la cause de le judgement de dammages a luy d'estre done envers son seignior. Et plusors autres cases & matters y sont, per queux un villein poit estre enfranchise envers son seignior, &c. Sed de illis quære (3).*

trespasse, or of such like, this is an enfranchisement, for that he might imprison the villeine, and take his goods without such suite. But if the lord sue his villeine by appeale of felony, where he was indited of the same before, this shall not enfranchise the villeine, albeit that the matter of appeale be found against the lord, for that the lord could not have the villeine to be hanged without such suite. But if the villeine were not indited of the same felony, before the appeale sued against him, and afterward is acquitted of this felony, so as he recover damages against his lord for the false appeale, then the villeine is enfranchised, because of the judgment of damages to be given unto him against his lord. And many other cases and matters there be, by which a villeine may be enfranchised against his lord, &c. But enquire of them.

(as regularly he is ever by intendment of law untill a day be given over; unlesse it be when a verdict is to be given, for then he is demandable.) And this is in two sorts, one privative and the other positive. Privative; as upon demand made, that he make default, and depart in despite of the court, and then the entry is, [y] *et postea eodem die devenit ad barram prædictæ tenens, & præd' petens tunc solenniter exactus non venit, sed à secl'a sua prædicta in contemptum curiæ se retraxit; ideo consideratum est, &c.* Positive, as when the entry is; *et super hoc idem quærens dicit, quod ipse non vult ulterius placitum suum prædictum prosequi, sed abinde omnino se retraxit, ideo, &c.* Another form thereof is, *quod idem quærens factur se (seu cognovit se) ulterius nolle prosequi versus prædictæ defend', &c. de placito prædicto.* [z] A departer in despite of the court is on the part of the tenant, and is, when the tenant or defendant after appearance and being present in court upon demand makes departure in despite of the court, and then the entry is, *et prædictæ tenens seu defendens licet solenniter exactus non revenit, sed in contemptum curiæ recessit & defaultam fecit, ideo, &c.* It is called a *retraxit*, because that word is the effectual word used in the entry, as before it appeareth, and it is ever on the part of the demandant or plaintife. [a] Another difference betweene a *retraxit*, and a nonsuit is, that a *retraxit* is a barre of all other actions of like or inferiour nature: *qui semel actionem renunciavit, amplius repetere non potest.* But regularly a nonsuit is not so, but that he may commence an action of like nature, &c. againe. For it may be, that he hath mistaken somewhat in that action, or was not provided of his proofes, or mistaking the day, or the like: But yet for some special reasons, nonsuit in some actions is peremptory.

In a *quare impedit*, if the plaintife be nonsuited after appearance, the defendant shall make a title, and have a writ to the bishop [b] and this is peremptory to the plaintife, and is a good barre in another *quare impedit* (1); and the reason is, for that the defendant had by judgement of the court a writ to the bishop, and the incumbent, that commeth in by that writ, shall never be removed, which is a flat barre as to that presentation; and of this opinion is Littleton in our bookes. And the same law, and for the same reason it is in the case upon a discontinuance.

[c] In a writ *de nativo habendo*, nonsuit after appearance is peremptory; for thereby the villeine is enfranchised. And so it is if two be plaintifes in a *nativo habendo*, if one be nonsuit; this is the nonsuit of both. and no summons and severance doth lie in that case, albeit it be a reall action. And this is *in favorem libertatis*; for, in a *libertate probanda*, nonsuit after appearance is not peremptory, neither is the nonsuit of the one the nonsuit of both.

[d] Nonsuit in an appeale of murder, rape, robbery, &c. after appearance is peremptory, and this is; *in favorem vite*, for if the defendant be acquitted, and take out proceffe upon the statute of W. 2. against the abettors, or if he purchase his originall writ, for that cause he may be nonsuit.

[e] If the plaintife in an appeale of mayhem be nonsuit after appearance, it is peremptory; for the writ saith, *felonice maibemavit*, and therefore the nonsuit is peremptory.

[f] In an attainit, if the plaintife after appearance be nonsuit, it is peremptory, and the reason is, for the faith that the law gives to the verdict, and for the terrible and fearefull judgement that should be given against the first jury if they should be convicted, and therefore upon the nonsuit, the plaintife shall be imprisoned, and his pledges amerced. But if the proceffe in an attainit be discontinued, the plaintife may have another writ of attainit; because upon the nonsuit there is a judgement given, but not upon the discontinuance. *Note* it is truly said, that *exceptio probat regulam*; for these cases excepted stand upon their special and particular reasons, and fall not within the general reason of the rule. It is a general rule, that nonsuite before appearance is not peremptory in any case; for that a stranger may purchase a writ in the name of him that hath cause of action, as shall be said hereafter in this section.

[g] In reall or mixt actions the nonsuit of one demandant is not the nonsuit of both, but he that makes default shall be summoned and severed; but regularly in personall actions, the nonsuit of the one is the nonsuit of both, unless it be in certaine particular cases:

[b] In personall actions brought by executors there shall be summons and severance; because the best shall be taken for the benefit of the dead. And so it is in an action of trespassse as executor for goods taken out of their owne possession. Like law in account as executors by the receipt of their owne hands.

[i] In an *audita querela* concerning the personalty, the nonsuite of the one is not the nonsuit of the other; because it goeth by way of discharge and freeing of themselves, and therefore the default of the one shall not hurte the other.

[k] In a *quid juris clamat*, the nonsuit of the one is the nonsuit of both; because the tenant cannot attorne according to the grant.

[l] Some actions follow the nature of those actions, whereupon they are grounded; as the writs of error, attainit, *scire facias*, and the like. If a reall action be brought by severall *præcipes* against two or more, if the demandant be nonsuite against one, he is nonsuite against

(1) But lord Dyer held the nonsuit not peremptory, if another *quare impedit* was brought within the six months. Dall. 81. 82. Perhaps, however, he only meant to assert this in the case of a nonsuit before appearance. As to lord Coke's doctrine, other authorities for it may be added to those he cites. See 1. Brownl. 161. 2. Salk. 559.

against all; for as to the demandant it is but one writ under one *teste*. *Note*, severance is twofold, *viz.* by summons *ad sequendum simul*, and that is when one of the demandants or plaintiffs never appeared: and by award of the court of nonsuit without any summons, and that is after appearance.

[m] 6. R. 2. Nonsuit 13. 25. H. 8. Nonsuit Br. 62. 20. H. 7. 5. (2. Ro. Abr. 130. 131. Post. 227. b.) [m] The king's majesty cannot be nonsuited, because in judgement of law, he is ever present in court; but the king's attorney, *qui sequitur pro domino rege*, may enter an *ulterius non vult prosequi*, which hath the effect of a nonsuite. But in an information by an informer, *qui tam*, &c. the informer may be nonsuited.

[n] 2. H. 4. ca. 7. 3. E. 3. 21. 47. E. 3. 1. 2. 3. E. 4. f. 11. [n] At the common law upon every continuance or day given over before judgement, the plaintiff might have been nonsuited; and therefore before the statute of 2. H. 4. after verdict given, if the court gave a day to be advised, at that day the plaintiff was demandable, and therefore might have been nonsuit, which is now remedied by that statute.

[o] 2. H. 5. 5. 8. R. 2. Nonsuit 34. [o] But after demurrer in law joyned, if the court doth give a day over, at that day the demandant or plaintiff is demandable, and therefore may be nonsuit, for that is not holpen by any statute.

[p] 9. H. 7. 1. 21. E. 3. 32. 11. Co. 39. 41. Metcalfe's case. (2. Ro. Abr. 131. contra.) [p] And after an award to account, the plaintiff may be nonsuit; and so note a diversity between an interlocutory award of the court, and a final judgement (1).

By these few instructions you shall the more easily understand the bookes of termes and yeares, and other authorities of law. And here (to returne to Littleton) it is to be noted, that, albeit the lord be nonsuit, yet the enfranchisement of the villeine doth remaine; for that grew by the appearance to the writ, and cannot be taken away by the nonsuit subsequent. So it is if the writ do abate, yet the enfranchisement remaines.

[q] 7. H. 4. 8. 11. H. 4. 13. 9. E. 4. 23. 7. H. 4. 8. a. 7. H. 7. 6. b. 5. H. 7. 15. [q] *Après appearance*, for otherwise a stranger may purchase a writ in his name, and therefore Littleton materially added these words, after appearance.

*Præcipe*. There be three kinds of *præcipes*. 1. A *præcipe quod reddat*, whereof Littleton here speaketh. 2. A *præcipe quod permittat*; and 3. a *præcipe quod faciat*, whereof you may read plentifully in the Register, and Fitzherbert's *Natura Brevium*, and belongs not properly to this treatise.

*Account*. Of this sufficient hath beene said before.

Vid. sect. 748. 4. Co. 80. Noke's case F. N. B. 145.

*Covenant*. *Conventio*. Hereof there be two kinds, *viz.* a covenant personall, and a covenant reall; and a covenant in deed, and a covenant in law.

[r] W. 2. cap. 12. 22. Aff. p. 39. 33. H. 6. 2. 14. H. 7. 2. 40. Aff. 18. 40. E. 3. 42.

*Ou il fuit endite de ceo*. [r] For if the villeine be not first indited of it, then, upon the acquittal of the villeine, the villeine shall recover damages against the lord by the stat. of W. 2. *quia multi per malitiam*, &c. and consequently shall be enfranchised. But if the villeine be formerly indited of the felony, then though the villeine be acquitted upon the appeale, he shall recover no damages against the lord. For wheresoever the lord giveth to the villeine a just cause of action, he is enfranchised. [s] And therefore if the lord kill his villeine, his sonne and heire shall have an appeale, and thereby his heire shall be enfranchised, because the offence of the lord gave to the heire a just cause of action against the lord.

[s] Kelway 134.

## Sect. 209.

**QUE** *il ad este*  
*Custome, &c.*

Here some may object, that such a custome may have a lawful beginning; for Littleton in the beginning of this chapter, sect. 174. alloweth, that [a] a freeman may take lands of the lord to be holden of him, that is, to pay a fine for the mariage of his sonne or daughter, and therefore [b] some have thought that such a custome generally within the manor should be good. But the

[a] 10. E. 3. 23. Roger de Vale's case, 15. E. 3. Aid. 33.

[b] 34. H. 6. 15. a. per Litt.

**ITEM** *si seig-*  
*nior d'un manor*

*voile prescriber, que il ad este custome deins son manor de temps dont memo-ry ne curt, que chef-cun tenant deins mesme le manor, que maria sa file a ascun home sans licence de le seignior del man-*

**ALSO** if the lord of a manor will prescribe, that there hath beene a custome within his manour time out of minde of man, that every tenant within the same manor, who marieth his daughter to any man without licence of the lord of the  
*nor*

(1) But Brooke says, that the *award to account* is a *judgment*, and therefore that a man cannot be nonsuited after such award. Bro. Abr. *Nonsuit* pl. 17. 21. E. 3. 7. Rolle, to the same purpose, cites 3. H. 4. 7. 21. E. 3. 7. 21. H. 6. 26. 1. H. 7. 1. b. See 2. Ro. Abr. 131. However he adds, that the 27. E. 3. 87. and Co. Litt. are *contra*. Lord Coke's opinion is particularly warranted by Metcalfe's case in the Eleventh Report, which, as he here explains, proceeded on the distinction between an *interlocutory* and a *final* judgment.

nor, *ferra fine* (1), & *ont fait fine al seignour del mannor pur le temps esteant, cest prescription est void. Car nul doit faire tiels fines forsque tant-solument villeines. Car chescun franke home poit frankement marrier sa file, et que pleist a luy & sa file. Et pur ceo que cest prescription est encounter reason, tiel prescription est voyd.*

mannour, shall make fine, and have made fine to the lord of the mannor for the time being, this prescription is voyd. For none ought to make such fine, but onely villeines. For every free man may freely marry his daughter to whom it pleaseth him and his daughter. And for that this prescription is against reason, such prescription is voyd.

answer is, that, though it may be so in a particular case upon such a special reservation of such a fine upon a gift of land, yet to claime such a fine, by a generall custome within the mannor, is against the freedome of a freeman, that is not bound thereunto by particular tenure. But a custome may be alledged within a mannor, [b] That every tenant (albeit his person be free) that holdeth in bondage or by native tenure, the freehold being in the lord, shall pay to the lord, for the marriage of his daughter without licence, a fine: and it is called *marchet*, as it were a *chete* or fine for marriage (2). And here Littleton saith, that none ought to pay such fines, but in villenage or base tenure.

[b] 43. E. 3. 5. 14. H. 6. 15.

villeines, (that is) either villeines of blood, or freemen holding in villenage. Villeines use to pay to their lords in acknowledgement of their bondage for their several heads, and thereupon it is called *chevage*, *chevagium*, of the French word *chiefe*, as it were the service of the head. Of which Bracton saith, [c] *chevagium dicitur recognitio in signum subjectionis & domini de capite suo*. And sometimes it is written *chivage*, but more properly *chiefage*. [d] *Chevagium* signifieth also a great misprision for any subject to take summes of money, or other gifts yearly in name of *chevage*; because they take upon them to be their chiefe heads or leaders (3).

[c] Bracton lib. 1. cap. 10. Britton fol. 79. b.

[d] 27. Aff. 44.

*Pur ceo que cest prescription est encounter reason, ceo est voyd.* This contains one of the maxims of the common law, *viz.* that all customes and prescriptions that be against reason are voyd. (2. Ro. Abr. 265. Ante 113. a.)

## Sect. 210.

*MES en le county de Kent, ou terres & tenements sont tenus en gavelkind, la, ou, per le custome & use de temps dont memory ne curt, les fits males doient ovelment inheriter, ceo custome est allowable; pur ceo que il estoit ove ascun reason; pur ceo que chescun fits est auxy graund gentlehome come leigne fits est,*

**B**UT in the county of Kent, where lands and tenements are holden in gavelkinde, there, where by the custome and use out of minde of man the issues male ought equally to inherite, this custome is allowable; because it standeth with some reason, for every sonne is as great a gentleman as the eldest sonne is, and perchance will grow

**E**N [e] *le county de Kent.* For that in no county of England lands [f] at this day be of the nature of gavelkinde of common right, saving in Kent onely. But yet in divers parts of England, within divers manors and seignories, the like custome is in force.

[e] Vide L'estatute de Consuetudinibus Kancia, ann. 21. E. 1. 2. E. 3. 12. 3. E. 3. 21. 38. 23. Aff. pl. 12. 8. E. 3. 42. b.

[f] Vide Mirror cap. 1. sect. 3.

*En gavelkinde.* That is, *gave all kinde*: for this custome giveth to all the sonnes alike (4).

*Les fits males inheriter.* And this is the generall custome extending to sonnes. But yet [g] by custome, when one brother dieth without issue, all the other

[g] 23. Aff. pl. 21.

(1) The words *a le volunte le seignior* are added in L. & M.—(2) See further, as to *marchet*, the word in Spelm. Gloss. and the Appendix to Robinson on Gavelkind p. 2.—(3) The case, cited by lord Coke from the book of Assises, consists of various articles enquired of by a jury in the court of King's Bench; and the seventeenth of these relates to those, *who receive persons under their patronage, taking from them certain yearly fees, by gift, rent, or in the name of chevage, to maintain them in wrong or right*. Lambard, in treating of unlawful assemblies, describes the offence of chevage from the Book of Assises, and takes notice of it as still inquirable. Lamb. Eirenarch. ed. 1602. p. 163.—(4) This was the common etymology, when lord Coke wrote; and it was countenanced by Mr. Lambard, in the explication of words prefixed to his Anglo Saxon laws. Lamb. de Prisc. Anglor. Leg. voc. Terra ex Scripto. But the latter afterwards inclined to a more probable derivation, conjecturing that *gavel* signified *rent*, and *gavelkind* imported land of such a kind as to yield *rent*. Lamb. Perambulat. of Kent, ed. 1596. p. 519. Mr. Somner pursues the same idea, and expatiates to support it. Somn. Gavelk. 1st. edit. 3. It is rather surprising, that lord Coke did not hit upon a like derivation, as elsewhere he describes *gavel* or *gabel* to signify *rent*. Post. 142. a.—See further to this point Robins. on Gavelk. 1.

(1. Ro. Abr. 624.)

other brethren may inherit(1).

*Chescun fitz est auxy grand gentlehome come leigne fitz est.* By this it appeareth, that gentry and armes is of the nature of gavelkinde; for they descend to all the sonnes, every sonne, being a gentleman alike. Which gentry and armes do not descend to all the brethren alone, but to all their posterity. But yet *jure primogenituræ*, the eldest shall beare, as a badge of his birthright, his father's armes without any difference; for that, as Littleton saith, sectione 5. he is more worthy of blood; but all the younger brethren shall give several differences, & *additio probat minoritatem*, and [b] *hereditas inter masculos jure civile est dividenda*.

*Et per case a plus graunde honor Et valour cressera, fil avoit rien per ces ancesters, ou auterment peradventure il ne puisse tielment cresser, Et c.*

to greater honour and valour, if he hath any thing by his ancestors, or otherwise peradventure he would not encrease so much, &c.

*See into arms ant. fol. 27. a. of the extract from the 1st ed. in the notes of arms & gentry. I understand, that in the case of a woman, the right to be an arms holder with her son, if she is an heir, is which the right is not assignable.*

[b] Fortescue cap. 40.

*Ou auterment peradventure il ne puisse tielment cresser.* The reason of this is rendered by the poet.

Horace.

*Da-da - way in the science of heraldry 369. There is an extract from Juvenal Sat. 3. lines 104. & 105.*

*Haud facile emergunt, quorum virtutibus obstat Res angusta domi.*

31. H. 8. ca. 3. V. 18. H. 6. cap. 1. (1. Sid. 136.)

But now by the statute of 31. H. 8. a great part of Kent is made descendable to the eldest sonne, according to the course of the common law (2); for that, by the meanes of that statute, divers ancient and great families after a few descents came to very little or nothing:

*In plures quoties rivus deducitur amnis, Fit minor, ac unda deficiente, perit.*

Sect. 211.

Vide Sect. 165.

**P**ER custome appel burgh English.

Of this custome Littleton hath spoken before in the chapter of Burgage. And in our bookes there is a special kind of Borough English [1]; as, it shall descend to the yonger sonne, if he be not of the halfe blood, and if he be, then to the eldest sonne (3).

[1] 32. E. 3. tit. Age 81.

[2] Mich. 10. Ja. Eliot's case in Briefe de faux Judgement.

[2] Within the mannor of B. in the county of Berke, there is such a custome, that if a man have divers daughters, and no son, and dieth, the eldest daughter shall only inherit; and if he have no daughters, but sisters, the eldest sister by the custome shall inherit, and sometime the yongest. And divers other customes there be in like cases.

[1] Brit. 187. b.

And herewith agreeth Britton, who saith, (1) *de terres des ancienes demeynes soit use solongue le antient usage del lieu, dont en aucun lieu le tient len per usage, que le heritage soit departable entre tous les enfans freres & sores, & en aucun lieu que le cigne avera tout, & en aucun lieu que le puisne frere avera tout.*

*Pur cause de son juventute poit le plus meins de tous ses freres luy mesme aider, Et c.* Hereby (Et c.) are implied those causes wherefore a youth is lesse able to ayd himselfe, &c. which the poet briefly and pithily expresseth thus:

*Imberbis*

(1) This extension of the custom of gavelkind, to collaterals, prevails universally in Kent. See Robins. on Gavelk. 92.—  
(2) There are six other statutes for disgavelling particular lands in Kent, besides the 31. Hen. 8. though that is the only statute in print. They are mentioned in Mr. Robinson's book on Gavelkind, and the learned writer is very full in his explanation as well of them, as of the 31. H. 8. especially observing, that they are construed to alter only the partible quality of the customary descent to males, which agrees with lord Coke's manner of mentioning the 31. H. 8. See Robins. on Gavelk. p. 75.—  
(3) The reader will find the chief instances of special kinds of Borough-English brought together in Mr. Robinson's Book on Gavelkind. See Append. p. 6.

*Imberbis juvenis, tandem custode remoto,  
Gaudet equis, canibusque, & aprici gramine campi;  
Cereus in vitium sceti, monitoribus asper,  
Utilium tardus provisor, prodigus æris,  
Sublimis, cupidusque, & amata relinquere pernix.*

Horace.

And againe, no living creature more infirme than man :

*Nil homine infirmum tellus animalia nutrit  
Inter cuncta magis.*-----

Homer.

## Sect. 212.

*MES* si home voile prescriber, que, si ascuns a-vers fueront sur les demesnes de son mannor là dammage feants, que le seignior del mannor pur le temps esteant ad use eur de distreyner, & le distresse retainer tanque fine fuit fait a luy pur le dammage a la volunt, cest prescription est void; pur ceo que il est encounter reason, que, si tort soit fait a un home, que il de ceo serroit son judge demesne; car per tiel voy, s'il avoit dammages forsque al value d'un mail, il pu-issoit assesser & aver pur ceo C. l. que serroit encounter-reason. Et issint tiel prescription, ou ascun autre prescription use, si ceo soit encounter reason, ceo ne doit (1) estre allow devant judges; quia malus usus abolendus est (2).

**B**UT if a man will prescribe, that, if any cattle were upon the demeanes of the mannor there doing damage, that the lord of the mannor for the time being hath used to distreine them, and the distresse to retaine till fine were made to him for the damages at his will, this prescription is voyd; because it is against reason, that if wrong be done any man, that he thereof should be his own judge; for by such way, if he had dammages but to the value of an-halfpeny, he might assesse and have therefore C. li. which should be against reason. And so such prescription, or any other prescription used, if it be against reason, this ought not, nor will not bee allowed before judges; quia malus usus abolendus est.

*EST* encounter reason, que si tort soit fait a un home, que il de ceo serroit son judge demesne. For it is a max-ime in law, *aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa.* \* And therefore a fine, levied before the baylifes of Salop, was reversed; because one of the bailifes was partie to the fine, *quia non potest esse judex & pars* (3).

*Malus usus abolendus est:* and every use is evill, that is (as our author faith) against reason, *quia in consuetudinibus non diuturnitas temporis, sed soliditas rationis est consideranda* (4).

And by this rule cited by our author, at the parliament holden at Kilkenny in Ireland, Lionel Duke of Clarence being then lieutenant of that realme, the Irish customs called there the Brehon law, (for that the Irish call their judges Brehons) was wholly abolished; for that (as the parliament sayd) it was no law, but a lewd custome, & *malus usus abolendus est* (5).

But our student must know, that king John in the twelfth yeare of his reign went into Ireland, and there, by the advice of grave and learned men in the laws whom he carrieth with him, by parliament *de communi omni de Hibernia consensu*, ordained and established, that Ireland should be governed by

10. E. 3. 23. 4. E. 3. 54. 7. E. 3. 24. 38. E. 3. 18. 2. H. 3. 4. 3. H. 4. 8. H. 6. 19. 5. H. 7. 9. b. \* Hil. 4. H. 4. coram rege Salop. (2. Ro. Abr. 92. 93. 1. Ro. Abr. 492. 496.)

(5. Co. 84)

An. 40. E. 3. at Kilkenny.

The Brehon law.

Vide sect. 265.

(Vaugh. 293.)

(1) Instead of *doit* it is *voet* in L. & M. Rob. & P.

(2) Sect. 174. is placed here in L. & M. as we have formerly noticed. See 17. b. note 2.

(3) See 14. Vin. Abr. 513. 4. Com. Dig. 6.

(4) See Dav. Rep. 32. & 7. Vin. Abr. 180. 185.

(5) Acc. 4. Inst. 358. So much of the Irish statutes of 40. E. 3. as relates to abolishing the Brehon law, is in Dav. on Ireland, fol. ed. 28. The other heads of these statutes are also given in the same book p. 44. What were the most exceptionable parts of the Brehon law, or Irish customs, are explained *ibid.* 36. in Spens. Irel. 111. ed. 4. and Ware's Antiq. of Ireland. Har-115's ed. 69.



Rot. Pat. 11. H. 3. 7. Co. 22. b.  
Calvin's case.

Rot. Patent 18. H. 3. M. 17.  
N. 21.

Rot. Patent 30. H. 3.

\* Tri. 13. E. 1. coram rege in  
Theaur. in longo placito.  
[m] 2. R. 3. 12. In Camera Stel-  
lata 1. H. 7. 3. (4. Inst. 350.)

the lawes of England (1), which of many of the Irishmen, according to their owne desire, was joyfully accepted and obeyed, and of many the same was soone after absolutely refused, preferring their Brehon law before the just and honourable lawes of England. *Rex, Sc. baronibus, militibus, & omnibus libere tenentibus salutem. Satis, ut credimus, vestra audivit discretio, quod quando bonæ memoriæ Johannes quondam rex Angliæ, pater noster venit in Hyberniam, ipse duxit secum viros discretos & legis peritos, quorum communi consilio, & ad instantiam Hybernensium, statuit & præcepit leges Anglicanas in Hybernia, ita quod leges easdem in scripturas redactas reliquit sub sigillo suo ad Scaccarium Dublin.*

*Rex comitibus, baronibus, militibus, & liberis hominibus & omnibus aliis de terra Hiberniæ salutem. Quia manifestè esse dinoscitur contra coronam & dignitatem nostram & consuetudines & leges regni nostri Angliæ, quas bonæ memoriæ dominus Johannes rex pater noster, de communi omnium de Hybernia consensu, teneri statuit in terra illa, quod placita teneantur in curia Christianitatis de advocationibus ecclesiarum & capellarum, vel de laico feodo, vel de catallis, quæ non sunt de testamento, vel matrimonio: vobis mandamus, prohibentes quatenus hujusmodi placita in curia Christianitatis nullatenus sequi præsumatis in manifestum dignitatis & coronæ nostræ præjudicium, scituri pro certo, quod si feceritis, dedimus in mandatis justiciario nostro Hyberniciæ, statuta curiæ nostræ in Anglia contra transgressiones hujus mandati nostri cum justitia procedat, & quod nostrum est exequatur. In cujus, Sc. teste rege apud Winchcomb, 28 die Octobris, anno regni nostri 18. Et mandatum est justicio Hyberniciæ, per literas causas, quod prædictas literas patentes publicè legi & teneri faciat.*

*Rex, Sc. pro communi utilitate terræ Hyberniciæ, & pro unitate terrarum, provisum est, quod omnes leges & consuetudines, quæ in regno Angliæ tenentur, in Hybernia teneantur, & eadem terra eisdem legibus subjaceat, ac per easdem regatur, sicut Johannes rex, cum illic esset, statuit & firmiter mandavit. Ideo volumus, quod omnia brevvia de communi jure, quæ currunt in Anglia, similiter currant in Hybernia sub novo sigillo regis. In cujus, Sc. teste me ipso apud Woodstocke. Wherein it is to be observed, that union of lawes is the best meanes for the unity of countries. \* Una & eadem lex esse debet tam in regno Angliæ quam Hyberniciæ. [m] Terra Hyberniciæ inter se habet parliamentum & omnimodas curias prout in Anglia, & per idem parliamentum facit leges & mutat leges, & illi de eadem terra non obligantur per statuta in Anglia, quia hii non habent milites parliamenti (2).*

By an act of parliament (called Poyning's law) holden in Ireland in the tenth yeare of Henry the seventh, it is enacted, that all statutes, made in this realme of England before that time, should be of force and be put in use within the realme of Ireland (3); which (though it be by way of digression) is not unnecessary for our student to know. But now let us heare our author (4).

## CHAP. 12.

## Of Rents.

## Sect. 213.

**S**OME have divided rents into foure kindes, viz. rent service, rent charge, rent distreynable of common right, (whereof somewhat shall be said in this chapter) and rent secke.

*Rent.* In Latine *redditus*, (a) by some dicitur à *redendo*, quia *retro*, & *quotannis* *redit*. \* And others say it is derived of *reddere*, for that the rent is reserved out of the profits of the land, and is not due till the tenant or lessee take the profits; for *reddendo inde* or *solvendo*, or *reservando inde*, or the like, [b] is as much to

**T**ROYS maners de rents y sont, cest assavoir, rent service, rent charge, & rent secke. Rent service est, l'ou le tenant tient sa terre de son seignior per fealty & certaine rent, ou per homage fealty & certain services & certaine rent. Et si rent service

**T**HREE manner of rents there be, that is to say, rent service, rent charge, and rent secke. Rent service is, where the tenant holdeth his land of his lord by fealty and certaine rent, or by homage fealty and certaine rent, or by other services and certaine rent. And if rent service at any day, that soit

[a] Fleta lib. 3. ca. 14. Britton ca. 41. Mirror ca. 2. sect. 16. Pl. Com. 132. b.  
\* 10. Co. 127. Clun's case.

[b] Pl. Com. 138. 139. &c. in Browning's & Belling's case. 35. H. 6. 34.

The continuation of the note on the origin of feuds, left unfinished in fol. 71. a. and intended to have been inserted here, is further postponed to the end of the work. See post. fol. 395. a.

(1) Some think, that the laws of England were introduced into Ireland before this charter of John by his father Henry the second. This opinion is strongly enforced by the testimony of an historian of the reign of Henry the third; for Matth. Paris writes, that *rex Henricus, antequam ex Hibernia rediret, apud Lismore concilium congregavit, ubi leges Angliæ sunt ab omnibus grante receptæ, & juratoriâ cautione præstitâ, confirmatæ.* Molyn. Case of Irel. Lond. ed. of 20. p. 24. & Matth. Par. ad ann. 1172. vit. H. 2. ibid. cit. The other authorities to establish the same fact are well collected by Mr. Harris in his edition of Ware's Antiquities of Ireland. See p. 78. See further 1. Lel. Hist. Irel. 76. & Vaugh. 293.

For the remainder of the notes to this file of fol. 141. see post. fol. 143. a.

*soin a ascun jour, que doit estre pay, adere, le seignior poit distraîner pur ceo de common droit.* it ought to be payed, be behinde, the lord may distraîne for that of common right.

say as the tenant or lessee shall shall pay so much out of the profits of the lands; for *reddere nihil aliud est, quam acceptum, aut aliquam partem ejusdem, restituere. Scilicet reddere est quasi retro dare,* and hereof cometh *redditus* for a rent.

Here note for the better understanding of ancient records, statutes, charters, &c. *gabel*, or *gavell*, *gabulum*, *gabellum*, *gabellatum*, *gabellatum*, and *gavilletum*, doe signifie a rent (1), custom, duty, or service, yeelded or done to the king or any other lord; as *Wallingford continet 276 bagas i. c. domos reddentes 9 libras de gablo i. de redditu.* And Oxford, *hæc urbs reddebat pro theolonia et gablo regi 20. P. & sextarios mellis, comiti Alpbato 10 libras.* And this is the legall signification thereof (2).

**Rent service.** It is called a rent service, because it hath some corporall service incident unto it, which at the least is fealty, as here it appeareth.

**Sa terre.** [c] A rent service cannot be reserved out of any inheritance but such as is manurable, whereinto the lord may enter and take a distresse, as in lands and tenements, reversions, remainders, and as some have said, out of the herbage of lands, and regularly not out of any inheritances incorporeall, or that lye in grant. [d] By act of law one rent or service may issue out of another, as if A, before the statute of *quia emptores terrarum* had given lands to B, to hold to him by fealty and ten shillings rent, and B had made a feoffment in fee to C, &c. whereby there was a mesnalty created, in this case C should hold of B, either by the same services the law created, or such as he specially reserved, and B did by operation of law hold those services of A by fealty and ten shillings rent, that is to say, rent and service out of rent and service; and if the rent be behinde, the lord paramount may distraîne upon the land for his rent, for both mesnalty and seigniorie doe issue out of the land, the mesnalty immediately, and the seigniorie mediately, which is worthy of due consideration and observation.

**Certaine rent.** [e] For the rent must be certaine, or which may bee reduced to a certainty, for *id certum est, quod certum reddi potest.* [f] *Continetur carta reddendo inde annuatim ad tales terminos, vel faciendo inde talia servitia, vel tales consuetudines, quæ omnia debent esse certa & in carta expressa &c.* But of this I have spoken sect. 136. And the rent may as well be in delivery of hens, capons, roses, spurres, bowes, shafts, horses, hawkes, pepper, comine, wheat, or other profit that lyeth in render, office, attendance, and such like, as in payment of money. [g] But a man upon his feoffment or conveyance cannot reserve to him parcell of the annuall profits themselves, as to reserve the vesture or herbage of the land or the like (3); for that should be repugnant to the grant, *non debet enim esse reservatio de proficuis ipsis, quia ea conceduntur, sed de redditu novo extra proficua.*

**Poet distreiner pur ceo.** For where there is fealty, &c. incident to the rent, there is a distresse incident also thereunto. [h] But it is to be understood, that for a rent or service, the lord cannot distreine in the night, but in the day time; and so it is of a rent charge. But for dammage feafaunt one may distreine in the night, otherwise it may bee the beasts will be gone before he can take them.

**De common droit.** Of common right, [i] that is, by the common law so called; because the common law is the best and most common birth-right, that the subject hath for the safeguard and defence, not onely of goods, lands and revenues, but of his wife and children, his body, fame, and life also. So as the meaning of Littleton in this particular case is, that the lord may distreine for this rent of common right, that is, by the common law, without any particular reservation or provision of the party. And it is to be observed, that the common law of England sometime is called right, sometime common right, and sometime *communis justitia.* In the grand charter the common law is called right. *Rectum nulli vendemus; nulli negabimus aut differemus justitiam vel rectum.* In the statute of W. 1. c. 1. it is called *common droit.* *En primes voet le roy, & commande, que le peace de s. esglise & de la terre soit bien garde & maintaine en tous points, & que common droit soit fait a tous, auxibien aux riches, sauns regard de nulluy;* which agreeth with the ancient law in the time of king Edgar. *Porro autem has populo, quas servet, proponimus leges. Primum publici juris beneficio quisquam fruitor, idque ex æquo & bono, sive is dives sive inops fuerit jus redditor.* And Fleta saith, *Item quod pax ecclesiæ et terræ inviolabiliter observetur, & quod communis justitia singulis pariter exhibeatur.* And all the commissions and charters for execution of justice are, *facturi quod ad justitiam pertinet secundum legem & consuetudinem Angliæ.* So as in truth justice is the daughter of the law, for the law bringeth her forth. And in this sense being

(1) See Acc. ante 140. a. note 4.

(2) But though in old deeds *gavelet* may often signify *rent*, and this use of the word may best agree with its origin, yet it is not the only legal signification. On the contrary, the word is now most usually applied to a remedy or process, peculiar in denomination to Kent and London, by which the lord of the fee, when his tenant is in arrear for rent or service, may force him to pay the arrears and damages, by seizing the land and holding it till payment. In Kent this remedy is founded on immemorial usage; Mr. Robinson learnedly deducing it as well from the general law of fiefs, as from the practice of our Anglo-Saxon ancestors; and the passages cited by another eminent writer, in treating of forfeiture by *cesser*, tending to the same point. Robins. on Gavelk. 243. Wright's Ten. 197. The *gavelet*, thus prevailing by the custom of Kent, may be used whether there is a sufficient distress on the land or not, but is restricted to gavelkind tenure. Robins. on Gavelk. 243. To London a writ of the same denomination was given for rent-service generally by the 10. of Edward the second, which is therefore called the statute of *gavelet*. But by the words of the statute this latter *gavelet* only lies, where the lord cannot obtain payment by distress. From this account of the *gavelet* in Kent and London, it appears that Sir Henry Spelman was well justified, when, after giving the etymon of *gavelet*, and describing it sometimes to signify the tenure of *gavelkind*, he adds, *gaveletum juris etiam processus est huic dicitur tenuræ, casu quo tenens redditus & servitia ultra modum subducit; quod & Londoniensibus creditur statuto an. 10. Edwardi 2. de gaveleto.* Spelm. Gloss. voc. *Gaveletum.* We take notice of this passage from Spelman, because the learned and ingenious observer on our ancient statutes, seems to have misunderstood the *gavelet* thus described, for though the word originally imported *rent*, yet our explanation shews, that it also means a *process for the recovery of rent*, technically called *gavelet* both in Kent and London. See Barr. on Ant. Stat. 2d. ed. 149.—Besides the two remedies thus called *gavelet*, there is another very similar one for rents-service in all parts of the kingdom; and this is the writ of *cessavit*, which is regulated by, if it did not wholly originate from the statutes of Gloucester and Westminster the second. 6. E. 1. c. 4. 13. E. 1. st. 1. c. 21. 41. But lord Coke, in his comment on the statute of Gloucester, mentions his having read the record of the proceedings on a *cessavit*